Policy change and national identification: the discursive institutionalism of Japan’s migrant admission policy

Abstract

1. Introduction

In June 2023, the Japanese government decided to expand the Specified Skilled Worker System (SSWS), allowing more migrant workers to bring their families and apply for permanent residency. In 2024, the government decided to dissolve the Technical Intern Trainee Program (TITP), a typical side-door migration policy widely criticised both domestically and internationally for being exploitative. For the past thirty years, Japan has officially denied the acceptance of migrant workers, relying instead on this side-door policy. The migrant admission reform of 2023–24 may signify a fundamental shift, building upon the policy reform initiated in 2018.¹

In 2018, the administration of Abe Shinzō introduced the SSWS, marking the first official migrant worker programme in post-war Japan. Under this system, SSWs are allowed to work in twelve industries,² including construction, agriculture, and food manufacturing, which had previously been restricted. The government maintained its long-standing dichotomic stance: migrants were welcomed in ‘professional and skilled’ fields but excluded from ‘unskilled’ fields, a policy framework that had defined its migration stance during the last three decades. However, in the 2018 reform, the definition of ‘professional and skilled’ was expanded to include SSWs.³ The TITP was also retained and connected to the SSWS. Thus, the 2018 reform exhibited an equivocal nature, combining continuity of the side-door policy with the establishment of the first official migrant admission programme.

In response to a rapid increase in irregular migrants during the latter half of the 1980s, the Japanese government amended the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in 1989. This amendment, along with related policies, defined Japan’s migration regime for the next thirty years. First, while the government permitted migrant workers in ‘professional and skilled’ fields, it continued to refuse workers designated ‘unskilled’. At the same time, a new visa category for Nikkeijin (descendants of Japanese nationals) was introduced, followed a few years later by the Foreign TITP. Beginning in the late 2000s, the government also created or expanded other migration pathways, such as those established under Economic Partnership Agreements. These measures have intentionally or unintentionally functioned as unofficial routes for non-professional and unskilled fields to fill labour shortages. In essence, while the Japanese government has steadfastly refused to admit unskilled workers, migrants who entered Japan under other programmes have effectively addressed labour gaps in these industries. This side-door policy has long defined Japan’s approach to unskilled migrant workers, with the focus shifting between different prioritized programmes over time (Tsuda and Cornelius 2004; Tian 2018; Chung 2022).

Attempts have been made to eliminate the side-door policy and establish an official route for accepting migrant workers. In the mid-2000s, intensive debate over reforming migrant admission policy emerged, with the business community and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) proposing various policy ideas. However, these efforts failed to produce a policy shift, ultimately dissipating due to the 2008 economic crisis and the change in government in 2009 (Milly 2014; Strausz 2019). From the late 2000s to the early 2010s, discussions on migrant admission policy were largely absent.

However, shortly after the start of the second Abe administration in 2012,⁴ the environment for discussing migrant admissions began to shift. The number of migrant workers, which had bottomed out in 2012, started to rise again. By 2014, the effective job opening ratio exceeded 1.0, and the unemployment rate had declined to 3.6 per cent. From around 2014, the government introduced additional incremental measures to admit migrant workers. These included the Urgent Employment Programme for Construction and Shipbuilding for Recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Preparation for the Tokyo Olympics, the establishment of a new residential visa category for caregivers, and the admittance of migrant workers such as domestic workers and agricultural workers in National Strategic Special Zones.

In these ways, prior to 2018, the government gradually established ‘exceptional’ or ‘urgent’ pathways for migrants to enter and work in fields not officially recognised as ‘professional and skilled’. On 20 February 2018, following a meeting of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), Prime Minister (PM) Abe highlighted the urgent need to examine the system for accepting migrant workers. Shortly thereafter, the PM’s office (Kantei) launched the Taskforce on Acceptance of Foreign Human Resources in Professional and Technical Fields (hereafter Task Force). The Task Force, chaired by the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary and comprising bureaucrats from various ministries, drafted the new programme. This draft was subsequently discussed among the ruling parties and the Immigration Bureau, leading to a revised bill of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act being submitted to the Diet. By the end of 2018, the bill was passed, establishing the SSWS.

Previous studies on Japan’s migrant admission policy have examined the origins and persistence of the long-standing side-door policy, emphasising the roles of bureaucracy, institutional constraints, and negative public perceptions of migrants in light of the ‘failures’ of migrant admission in European countries (Kajita 2001; Hamaguchi 2010; Milly 2014; Strausz 2019). While these studies provide valuable insights into the stability of the side-door policy, the policy shift under the Abe administration necessitates additional explanation.

In addition, some studies have criticised the Abe administration’s refusal to use the term ‘immigration’, despite its efforts to expand pathways for accepting migrant workers (Roberts 2018; Chung 2019; Strausz 2021). While it is true that denying the term ‘immigrants’ contradicted reality, this can be understood as rhetoric—‘the strategic and persuasive deployment of… discourses’ to ‘legitimate specific courses of action, initiatives, etc’. (Hay and Rosamond 2002: 152). This article considers this rhetoric as a discursive strategy employed by the Abe administration. Thus, using the framework of discursive institutionalism (DI), this study examines the discursive strategies and institutional contexts employed by the Abe administration that contributed to the shift in Japan’s migrant admission policy. DI, as the fourth new institutionalism, provides a framework for explaining institutional changes by focussing on the actors’ ideas and interactive processes of discourse (Schmidt 2002). Given that the 2018 reform marked the beginning of this policy shift, DI serves as an effective framework for contextualising this change, taking discourse ‘seriously’ (Schmidt 2010).

