Competition Law and Development
Daniel D. Sokol (ed.)
et al.
Published:
11 September 2013
Online ISBN:
9780804787925
Print ISBN:
9780804785716
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Contents
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Competition Agency Enforcement Areas and Efficiency of Operations Competition Agency Enforcement Areas and Efficiency of Operations
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Economies of Scale and Scope Economies of Scale and Scope
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Implications for the Competition Agency and Enforcement Implications for the Competition Agency and Enforcement
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Administrative Structure and Independence of the Competition Agency Administrative Structure and Independence of the Competition Agency
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Competition Agency and Independence Competition Agency and Independence
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Implications for the Structure of the Agency and Enforcement Implications for the Structure of the Agency and Enforcement
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Agency and Enforcement Statistics Agency and Enforcement Statistics
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Cross-Country Benchmarking of Agencies Cross-Country Benchmarking of Agencies
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Chapter
6 Resource Constraints and Competition Law Enforcement: Theoretical Considerations and Observations from Selected Cross-Country Data
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Pages
90–114
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Published:11 September 2013
Cite
Ghosal, Vivek, 'Resource Constraints and Competition Law Enforcement: Theoretical Considerations and Observations from Selected Cross-Country Data', in Daniel D. Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng, and Ioannis Lianos (eds), Competition Law and Development (Redwood City, CA , 2013; online edn, Stanford Scholarship Online, 23 Jan. 2014), https://doi.org/10.11126/stanford/9780804785716.003.0007, accessed 13 July 2026.
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Abstract
This chapter examines optimal structure and enforcement patterns of competition law enforcement agencies. Controlling for the size of the economy, larger agency size is not necessarily optimal. Highly developed economies are observed to have comparatively smaller agencies. This is likely driven by relatively better allocation of human capital, and reaping economies of scale and scope in utilization of scarce enforcement and investigative inputs. An important deficiency that prevents better understanding of enforcement patterns and institutional characteristics across countries relates to significant gaps in relevant data. International organizations such as ICN and OECD can meaningfully contribute in alleviating this deficiency.
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