
Contents
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1. The Inverted World 1. The Inverted World
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a) The First Legal Supersensible World a) The First Legal Supersensible World
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b) The Second Legal Supersensible World b) The Second Legal Supersensible World
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2. The Transformation of Legal Meaning in the Inverted World 2. The Transformation of Legal Meaning in the Inverted World
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3. The Consequence of the Inverted World 3. The Consequence of the Inverted World
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4. The Inverted World and the Legal Philosopher 4. The Inverted World and the Legal Philosopher
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5. Why is Verstand Unconnected with Actuality? 5. Why is Verstand Unconnected with Actuality?
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a) A Self-standing Concept a) A Self-standing Concept
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b) Interaction of Concepts b) Interaction of Concepts
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c) Verstand's Representation of A Multiplicity of Particular Experiences c) Verstand's Representation of A Multiplicity of Particular Experiences
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d) Difference as a Difference Between Concepts d) Difference as a Difference Between Concepts
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6. Hegel's Critique of Verstand 6. Hegel's Critique of Verstand
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7. Vernunft 7. Vernunft
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a) Truth of the Content of Rules a) Truth of the Content of Rules
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b) Reason b) Reason
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c) Legal Reasoning as Vernunft c) Legal Reasoning as Vernunft
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8. Anthropologist or Philosopher? 8. Anthropologist or Philosopher?
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9. Truth and the Identity of Law 9. Truth and the Identity of Law
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Cite
Abstract
This chapter discusses Hegel's theory of legal reasoning. In order to set up the theory, the first four sections address Hegel's metaphor of an inverted world, how meaning is transformed in the inverted world, the consequences of the identity of law in the inverted world, and the role of the philosopher in the inverted world. Against the background of this metaphor, the fifth section turns to Hegel's insights about the intellectual differentiation of rules in a seemingly uncontrollable objective world. Hegel calls this Verstand, which associates legal units with externally posited rules. From Hegel's critique of Verstand, sections six and seven consider Hegel's theory of legal reasoning that aspires to institutionalize Vernunft. Vernunft links concepts with particular context-specific social experiences of the subject who is immersed in an ethos of which she or he feels an intimate part. Vernunft incorporates such a broad spectrum of research materials that one needs to ask whether legal reasoning is really anthropology. The eighth section discusses why this is not so; section nine explains that the identity of legality rests with truth about the content of rules.
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