2. The debate over restrictive migrant admission policies in Japan

While various factors shape migration policies, studies have primarily focused on the openness to migration in liberal democratic countries during the post-war era, as well as the intended and unintended consequences of this openness (Hollifield 1992, 2004; Freeman 1995; Joppke 1998; Castles 2004a, 2004b). Along these lines, Japan is expected to follow the path of other liberal democracies (Hollifield et al. 2017).

However, some scholars have argued that not all liberal democratic countries are open to migration (Ellerman 2013, 2015). Japan serves as one of the ‘negative cases’, as it achieved economic development without relying on migrant workers and consistently refused to officially accept migrants into fields that were not ‘professional and technical’ until 2018 (Bartram 2000, 2005; Strausz 2019). During the late 1960s and early 1970s, when Japan faced a significant labour shortage similar to those experienced by labour-importing countries, it avoided addressing this shortage by accepting migrant workers (Bartram 2005). This indicates that economic factors alone cannot fully explain Japan’s refusal to admit migrants. Consequently, previous studies have focussed on political factors that influenced Japan’s stance on migration.

First, some studies have highlighted the pivotal roles of bureaucracy and inter-ministerial interest conflicts (Kajita 2001; Hamaguchi 2010, 2020; Kalicki 2019; Wakisaka 2024). Specifically, the competition between the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) in the late 1980s has been well documented, culminating in the MOJ’s victory and the adoption of a more restrictive policy. Hamaguchi (2020) demonstrated that, under the MOJ’s jurisdiction, the importance of labour policy in addressing migrant worker issues was dismissed, and such issues were reframed solely through the lens of immigration control.

Second, other studies have focussed on institutional constraints to policy change, particularly in examining the relationship between civil society and the national government from a comparative perspective. Unlike South Korea and other emerging migration destinations, Japan has been characterised by the limited influence of civil society on national policymaking (Chung 2014; Milly 2014). While civil society groups and local communities have advocated for migrants’ rights (Tsuda 2006; Shipper 2008), their efforts have primarily operated at local levels and have had minimal impact on national-level politics. This limited influence is partly due to the lack of political opportunities available to civil society groups under predominantly conservative governments. Additionally, within Japan’s political system, there has been a tendency to avoid setting migration policy agendas, as attitudes toward admitting migrants were split within both ruling and opposition parties. Consequently, no political actors took the initiative to transform policy. In the mid-2000s, while several forces within the LDP and the business community proposed opening doors for migrant workers, these proposals were dispersed and ultimately failed to produce a policy shift. The 2008 economic crisis and the 2009 change in government further stifled these efforts (Milly 2014). Subsequently, the government continued to develop ‘exceptions’ for admitting migrant workers while maintaining the side-door policy, as mentioned earlier. This institutional fragmentation with different political legitimacies, contributed to an increase in de facto migration without formal agreements, a situation that persisted until 2018 (Koido and Kamibayashi 2018; Chiavacci 2020).

Despite these differences, such arguments tend to focus on actors’ interests within institutional constraints as causes of their (non)behaviours. However, interests are not objective facts but socially constructed through actors’ perceptions, shaped by ideational perspectives (Béland and Cox 2011; Hay 2011). This means that there are no ‘objective’ interests; rather, interests are the products of subjective interpretation by actors, and these interpretations influence their preferences, decisions, and behaviours.

Third, the impact of perceptions of ‘migrants’ has also been a significant focus of discussion. David Bartram attributed Japan’s refusal to admit migrant workers during the late 1960s and early 1970s to negative perceptions of migrant workers (Bartram 2005). According to Bartram, bureaucrats in the developmental state at the time rejected economic organizations’ calls for migrant labour, ‘perceiving’ that migrant workers admitted through the guest worker programme imposed societal costs and were incompatible with the country’s long-term developmental goals. Similarly, during the debates surrounding the 1989 policy revision, the negative perception of ‘unskilled foreign workers’ hindered the establishment of an official admission policy programme. Kajita Takamichi observed that, as a latecomer amongst migrant-receiving countries, Japan tended to view migrant workers in Europe as source of ‘problems’ (Kajita 2001; see also Strausz 2019). Japan interpreted the European experience as evidence that admitting migrant workers would inevitably lead to their settlement and the emergence of ‘social problems’,⁵ a perception that has persisted and been reinforced over the past thirty years (Koido and Kamibayashi 2018). In addition, security fears fuelled by the police, the immigration bureau, and media campaigns in the early 2000s perpetuated this perception. These campaigns linked the increasing number of migrants to deteriorating law and order, further deterring the government from accepting ‘unskilled’ migrant workers (Takaya 2015; see also Kalicki 2022).

Therefore, prior to 2018, no political actor took the initiative to reform migration policy. The side-door policy, combined with institutional fragmentation, partially addressed the demand for migrant workers, despite the pervasive negative perception of migrants. In line with historical institutionalism, these institutional arrangements exhibited path-dependant effects, creating an equilibrium (Pierson 2004).

