... to the impermissibility of believing its conjuncts. Section III situates the discussion in Sections I and II in the literature about epistemic akrasia. Section IV concludes with an analogy to Moorean propositions. For the rest of the paper, let E range over the positive epistemic statuses...

... but it’s an open question whether I have justification to believe that p. Chapter 9 argues that accessibilism is needed to explain the epistemic irrationality of epistemic akrasia—roughly, believing things you believe you shouldn’t believe. Section 9.1 defines epistemic akrasia...

... Evidence coherence easy knowledge higher-order evidence bootstrapping epistemic akrasia The goal of this chapter is to provide a unified solution to two widely discussed epistemological puzzles. I will begin by setting out each of these two puzzles. I will then briefly survey some of the proposed...

... Higher-order defeat self-misleading evidence epistemic akrasia evidentialism higher-order evidence Evidentialism is the thesis, roughly, that one’s beliefs should fit one’s evidence. The enkratic principle is the thesis, roughly, that one's beliefs should “line up...

... belief credence conditionalization epistemic akrasia It seems obvious that when higher-order evidence makes it rational for one to doubt that one’s own belief or credence on some matter is rational, this in itself can undermine the rationality of that belief or credence. For example, evidence that I...

... how new insights about its nature lead to a different picture of its rational profile. A second and subsidiary goal of the paper is to show how our framework provides a compelling basis for more moderate positions about disagreement and epistemic akrasia. We show that the puzzles about these topics...

... opinions must “line up” with your higher-order opinions—is incorrect; epistemic akrasia can be rational. If all this is right, then it leaves us without answers—but with a clear picture of the question, and a fruitful strategy for pursuing it. Dorst K akrasia first order higher order Christensen D...

... epistemic Barnett D Das N Neta R Schoenfield M Higher-order evidence misleading evidence evidential support epistemic akrasia incoherence epistemic rationality It’s fairly uncontroversial that you can get misleading evidence about your evidence. Suppose the clues at the crime scene do not support...

... inferential belief Sosa E epistemic rationality rationality Structural Sufficiency Fixed Point Thesis FPT Conee E Feldman R justification knowledge reasons evidence epistemic rationality epistemic akrasia knowledge evidentialism internalism–externalism reasons for belief It might not be wise...

... Jaworska A Quinn W Raz J Yaffe G Wallace R J rationality structural requirements of akrasia weakness of will doxastic incontinence epistemic akrasia identification wholeheartedness agent-causation At the end of Chapter 6 , I discussed a case that involved a breakdown of rationality. This case...

... justification to believe that she is the thief. (2) p and I don’t know that p. (1) p and my belief that p is unjustified. Chapter 10 explores a puzzle about epistemic akrasia: if you can have misleading higher-order evidence about what...

... Schoenfield Goldman concessive knowledge attribution threshold for knowledge level-splitting epistemic akrasia defeat higher-order evidence closure practical and theoretical reasoning In this chapter, I want to focus on a recent challenge specifically to undermining defeat. Of course, undermining...

... to their ideals? This chapter explores that question using dual systems psychology, explaining how people can be guided by principles even when they are not consciously reflecting on those principles. de Montaigne Michel Wollstonecraft Mary Descartes René epistemic akrasia Hume David Mill John Stuart Bacon...

...-order evidence epistemic akrasia level-splitting inter-level coherence the Über-rule problem Consider the following familiar cases: The Pill: Sarah finds the right solution to a mathematical problem, but is then told that she might have ingested a reason-distorting pill, which...

... come from a number of different directions. For example, Titelbaum has argued that higher-order defeat is incompatible with the view that epistemic akrasia is irrational (more on epistemic akrasia below); Lasonen-Aarnio has argued that higher-order defeat is incompatible with the view that epistemic...