...Josh Quirke Everettian quantum mechanics quantum mechanics philosophy of physics metaphysics probability parfit fission Correspondence to: Josh Quirke, [email protected] © The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association...

...) are both true. Philosophers attracted to the conjunction of (1) and (2) ought to try to defend it by appeal to something other than future bias. death Lucretius’ Puzzle future bias Epicureanism Anthony Brueckner John Martin Fischer Derek Parfit Philosophers often say that we typically have...

...Bastian Steuwer But why should we follow Parfit in believing that Relation R leads us to accept person stages as the unit of moral concern? Why should we believe that entire lives are not strongly integrated? Broadly speaking there are two possible arguments, contra Parfit, that lives are strongly...

...:https://dbpia.nl.go.kr/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model ) Abstract In the posthumously published ‘Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles’ (2017), Derek Parfit presents a novel axiological principle which he calls the Wide Dual Person...

... Parfit to the same effect in a recent paper. McMahan uses these arguments to derive conclusions concerning the moral status of embryos and permanent vegetative state (PVS) patients. My claim will be that neither thinker has successfully shown that we are not human beings, and therefore these arguments do...

...Christian Perring © 1997 by The Society for Health and Human Values 1997 Abstract In this paper I argue that a Naturalist conception of personhood, such as the one defended by Derek Parfit, implies that there are degrees of personhood, i.e., that it makes sense to say one individual has a greater...

...Figure 1.1 Parfit’s continuum Figure 1.2 The Zone Figure 1.3 Against incomparability Figure 1.4 Parfit’s imprecise lexicality solution This chapter examines four seemingly promising ways to defuse continua or “spectra” arguments that exploit normative predicates like “better than...

...Figure 9.1 Figure 9.2 Derek Parfit’s much discussed “repugnant conclusion” that concerns moral questions about population size presumably makes trouble for certain forms of utilitarianism. After explaining in some detail Parfit’s case for the repugnant conclusion, this chapter goes on to argue...

...This chapter introduces two temporal biases which will be discussed in part III of the book: the bias towards the near (future) and the bias towards the future. It also analyses the irrationality of Derek Parfit’s Future-Tuesday-Indifference. It ends by arguing that we have an experience of time...

... that there are irreducible normative reasons, as claimed by Derek Parfit. Therefore, the intrinsic goodness of these experiences for us cannot involve any such reasons. Autonomy Persson I Pleasure Things going well for someone welfare Well being Crisp R Frankena W Mill J S Moore G E Naturalistic fallacy Norman R...

...Derek Parfit’s repugnant conclusion threatens the inclusive view of benefiting, as it threatens every view which implies that an outcome can be made better by the addition of beings who lead good lives, whether or not this benefits them. This chapter explains how the repugnant conclusion can...

...Many things matter, some of them greatly, but Parfit and I differ on how to understand this truism. Parfit’s kind of non-naturalism, it is argued, fails to provide a basis for explaining normative judgments, and an alternative must start with materials different from Parfit’s. My own analysis...

...Parfit’s attempt to supply an adequate epistemology for his objectivist theory of normative reasons rests on a conflation of the thesis that there are normative reasons with the thesis that there are robustly mind-independent normative reasons...

...Parfit devotes several chapters of On What Matters to a discussion of Nietzsche’s work. He is especially concerned to defuse the threat that Nietzsche might be thought to pose to the “Convergence Claim” that Parfit himself defends. But is it really reasonable to expect that, even...

...This chapter responds to Derek Parfit’s claim that if meta-ethical non-cognitivism or reductive realism turned out to be true, then his life would have been wasted. An argument is given that Parfit’s life has not been wasted, and the argument is examined to see which premises could turn out...

... that the book defends, an attachment-sensitive conception of leading a life. It ends with an outline of the book. detachment attachment Derek Parfit Sharon Street Thomas Nagel Kwong-loi Shun David Velleman What is it to lead a human life? Viewed in one way, this is an odd question. Many...

...0 13 01 2025 This chapter discusses what Derek Parfit calls “the bias toward the future”: our preference that certain kinds of painful experiences lie in our past rather than our future, and that certain kinds of pleasurable experiences lie in our future rather than our past. Parfit argues...

... Habermas Jurgen Murdoch Iris pragmatism Price Huw Sellars Wilfrid Brandom Robert Frege Geach problem Austin J L semantics Williams Michael Dewey John Rorty Richard Parfit Derek Joyce Richard Street Sharon Williams Bernard expressivism desire concern commitment Hume Nietzsche Dworkin...

...In this chapter, the author explains what the non-identity problem is and why it matters, as well as Derek Parfit’s central role in the literature on the problem. The author explains the solution to the problem Parfit tentatively proposed in Reasons and Persons (1984) and the two...

..., Derek Parfit, Joseph Raz, Harry Frankfurt). By “absolute standards,” authors usually refer to standards whose validity or plausibility does not depend on comparison. “Relative standards,” on the other hand, depend on comparative measures to gain informational value. Whether I am considered wealthy may...