3. Framework and methods

To explain this policy shift, it is necessary to examine how the government overcame path dependency by justifying and legitimising the shift to secure agreement. This article adopts DI as a framework for analysis. Unlike historical institutionalism and other forms of new institutionalisms—such as rational choice and sociological institutionalisms—that view institutions as static and focus on explaining continuity, DI provides a lens to examine the ‘dynamics of institutional change’. It does so by emphasising the role of ideas and interactive processes of discourse (Schmidt 2002; see also Schmidt 2008, 2010; Hay 2011).

While some DI scholars focus on the content of ideas, this article emphasises discourse as ‘a set of policy ideas and values and an interactive process of policy construction and communication’ (Schmidt 2002: 210). At the ideational level, discourse has cognitive and normative functions. Cognitive functions justify a policy programme based on the ‘logic of necessity’, that is, by offering solutions to problems. Normative functions are used to legitimise a policy programme based on the ‘logic of appropriateness’, aligning with or redefining national values (Schmidt 2002: 213–214). At the interactive level, discourse has coordinative and communicative functions. The former ‘provide policy actors with a common language and ideational framework’ to collaboratively create policy programmes, whereas the latter ‘serve[s] political actors as the means for persuading the public, through discussion and deliberation’ (Schmidt 2002: 230). In public communication, the overall policy programme tends to be expressed ‘in a “master” discourse by a “master” politician, generally the president or prime minister once elected’ (Schmidt 2002: 235). The institutional context influences the relative importance of these functions. In multi-actor systems such as Germany and the EU, the coordinative discourse tends to be more enhanced, whereas in single-actor systems such as Britain and France which are defined by ‘a strong concentration of power and authority in the executive’, the communicative discourse tends to be more developed (Schmidt 2002: 231). Japan fits the latter case (Peng 2016; Nishioka 2021). DI thus highlights not only the content of ideas but also the interactive dimension of discourse, emphasising the contexts in which ideas are conveyed, contested, and legitimised through discourse in policy processes.⁶ In essence, DI explains policy change by analyzing the discursive strategies of policy actors within institutional contexts, acknowledging discourse as one factor among many in driving policy change.

Using the framework of DI, this study examines the discursive strategies and institutional contexts employed by the Abe administration to facilitate change in Japan’s migrant admission policy. The analysis focuses on the period from the start of the second Abe administration in late 2012 to the establishment of the SSWS in 2018, while briefly addressing the pre- and post-intervention periods. Specifically, this article explores how the issue of migrant admission was proposed, justified, and legitimised by the administration. It also traces how the administration’s discourse shaped the cognitive and normative frameworks of policy and political actors, enabling them to address migrant admission policies and generate a policy shift through interactions with other actors and the public within institutional settings. Although this study draws on Schmidt’s conceptualization of DI, it explains the shift in Japan’s migrant admission policy by examining the policy process in detail rather than adopting a comparative approach.

To achieve this, this study utilised data from thirty-five interviews with actors involved in the process of the reform. The interviews were conducted by the author and her colleagues between December 2020 and September 2022. Participants included representatives from fourteen industry groups, either representing fields that accepted SSWs or advocating for recognition as eligible for SSWs, as well as nine LDP politicians involved in the migration admission policy process, six government agencies involved in the SSWS, four experts, and two business community representatives. In addition to the interviews, this study draws on related documents and records, such as transcripts of interviews and press conferences by the PM and government officials, Diet records, official documents from government ministries, proposals of interest groups, and media reports. Furthermore, this paper incorporated insights obtained from personal communications with journalists and researchers.

4. Discourses and processes of change in migrant admission policy under the Abe administration

4.1 Setting the agenda: adoption of the phrases ‘foreign human resources’ and ‘not an immigration policy’

As noted earlier, there was a pervasive negative perception of migrants, heavily influenced by the perceived experiences of ‘European failures’. A retired economic official we interviewed referred to communication with German officials. According to him, the German official acknowledged they had ‘failed’ based on Germany’s experience of accepting Turkish migrants, which he interpreted as evidence that immigration poses a ‘problem’ to maintaining social stability (a retired public official from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, interview on 8 December 2021). Similarly, a bureaucrat from the MOJ, who formerly served as chief of the Tokyo Regional Immigration Bureau, observed that Germany’s experience with foreign workers led to societal divisions and political instability, which he described as a ‘failure’ (Bando et al. 2021: 126).

It is in this context, that the Abe administration created a discourse employed to set the agenda for shifting the policy, which strategically circumvented the negative perception of migrants.

First, let us examine the institutional context. Approximately one year after the start of the second Abe administration, the issue of migration was addressed within the CEFP and the Council for Industrial Competitiveness (CIC). This approach aligned with the administration’s typical method of policy agenda-setting. Previous studies have characterised this as ‘the PM’s office-led (Kantei-shudō)’, or ‘top-down’ policymaking (Iio 2019; Tanaka 2019). The CEFP, established in 2001, was designed to deliberate on key economic and fiscal policies and included ministers and experts organised under the PM’s leadership. Similarly, the CIC, established in January 2013 under the Japan Economic Revival Headquarters, focussed on developing and promoting growth strategies until its dissolution in September 2016. The CIC was also chaired by the PM and comprised ministers and experts as members. During the early years of the Abe administration, the CEFP and CIC worked in tandem to address issues and strategies related to the cabinet’s economic policies, commonly referred to as Abenomics. These councils symbolised the Kantei’s leadership and provided a means to bypass ministerial and political interests. Thus, it was a logical step for the Abe administration to utilise the CEFP and CIC as platforms for setting an agenda to accept migrants within the context of economic reform (Milly 2017).

