| . | “Quasi” R2 . | |$\ln\left(\mbox{IQR}_{b,q}\right)$| . | |$\ln\left(\sigma_{\mbox{loan}_{b,q}}\right)$| . | VW ROL . | VW defaults . | |$\ln\left(\mbox{new ind.}\right.$| . | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | . | . | . | . | . | |$\left.\mbox{debt}_{b,q}\right)$| . | ||||||
| . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | ||||||
| A. Upgrades | ||||||||||||
| Branch level | −0.047*** | −0.133*** | −0.119*** | −0.011*** | 0.015*** | −0.113*** | ||||||
| (0.009) | (0.031) | (0.025) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.036) | |||||||
| Adj-|$R^{2}$| | 0.110 | 0.269 | 0.291 | 0.136 | 0.182 | 0.395 | ||||||
| B. Downgrades | ||||||||||||
| Branch level | 0.018 | −0.078 | −0.003 | −0.005 | 0.008 | −0.039 | ||||||
| (0.018) | (0.055) | (0.047) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.054) | |||||||
| Adj-|$R^{2}$| | 0.109 | 0.264 | 0.291 | 0.137 | 0.186 | 0.406 | ||||||
| Branch FEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | ||||||
| Quarter FEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | ||||||
| . | “Quasi” R2 . | |$\ln\left(\mbox{IQR}_{b,q}\right)$| . | |$\ln\left(\sigma_{\mbox{loan}_{b,q}}\right)$| . | VW ROL . | VW defaults . | |$\ln\left(\mbox{new ind.}\right.$| . | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | . | . | . | . | . | |$\left.\mbox{debt}_{b,q}\right)$| . | ||||||
| . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | ||||||
| A. Upgrades | ||||||||||||
| Branch level | −0.047*** | −0.133*** | −0.119*** | −0.011*** | 0.015*** | −0.113*** | ||||||
| (0.009) | (0.031) | (0.025) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.036) | |||||||
| Adj-|$R^{2}$| | 0.110 | 0.269 | 0.291 | 0.136 | 0.182 | 0.395 | ||||||
| B. Downgrades | ||||||||||||
| Branch level | 0.018 | −0.078 | −0.003 | −0.005 | 0.008 | −0.039 | ||||||
| (0.018) | (0.055) | (0.047) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.054) | |||||||
| Adj-|$R^{2}$| | 0.109 | 0.264 | 0.291 | 0.137 | 0.186 | 0.406 | ||||||
| Branch FEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | ||||||
| Quarter FEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | ||||||
The table reports the results using a sample of all branch upgrades (panel A) and downgrades (panel B). The control group are all branches that did not change their organizational design. We report the estimated effect on the three measures of contract standardization (Columns 1 to 3), value-weighted return on loans (Column 4) and default (Column 5), and total new lending to small individual borrowers (Column 6). The unit of analysis is a branch-quarter. The variable Branch Level is a number between 1 and 3, where the lowest value (level 1) and the highest value (level 3) characterize the least hierarchical branches and the most hierarchical branches, respectively. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the branch level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
| . | “Quasi” R2 . | |$\ln\left(\mbox{IQR}_{b,q}\right)$| . | |$\ln\left(\sigma_{\mbox{loan}_{b,q}}\right)$| . | VW ROL . | VW defaults . | |$\ln\left(\mbox{new ind.}\right.$| . | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | . | . | . | . | . | |$\left.\mbox{debt}_{b,q}\right)$| . | ||||||
| . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | ||||||
| A. Upgrades | ||||||||||||
| Branch level | −0.047*** | −0.133*** | −0.119*** | −0.011*** | 0.015*** | −0.113*** | ||||||
| (0.009) | (0.031) | (0.025) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.036) | |||||||
| Adj-|$R^{2}$| | 0.110 | 0.269 | 0.291 | 0.136 | 0.182 | 0.395 | ||||||
| B. Downgrades | ||||||||||||
| Branch level | 0.018 | −0.078 | −0.003 | −0.005 | 0.008 | −0.039 | ||||||
| (0.018) | (0.055) | (0.047) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.054) | |||||||
| Adj-|$R^{2}$| | 0.109 | 0.264 | 0.291 | 0.137 | 0.186 | 0.406 | ||||||
| Branch FEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | ||||||
| Quarter FEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | ||||||
| . | “Quasi” R2 . | |$\ln\left(\mbox{IQR}_{b,q}\right)$| . | |$\ln\left(\sigma_{\mbox{loan}_{b,q}}\right)$| . | VW ROL . | VW defaults . | |$\ln\left(\mbox{new ind.}\right.$| . | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | . | . | . | . | . | |$\left.\mbox{debt}_{b,q}\right)$| . | ||||||
| . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | ||||||
| A. Upgrades | ||||||||||||
| Branch level | −0.047*** | −0.133*** | −0.119*** | −0.011*** | 0.015*** | −0.113*** | ||||||
| (0.009) | (0.031) | (0.025) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.036) | |||||||
| Adj-|$R^{2}$| | 0.110 | 0.269 | 0.291 | 0.136 | 0.182 | 0.395 | ||||||
| B. Downgrades | ||||||||||||
| Branch level | 0.018 | −0.078 | −0.003 | −0.005 | 0.008 | −0.039 | ||||||
| (0.018) | (0.055) | (0.047) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.054) | |||||||
| Adj-|$R^{2}$| | 0.109 | 0.264 | 0.291 | 0.137 | 0.186 | 0.406 | ||||||
| Branch FEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | ||||||
| Quarter FEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | ||||||
The table reports the results using a sample of all branch upgrades (panel A) and downgrades (panel B). The control group are all branches that did not change their organizational design. We report the estimated effect on the three measures of contract standardization (Columns 1 to 3), value-weighted return on loans (Column 4) and default (Column 5), and total new lending to small individual borrowers (Column 6). The unit of analysis is a branch-quarter. The variable Branch Level is a number between 1 and 3, where the lowest value (level 1) and the highest value (level 3) characterize the least hierarchical branches and the most hierarchical branches, respectively. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the branch level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
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