... perception, demonstrative reference, attention, memory, and cognitive encapsulation. The primary goal is to shed light on the motivations for and challenges facing both conceptualism and nonconceptualism. A secondary goal is to show that each side has to grant significant concessions to the other. Ultimately...

..., excising the distinction between seeing and hallucinating and diminishing the importance of attention and perceptual conscious experience to knowledge of demonstrative reference. References Block, Ned. 1995 . “The Mind as the Software of the Brain.” In D. Osherson, L. Gleitman, S. Kosslyn, E. Smith...

... in colour Figure 2.5. Titchener‐Ebbinghaus illusion Figure 2.6. Two fish Figure 2.7. Poker chip on a table Pictures can be vehicles for demonstrative reference because they put their perceivers in a perceptual state of the kind that grounds demonstrative reference. This is a state that represents...

... reliable and trustworthy? While it is not possible to cover here the full range of linguistic phenomena affected by luck, a wide range of issues in linguistics and philosophy of language are investigated, including syntax processing, demonstrative reference, conversational implicature, testimony, lexical...

... representational content—arises. In §3.1 , I shall argue that ordinary speaker intuition does, after all, provide some evidence for the MCP for the case of perceptual demonstratives. For the account of perceptual demonstrative reference which can be built around the MCP provides a reason to favour one set...

... anti-realism demonstrative reference nonconceptual content perception projection realism sortal concepts Spelke-objects topology visual field Why, if at all, should we be realists about the ‘external world’ of common-sense ontology? I am prompted to raise once more...

... an argument for the determinacy of reference. He proposes an account of reference—via an account of the phenomenal experience of demonstrative reference—that bears out the first-person intuition of determinate reference as correct. Understood properly, reference has a subjective, phenomenal component...

... that rejects (3)—the claim that there can be justification only where there are truth-conditions. With the account of perceptual demonstrative reference fixing as practical acquaintance in place, I can now deliver on this promise. The ‘practical acquaintance’ model entails that in a Case 1...

... of, it is argued that there is no good rationale for maintaining that demonstratives refer in their own right. Rather, they have meanings that constrain their literal use. Speakers can and do use them to refer and to communicate what they use them to refer to without there being any referential role...