During this period, the CEFP and CIC held meetings multiple times per month, occasionally convening joint sessions. Discussions within the CEFP were adjusted and integrated annually into the Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform (BPEFMR), which provided the government with foundational principles and constrained policymaking by ministries. Similarly, discussions within the CIC were incorporated each year into the Japan Revitalization Strategy (JRS). According to an anonymous member of the CEFP, who is an economic expert, the PM’s interviews following these meetings played a crucial role in shaping subsequent policymaking (interview on 6 September 2022).

Abe’s public statements played a crucial role in setting the agenda for reforming Japan’s migration policy. On 24 December 2013, during a CEFP meeting, several members referred to the ‘utilisation of foreign workers’ or ‘human resources’ from Asia as a mean to address population decline. Following the meeting, Abe expressed his expectation for comprehensive discussions within the CEFP on strategies to tackle depopulation. On 20 January 2014, the CIC proposed ‘promoting a national debate’ on ‘how to utilise foreign human resources to achieve sustainable economic development’.⁷ After this meeting, Amari Akira, who as Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy and Minister in charge of Economic Revitalization was a CIC member, raised the possibility of opening pathways for migrants beyond those categorised as ‘professional and skilled’.⁸ These developments suggested that the Abe administration was beginning to position the acceptance of migrant workers not limited to ‘professional and technical fields’ as a component of its growth strategy, signalling a shift toward concrete action.

Two months later, when questioned in the Diet about the discussion at the CEFP meeting, Abe adopted a cautious stance. He referred negatively to Europe’s experience with migrant admission, emphasising that the issue of whether to accept immigrants was intrinsically tied to the future of the nation and the lives of its people. Abe concluded, ‘It requires a national debate’ (House of Representatives, Budget Committee, 13 February 2014). Moreover, instead of using the term ‘foreign human resources (gaikokujinzai)’, Abe reiterated the existing policy language at the time, emphasising the ‘acceptance of foreign workers in professional and skilled fields’.

Sooner rather than later, the Abe administration began to use the term ‘foreign human resources’ in policy discussions, replacing terms such as ‘immigrants’ or ‘foreign workers’. This term originally emerged from the business community. In 2007, Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) introduced the term in ‘The Second Proposals of Acceptance of Foreign Human Resources’. However, the proposal had little impact on policymaking at the time. In the early period of the Abe administration, Keidanren was not actively involved in discussion on migrant admission. While the chairperson of Keidanren had traditionally been a member of the CEFP, this was not the case during the initial years of Abe’s administration, reportedly due to a strained relationship between the chairperson and PM Abe (Karube 2017).⁹ In September 2014, a new chairperson—elected a few months earlier—was appointed to the CEFP. By 2016, Keidanren had published another proposal advocating acceptance of migrant workers. Although the business community sporadically used the term ‘foreign human resources’, such as during CIC discussions, the Abe administration adopted it more strategically, shaping the discourse around migration policy.

In April 2014, during an interview following a joint meeting of the CEFP and CIC, Abe stated, ‘Be careful not to mistake this as an immigration policy; I would like it to be considered a system for utilising foreign human resources under full control to help promote women’s participation and mid- and long-term economic development’.¹⁰ While academia and broader society have criticised the refusal to use the term ‘immigrants’ (Roberts 2018; Chung 2019; Strausz 2021), the phrase ‘not an immigration policy but a utilisation or acceptance of foreign human resources’ became a central element of the ‘master’ discursive strategies in the discussion about admitting migrants and has shaped the individual programmes of various ministries as well as parliament and public debate. On the same day as the meeting, the cabinet approved the ‘Urgent Measures Concerning the Utilization of Foreign Human Resources in the Field of Construction’ for the Tokyo Olympics.¹¹ The frequency of the term ‘foreign human resources’ in Diet records rose significantly—from just two mentions in 2013 to seventy-one in 2014. Although its usage declined in 2015, it increased again in 2017, peaking at 524 in 2018 when the migrant admission policy reform was under discussion in the Diet.¹²

4.2 Conflicting discourses in the ambiguous period

As noted above, the use of the term ‘foreign human resources’ increased sharply in policy debates following Abe’s statement. In the subsequent year, the annual report by the Japan Economic Revival Headquarters, Revising JRS, Three Action Plans in 2015, explicitly addressed ‘the utilisation of foreign human resources’ to ‘ensure sustainability of economic and social infrastructure’, which included not only skilled migrants but also other migrants for the first time (Japan Economic Revival Headquarters 2015). Although the government continued to reject migrants as a solution to population decline and labour shortages, it finally positioned ‘the utilisation of foreign human resources’ as a means to address labour shortages, in addition to the participation of women and older adults. However, an annotation in the report stated, ‘…not be misconstrued as an immigration policy’. Between 2014 and 2018, the government introduced several migrant admission programmes. These initiatives, however, were largely categorised as ‘exceptional’ or ‘urgent’. As ‘exception’ implies the approval of derogation from the ‘normative rule’ within a limited scope without challenging the rule itself (e.g. Ong 2006), the establishment of these programmes did not signify a change in the rule of the migration policy. Instead, it represented an expansion of the ‘exception’ while maintaining the side-door policy.

