...-problem, I argue that the two prominent physicalist realist positions in the literature, orthodox Russellian and type-B physicalism, cannot deliver a solution. I then introduce a posteriori Russellian physicalism, a Russellian version of the phenomenal concept strategy, and show that it can overcome...

... The Russell-Myhill paradox (RMP) puts pressure on the Russellian structured view of propositions (structurism) by showing that it conflicts with certain prima facie attractive ontological and logical principles. I describe several versions of RMP and argue that structurists can appeal to natural assumptions...

... This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model ( https://dbpia.nl.go.kr/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model ) Abstract According to Russellian monism, phenomenal consciousness...

... good reason to reject it. Panpsychism Russellian monism Panprotopsychism Simplicity Goff Motivating panpsychism is not easy. In the face of incredulous stares, the demand for strong supporting arguments is high. Could simplicity help? It is this suggestion that the current paper...

...The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism. Torin Alter, Oxford University Press. © Torin Alter 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198840459.003.0001 Here I introduce the knowledge argument and outline the book. I start with a brief explanation...

...The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism. Torin Alter, Oxford University Press. © Torin Alter 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198840459.003.0014 This chapter considers whether, if sound, the knowledge argument shows that there are brute facts about...

...This chapter argues that, if every truth has a truthmaker, then some of those truthmakers are states of affairs or, in other words, events or Russellian facts. Moreover, some of those truthmaking states of affairs must have certain of their constituents essentially. Furthermore, if Truthmaker...

...This chapter discusses three forms of the combination problem for Russellian monism: the palette problem, the structural mismatch problem, and the subject irreducibility problem. These are grouped together as “top–down combination problems,” meaning that they start from reflection on the nature...

... argument and David Chalmers’ two-dimensional conceivability argument—are not wholly adequate. The second half of the book explores and defends a radical alternative to physicalism known as “Russellian monism.” Russellian monists believe that (i) physics tells us nothing about the concrete, categorical...

.... The theory constrains, but provides no complete account of, the nature of the propositions we believe. Most face-value theorists hold that the propositions we believe are structured, and the big contest here is between Russellian and Fregean propositions. Both conceptions are problematic. face value theory...

..., this seems neither necessary nor even likely (and these points may be generalized to other perceptual modes). Which of these properties is plausibly attributed to Russellian propositions? Regarding truth value, if the copperbeach I am viewing is dense, then that the copperbeach is dense...

...This chapter elaborates two standard versions of a view of consciousness known as Russellian Monism. The key idea of this view is that the fundamental entities in micro-reality have intrinsic natures not specified in microphysics, natures that include a range of properties crucial to consciousness...

...This chapter illustrates how the Frege cases pose major problems for language of thought (LOT) due to its neo-Russellian semantics that directly oppose its symbolic view of thinking. If this criticism is accepted, the soundness of any theory of psychological explanation based on neo-Russellianism...

... Representationalism in philosophy of perception Boghossian Paul Gibson James Marr David McGilvray James Velleman J David Gupta Anil Russellian theory of content Travis Charles Antirealism in philosophy of color Averill Edward Wilson Jackson Frank Orange Physicalism Relationism in philosophy of color...

...This chapter introduces and precisely defines the view that will be explored and defended in the second half of the book: Russellian monism. Various categories of Russellian monism are explored—panpsychist, panprotopsychist, constitutive, emergentist, panqualityist—and ultimately seven kinds...

... descriptions uniqueness familiarity Russellian uniqueness familiarity theories of definiteness “What you have is a Supergun. No, not ‘a’ Supergun, it’s ‘the’ Supergun. The only one of its kind.” – Louise Penny, The Nature of the Beast (2015), Chapter 12 the main topics...

... Jeffrey theory of propositions actions of ascription singular propositions as classificatory approach to content by singular propositions content composition logical composition singular propositions Fregean propositions Russellian propositions act-type theory of propositions formal semantics...

... protophenomenal properties qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis for phenomenal representation qualitative natures Adams Robert Armstrong David Chalmers David Strawson Galen conceivability argument Russellian monism McKitrick Jennifer dynamical properties micropsychism structural properties Alter Torin...

...Soft reduction of modality is sketched. It is a metaphysical position according to which modal facts are just as real and objective as temporal facts. Various kinds of possibility are distinguished. Some theories of how ‘that’-clauses designate propositions are discussed and rejected. A Russellian...

...A modal Russellian theory of ‘that’-clauses which takes ‘that’-clauses to be Russellian descriptions of propositions is proposed. Propositions are reduced to tuples of collections of worlds, possible and impossible. Non-propositional contents are sketched. Various kinds of belief reports...