... infinite-valued predicate logic, set theory, the comprehension principle, truth predicate, non-standard natural number Received 9 September 2004. Revised 11 November 2004. ...

... the natural language truth predicate. First, applying the truth predicate to something is equivalent to just saying it. Second, the equivalence principle is a sufficient account of the meaning of the truth predicate. Third, an account of the meaning of “true” is a sufficient account of the nature of truth...

... imitates standard approaches to truth. The ability of the transcendent truth predicate of ordinary language to blindly endorse foreign sentences can be captured by AU-quantification. The second approach, AU-quantification, provides a slight generalization of the first which may be useful in certain...

... warrant, and idealised assertibility. A minimalist conception of truth is not committed to any constitutive account of the truth-predicate as it applies to any and every discourse, but is rather satisfied to assign minimal content to the idea of ‘truth-in-general’. At least two approaches...

... application of a truth predicate which is itself relativistic, but theoretically eliminable. So far I have been somewhat obscure about what, exactly, it means to assess a sentence content as true or false, and careful readers may have noticed an apparent inconsistency between this kind of wording...

...This chapter examines the notion of relative truth as it relates to the theory of speech acts, especially assertion. At a basic level, assertion involves portraying content as true; we consider which of our various truth predicates is the one used in this characterization, concluding...

.... It also presents sentences that illustrate Never Raising from the complement of a truth predicate, from a clause with a cleft construction, and from a pseudocleft construction. Finally, it discusses parallels between Never Raising and Classical NR. Fillmore Charles J...

...This chapter focuses on the relationship between philosophy and the concept of truth. Philosophers naturally seek a theory of truth for the entire language; however, an adequate definition of truth can only be given for the fragment of our language that does not contain the truth predicate. A model...

... considers Tarski's notion of truth, which he calls “semantic” truth, before discussing his views on object language and metalanguage, recursive versus direct definition of the truth predicate, and self-reference. Languages like those of formal arithmetic and formal geometry are called first...

...Considers criteria of adequacy for a theory of truth. The semantics of the truth predicate is explicated, together with accounts of what the proximate and ultimate truth conditions of logically complex sentences are. We now have a theory of the determination of truth values in a language. In what...

... of their placeholders. They thus require a truth predicate for their expression, and, moreover, apply only indirectly to actual statements, through the use of Tarskian semantic disquotational facts. On Frege’s universalist conception, in contrast, logical laws are maximally general truths, differing from other truths...

... of the truth predicate, despite the fact that Tarski himself proposed languages that contain a hierarchy of truth predicates. This chapter further shows that untyped theories of truth abandon Tarski’s strictures on truth iteration. It has been argued that self-referential paradoxes are related to particular...

..., the univocity discussed in previous chapters might seem to secure an object-language expression of determinacy of truth-value; but this hope falls short, because such truth-operators must be carefully distinguished from truth-predicates. To introduce these truth-predicates, we outline an internalist attitude...

... a metatheory. But what kind of metatheory? Although the model theoretic semantics with which we are familiar today is a post-Fregean development, most believe that Frege offers a proto-soundness proof for his logic that intrinsically exploits a truth predicate and metalinguistic variables. In this chapter...

...This book explains how to define a disquotational truth predicate that we are directly licensed to apply not only to our own sentences as we use them now, but also to other speakers' sentences and our own sentences as we used them in the past. The conventional wisdom is that there can...