In fact, the TITP, a core component of the side-door policy, continued to play an important role in discussions on migrant admission policy, despite facing considerable criticism. In 2016, the Act on Proper Technical Intern Training and Protection of Technical Intern Trainees was enacted to address this criticism and enhance worker protection. Simultaneously, the TITP was expanded by extending the maximum period of the programme from three to five years and broadening the range of eligible industries to include service sectors such as nursing care. One year earlier, the MOJ’s Immigration Bureau published the Basic Plan for Immigration Control (5th edition), signalling its intention to maintain the existing policy. Regarding the acceptance of migrants not categorised as ‘professional or technical’, the Immigration Bureau emphasised the need for consideration ‘from wide-ranging perspectives’ and ‘based on a national consensus’ (Ministry of Justice Japan 2015). In 2017, Rengō, Japan’s largest national trade union centre, issued a statement titled ‘RENGŌ’s Position on Policies for Accepting Foreign Workers’ (Rengō 2017). The statement opposed the acceptance of migrant workers who were not categorised as ‘professional and technical’ and called for ‘comprehensive and national debates’, aligning closely with the MOJ’s position.

However, other actors began advocating for a more proactive approach to admitting migrant workers. In May 2016, the ruling party, the LDP’s Policy Research Council and Special Committee on Securing Labour Forces published a paper titled ‘Basic Stance on Acceptance of Foreign Workers toward an “Era of Co-existence”’, in which it criticised the government’s existing policy stance and called for promoting the acceptance of migrant workers, citing depopulation and labour shortages as pressing concerns. However, the paper maintained caution by including the phrase, ‘Be careful not to mistake this as an immigration policy’. According to a former Diet member in charge of drafting the paper, defining the terms ‘immigrants’ and ‘unskilled workers’ was crucial for overcoming the obstacles posed by the existing policy (interview with a former member of the House of Councillors from the LDP on 11 December 2020). I will address the former term later in this article. Here, I will focus on ‘unskilled workers’. The Japanese government’s basic rule for migration admission was to ‘not accept “unskilled workers”’. The LDP’s paper, however, pointed out that the term ‘unskilled workers’ functioned in a negative way as it resulted in accepting migrant workers without a clear definition, while suggesting that the term should not be used in discussions on migrant admission policy. Moreover, the former Diet member explained that he was urged to draft the paper by the chairperson of the LDP Policy Research Council at that time, driven by increasing pressure from the business community. This demand for migration admission had become difficult for the LDP to ignore.

In November of the same year, Keidanren published a report titled ‘The Basic Idea Toward Promoting the Acceptance of Foreign Human Resources’ that stated that ‘it was indispensable to promote accepting foreign human resources not only for the economy but also for maintaining and strengthening a vital society’. Specifically, Keidanren proposed the acceptance of ‘human resources’ essential for sustaining the country’s social infrastructure and the lives of its people, in addition to ‘highly-skilled foreign professional’. Importantly, Keidanren differentiated the foreign human resources it proposed from ‘immigrants’, deliberately distancing itself from the latter term. The report noted, ‘[t]he term “immigrants” can easily lead to discrepancies in assumptions depending on who is discussing and where they are discussing it. Careful discussion is needed’. Keidanren concluded by suggesting that ‘the general issue of immigration’ should be treated as a topic for future consideration (Keidanren 2016).

Moreover, in 2017 and 2018, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry also expressed their support for expanding the categories of accepted ‘foreign human resources’. According to an interview with a staff member, the Japan Association of Corporate Executives also began addressing the issue of securing labour in 2017. This effort culminated in the 2019 proposal titled ‘Labour Market Reform for Contributing to Sustainable Growth’, that called for an open system of strategically accepting foreign human resources.

During this period, public interest in migrant workers and their presence increased. The number of migrant workers in Japan had been steadily rising and, for the first time in the post-war period, surpassed one million in 2016 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2016). Media coverage on this issue also expanded, exemplified by Nishinippon Shinbun’s long-running series, which was later published as a book in the fall of 2017 titled ‘The Age of New Migrants (Shin Imin Jidai)’, and which reportedly inspired Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide to take the initiative within the PM’s office. In an interview with Nishinippon Shinbun, Suga remarked, ‘When reading the book, it was the same as my feeling. That’s why I consulted with others, and they also said, “it was impossible without enlargement of the acceptance of foreign human resources”’ (‘The detailed report of the exclusive interview, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Suga, ‘Japan’s economy will not turn around without foreign workers’, The Nishinippon Shinbun, 23 August 2018).

4.3 The decision by the PM’s office

By the end of 2017, both the LDP and the business community had called for the acceptance of migrant workers not limited to ‘professional and technical fields’. At the same time, Japan faced an increasingly severe labour shortage, accompanied by growing public interest in the issue. While these contexts mirrored the situation in the mid-2000s, a significant difference lay in the substantive authority wielded by the PM’s office under the Abe administration. Additionally, within the LDP opinions on migrant worker acceptance were more unified and articulated through the party’s Policy Research Council, rather than being fragmented as they had been in earlier debates.

At the CEFP meeting in February 2018, PM Abe expressed his intention to expand the acceptance of migrants, while making it clear that his government would not develop an immigration policy. A bureaucrat from the MOJ noted that they did not consider the establishment as a new migrant worker programme, as the new TITP Act had only been enacted a few months earlier. The bureaucrat acknowledged that the idea for the new programme arose directly from the PM’s statement (interview on 27 August 2021). This clearly demonstrates that the initiative to launch the new programme was a top-town decision driven by the PM’s office.

5. The logics of ‘necessity’ and ‘appropriateness’ in the 2018 reform

5.1 Acceptance of ‘foreign human resources’ and the denial of ‘immigrants’

This section analyses the logics of ‘necessity’ and ‘appropriateness’ in the context of the 2018 reform. Two perspectives emerge from these logics. First, the acceptance of ‘foreign human resources’ operates as a ‘logic of necessity’, addressing labour shortages and economic challenges, while the simultaneous denial of ‘immigrants’ aligns with a ‘logic of appropriateness’, maintaining alignment with societal and political norms. Second, the narrative of ‘competition for human resources in Asia’ and positioning Japan as ‘a chosen country’ serves as both a ‘logic of necessity’, emphasising economic imperatives, and a ‘logic of appropriateness’, reinforcing national identity and global competitiveness (Table 1).

Let us examine the first set of logics. The 2018 BPEFMR articulated the necessity of accepting migrants as follows:

Workforce shortages are intensifying and may prevent the sustainability of the economic and social base in Japan. To solve this problem… it is necessary to construct a system that enables wide acceptance that foreign human resources who have a certain level of professional knowledge and skills can contribute immediately, by eliminating the traditional limitation of only accepting foreign human resources having special professional and technical skills. (Cabinet Office 2018)

Building on the Three Action Plans of 2015, the acceptance of ‘foreign human resources’ in 2018 was framed as essential for maintaining the sustainability of Japan’s ‘economic and social base’. This marked a shift away from the traditional perception of (im)migrants as ‘problems’—a view that associated migrants with threats to social stability. Instead, the government acknowledged that admitting migrants was necessary to uphold social stability. This discourse effectively helped to justify the policy based on the ‘logic of necessity’.

However, this does not imply that the perception of immigrants as a ‘problem’ was entirely overcome. Instead, the term ‘immigrants’ was carefully eliminated from the policy development process. In an interview following a CEFP meeting where PM Abe emphasised the urgent need for a migrant worker programme, he clarified that it was ‘not an immigration policy’, because it would ‘set the maximum period of the stay’ and ‘not admit the accompaniment of family members’.¹³ The 2018 BPEFMR described these standards as follows:

As the abovementioned policy is different from immigration policy, the period of stay for foreign human resources under the new status of residence is limited to a total of five years, and no family members are allowed to accompany the worker in principle (Cabinet Office 2018).

This suggests that individuals with a limited period of stay and without the right to bring their family members were not considered ‘immigrants’. Conversely, this definition implied that ‘immigrants’ were those with no restrictions on their period of stay and the ability to bring their families. In practice, Specified Skilled Workers (SSWs) were divided into two categories: SSW(i) and SSW(ii). Only workers classified as SSW(ii) were permitted to bring their family members. Upon the establishment of the SSWS, SSW(i) workers were accepted into fourteen industrial sectors, whereas SSW(ii) workers were initially limited to just two sectors.

A former Diet member involved in the discussions on migrant worker acceptance within the LDP shared that the term ‘immigrants’ was defined as ‘those who have permanent residency with entry to Japan’ in the 2016 LDP proposal. This definition was intended to alleviate concerns that migrant workers with temporary status might eventually become immigrants. The former Diet member further explained that the avoidance of the term ‘immigrants’ in the policy discussions served the dual purpose to pre-empt criticisms from both conservatives and the left:

We cannot use the term ‘immigrant’ because of political risk. Leftists or labour unions are against immigration because they fear that their jobs will be ‘stolen’ or that it will lead to a decrease in their wages. That is the only way they can think. On the other hand, right-wing people in the LDP refuse immigrants as well as unskilled workers. These discussions dampened the establishment of the immigration policy (a former member of the House of Councillors from the LDP, interview on 11 December 2020).

This quote illustrates that the LDP leadership believed that the public—despite differing political attitudes—widely perceived immigrants as ‘problems’. This perception was deeply ingrained and shaped the normative framework of the political and policy actors involved in the 2018 reform. Supporting this sentiment, another LDP politician stated, ‘Hearing the news from abroad about the deterioration in security or a division in society due to immigration, there is no argument that the increase in foreigners would be okay’ (a member of the House of Representatives from the LDP, interview on 12 July 2021).

Another Diet member from the LDP linked the reluctance to the use of the term ‘immigrant’ to specific characteristics of Japanese society. He explained, ‘People might be uncomfortable with the term “immigrant” because Japan is a village society. Explicitly saying the powerful term “immigration policy” might produce the image of many foreigners coming to Japan at once, and what would happen in our culture and lives?’ (a member of the House of Representatives from the LDP, interview on 28 July 2021). Some conservatives believed that this discomfort stemmed from fears that a large influx of immigrants might disrupt the cultural idea of the nation (see also Strausz 2021: 268).

In contrast, the industry groups we interviewed generally preferred migrants who could settle long-term and bring their families. While many of these groups did not initially advocate for the establishment of SSW(ii), preferring to first evaluate the implementation of the SSWS, one staff member from an industry group stated that they had demanded the removal of the distinction between SSW(i) and SSW(ii), and that all SSWs should be allowed to bring their family members. However, this demand was ‘explicitly’ rejected by the supervisory ministry. The staff member interpreted this refusal as stemming from concerns that such a policy would effectively equate to immigration (a staff member of an industry group, interview on 6 October 2021).

Furthermore, the avoidance of terms such as ‘immigrants’ or ‘immigration policy’ was closely tied to framing the establishment of the SSWS as a continuation of existing policy. In an interview with Mainichi Shinbun, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga was asked how the SSWS differed from the acceptance of so-called immigrants. He emphasised that the new program aligned with existing policy, stating, ‘Although the media has regarded the establishment of the SSWS as a shift in Japan’s migrant worker policy, I think it clarifies the overall government’s orientation…This is not an immigration policy’ (‘Issues on migrant workers and US base in Okinawa, interview with Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide’, Mainichi Shinbun, 25 October 2018).

In these ways, the discourse that Japan did ‘not [have] an immigration policy’ aimed to circumvent the perception of immigrants as ‘problems’, which was defined in terms of cultural, socio-economic, or security issues. Simultaneously, it emphasised the continuity of the existing policy and preservation of ‘our society’. Thus, the discourse had a normative effect, legitimising the policy reform by reassuring the public that it would not fundamentally alter ‘our lives’ or ‘our society’. As such, it functioned as ‘a logic of appropriateness’, reinforcing the continuity of the nation and/or ‘our society’ despite the introduction of a new policy.

This discursive strategy appears to have been effective in mitigating opposition to migration to a certain extent. However, not all politicians were persuaded by it. During an LDP meeting, some right-wing politicians voiced opposition to the proposed bills. In response, an MOJ bureaucrat in charge of drafting the bill reportedly stated, ‘This is the intention of the PM and his office’, which effectively silenced the dissenting voices (former member of the House of Councillors from the LDP, interview on 11 December 2020). This anecdote underscores the significance of Kantei-shudō (that is, the PM’s Office-led top-down decision-making) in shaping the policy process and overcoming internal resistance.

5.2 ‘Competition for human resources in Asia’ and ‘a chosen country’

Another set of logics, comprising the ‘competition for human resources in Asia’ and the notion of Japan as ‘a chosen country’, operated in tandem and served as both a ‘logic of necessity’ and a ‘logic of appropriateness’.

While discussions on migrant admission in Japan had traditionally used Europe as the primary frame of reference, references to other migrant-receiving countries in Asia became increasingly prominent in the mid-2010s. This shift was driven by a growing recognition of the competition for human resources in Asia and concerns about Japan’s comparative advantage over other Asian countries. This discourse, which highlighted regional competition, was initially proposed by the media and contrasted with the ‘not an immigration policy’ narrative shaped by the PM’s Office. For instance, in 2014, an article titled ‘Foreign Workers Give up on Japan’, published in the economic newspaper Nikkei, remarked, ‘Japan has changed its position from “choosing [foreigners] to being chosen [by foreigners]”’ (Overcome the Problem of the Population, Nikkei, 30 September 2014). Similarly, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) aired a segment titled ‘The Competition for Workers in Asia’ in 2014, which was later adapted into a book, How Do We Accept Migrant Workers? including additional coverage:

(…) [U]nder the current circumstances, fewer workers will come to Japan soon. Factories in Korea and industrialised Thailand have already taken measures to address foreign workers, and in fact, the number of workers heading to these countries is increasing. Unless Japan seriously thinks about the measurement with foreign workers, we will be unable to keep them dreaming (Group of reporters of NHK 2017).

The book by The Nishinippon Shinbun referred to above similarly noted, ‘If this goes on, it would be a focal point not whether we accept foreigners but whether they will come to Japan in the not-too-distant future’ (The Nishinippon Shinbun 2017).¹⁴

Subsequently, the discourse of Japan as ‘a chosen country’ combined with that of ‘competition for human resources’ was incorporated into the discussions surrounding the 2018 reform. After the revised bill was approved by the cabinet on 2 November 2018, Suga articulated this perspective in an interview, stating: ‘In fact, we recognise the time has come for foreigners to choose the country in which they work. Aiming for the country where foreigners would like to work and live… We will compile comprehensive measures by the end of this year’. During the period of debate over the 2018 reform, Suga frequently reiterated this discourse, emphasising the need for Japan to position itself as an attractive destination for foreign workers.¹⁵

This discursive strategy not only facilitated discussions about the reform but also served to justify and legitimise it. First, the recognition of ‘competition for human resources in Asia’ opened up discussions on admitting migrants. Historically, concerns that accepting migrants would inevitably lead to ‘problems’, as seen in Europe’s perceived ‘failures’, had hindered such discussions in Japan. In contrast, the existence of migrant-receiving countries in Asia, viewed as ‘successes’, suggested that admitting migrant workers need not always result in ‘problems’, provided there were appropriate controls. Several politicians we interviewed referred to the ‘successes’ of migrant-receiving countries in Asia. For instance, an LDP politician acknowledged that South Korea’s and Singapore’s migrant worker programmes were often mentioned in the 2018 reform discussions. However, he added that these examples did not directly impact the debate, as participants generally felt that ‘other countries are other countries’ (a member of the House of Representatives from the LDP, interview on 14 July 2021). Another LDP politician highlighted the differences between Asia and the West, stating: ‘We have drawn on another country such as South Korea… Situations are different between the regions. South Korea is similar to Japan’ (a member of the House of Representatives from the LDP, interview on 28 July 2021). His comment suggested that he considered Japan, as an Asian country, to have different characteristics from Europe and the West. This statement reflects a shift from the perception of the West to Asia as a frame of reference in discussions of the issue of migration.

Second, the discursive strategy of ‘a chosen country’ and ‘competition’ justified the reform. At the inaugural meeting of the Task Force in February 2018, one participant emphasised the importance of ensuring appropriate treatment and employment environment for both Japanese and non-Japanese workers in order for Japan to become ‘a chosen country’ amidst the global competition for human resources.¹⁶

Third, Japan’s long-standing national identity as ‘the first developed country in Asia and the non-Western world’, rooted in the Meiji period, might play a critical role in legitimising the reform. The perception of competition for human resources in Asia not only resonated with the public but also influenced conservatives who were traditionally opposed to admitting migrants. This perception provided a compelling logic for justifying the reform by highlighting the risk of Japan falling behind its regional competitors. Several of our interviewees recognised other Asian countries as competitors in this regard. One LDP politician, identifying himself as a conservative, remarked:

Currently, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan also face labour shortages and seek workers from Asia… With a favourable environment, another country other than Japan would be chosen. In the LDP, the question of whether Japan is competitive compared to South Korea was raised. Unless there is an attractive policy, Japan will fail to attract human resources (a member of the House of Councillors from the LDP, interview on 14 September 2021).

This interviewee recognised that there was competition for human resources and expressed concerns about Japan’s global competitiveness. Similarly, in an interview with Bungei Shunjū, a prominent conservative monthly magazine, Sasaki Shōko, the former Chief of the Immigration Control Bureau in charge of the 2018 reform, shared her views on Japan’s migration strategies in comparison to other Asian countries. She argued that ‘future gains of human resources to be more competitive with Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea could lead to Japan’s development and the sustainability of its national power’ (interview with Sasaki Shōko, Chief of Immigration Control Bureau, quoted in Murayama (2019)).

The discourse of ‘a chosen country’, combined with the narrative of ‘competition for human resources in Asia’, drew attention to Japan’s position within the region and framed the reform as essential for sustaining the nation’s ‘national power’. By linking the reform to a national value, this discourse effectively legitimised the policy shift. A journalist, in personal communication with the author, observed that while the discourse of ‘a chosen country’ might be rhetorical, it was impervious to criticism. As a result, this discourse became pervasive and served as a ‘master’ narrative, justifying and legitimising the policy shift both among policymakers and within public discussions.

6. Discussion and conclusion

In retrospect, the Abe administration marked a period when two distinct discourses coexisted to justify and legitimise the shift in migrant admission policy. Discourses, as tools appeal to national values, inherently reflect different forms of national identification or self-recognition of the nation. The first discourse, ‘not an immigration policy’, aimed to circumvent the negative perception of migrants by framing them as cultural, socio-economic, or security ‘problems’. This perception was shaped by the interpretation of Europe’s migration experience over the past thirty years as a ‘failure’. Drawing lessons from Europe, this discourse emphasised the continuity of ‘our lives’ and ‘our society’, appealing to a collective sense of national stability and perpetuity. In contrast, the second discourse, ‘a chosen country’, combined with the narrative of ‘competition for human resources in Asia’, reflected Japan’s concerns about its current competitiveness and fears of losing power or being ‘left behind’ in the region. This unease challenged Japan’s long-standing national value of being ‘the first developed country in Asia and the non-Western world’. While both discourses shaped the 2018 policy shift, the former—rooted in older perspectives—gradually weakened over time. Meanwhile, the latter, emphasising competitiveness and regional relevance, gained traction and became increasingly influential in shaping public and policymaker attitudes after the Abe administration.

Indeed, the discourse of ‘a chosen country’, rather than ‘not an immigration policy’, has emerged as a dominant discursive strategy for justifying and legitimising the policy shift, at least in the communicative discourse between 2023 and 2024. In 2023, before the cabinet meeting at which the expansion of the SSWS was approved, PM Kishida Fumio at that time stated, ‘It is important for Japan to become “a chosen country,” considering the severe shortage of manpower’ (‘The enlargement of industrial fields of SSW (ii) to eleven’, Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 June 2023). Kishida further employed the discourse of ‘a chosen country’ at the cabinet meeting where his administration decided to abolish TITP and establish the new Ikusei Shūrō programme (‘The government decided to the system of Ikusei Shūrō Training and Securing Foreign Human Resources’, Nikkei, 9 February 2024). This suggests a shift in Japan’s self-perception within the context of migrant admission discussions. Japan now predominantly views itself as an Asian nation striving to avoid being ‘left behind’, rather than a country looking to Europe or ‘the West’ as a model or cautionary tale. This evolution in discourse reflects not only a change in Japan’s migrant admission policy but also a broader shift in national identification.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the Social Science Japan Journal Editorial Board, David Chiavacci, Naoto Higuchi, Nanako Inaba, and the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and constructive criticisms on an earlier draft of this article.

Conflict of interest statement. None declared.

Funding

This work was funded by the Labor Research Center.

References

Footnotes