... (2005) provides two nice examples – he directs them against Dretske (1971 , 2005 ), but they apply to Nozick as well: on Nozick’s original account, the subject in the zebra case, S, comes out knowing the conjunction [Z & ¬M]: that [Z] the animal in the pen is a zebra and [¬M...

... of this fundamental perceptual capacity is prone to an understanding, according to which propositional perception can be analysed by means of objectual perception. Based on a comparison with Fred Dretske’s definition of ‘propositional seeing’, I argue that this is a mistake resulting from the ill-founded belief...

...The critiques of the regularity theory by Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and D. M. Armstrong are shown to fail. A categorization of “accidental generalizations” is offered. The failures of the best system analysis version of the regularity theory, for example, the failure to define simplicity...

... knowledge? This chapter examines the puzzle in depth, as it arises for belief, perception, and sensation. Gallois’s own solution to the puzzle is criticized, as are those offered by Richard Moran and Fred Dretske. The puzzle of transparency in the special case of sensations is also discussed...

...This chapter argues that the formal requirements on self-describing media shed light on two elusive questions in the philosophy of mind. The first is a question that Dretske raised in Naturalizing the Mind: why do we have conscious access to the intrinsic properties of experience...

...Argues that the core of the concept of knowledge is true belief plus some property indicative of true belief and that there is no detailed answer to the query ‘and what property is that?’ The Nozick–Dretske counterfactual analysis, Alvin Goldman's causal theory, reliabilism, and the justified true...

...This chapter analyses intentional realism and the philosophy of science, followed by a description of belief attributions. It focuses on Fred Dretske's theory, which implies that mental states get representational content during a learning period when mentality becomes perfect indicators...

...This chapter uses recent work on epistemic contextualism to defend a version of Dretske’s claim that evidence must be conclusive when it is used as the basis of knowledge. Advocates of epistemic contextualism usually defend the claim by arguing that it can solve certain puzzles about knowledge...

.... This chapter argues against the idea that knowledge is more general than factual awareness, and it also argues that the case for identifying knowledge and factual awareness is underdetermined. awareness entails knowledge A→K Generality of Awareness Generality of Knowledge Identity View Dretske Fred...

... M closure Klein P Hempel C G raven paradox Dretske F Stine G Yourgrau P Audi R BonJour L Goldman A Kornblith H relevant alternative Schmitt F Shatz D counterfactual Ginet C Shuger S Adler J Forbes G Hill C Vogel J knowledge closure counterpossibility Dretske Klein Shuger...

...This chapter examines Peter Klein's ingenious defense of closure and raises a number of problems for it. closure Klein P Dretske F Gettier E Cartesian skepticism Cohen S Hempel C G Vogel J Alston W epistemic circularity closure Peter Klein Dretske lottery problem conditional...

... come by our knowledge of what others think and feel through perception. The idea has been worked out in different ways by different philosophers. In this chapter I consider the perceptual account proposed by Fred Dretske. In section one I outline Dretske’s account, and highlight a particular feature...

...According to Fred Dretske’ evidence argument I cannot know that that I am seeing my son (and other simple first-personal present tense psychological facts). However, since I can and do know these things, something is wrong with the evidence argument. What? I suggest that the argument overlooks...

... of interest in reliabilism, a particular species of externalism, and in this chapter, I examine three externalist and reliabilist accounts of warrant: those offered or suggested by William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman. After introducing the notion of Alstonian justification, I point out...

...Once one has ‘sparse’ universals it is natural to think that an account of laws of nature can be given in terms of relations between these universals. Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and myself all proposed this view at much the same time. My own first version was subjected to trenchant criticism...

... critically examined include those of Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and David Armstrong. These accounts display most saliently the impossibility of a simultaneous metaphysical solution to the joint problems of inference and of identification. Special attention is given to the failures of David Armstrong's...

...Fred Dretske has raised an amusing counter‐example to a plausible epistemic principle of testimonial transmission—namely, that if someone knows something then, given that certain simple conditions hold, he or she can bring an audience to know that thing by telling them that it is so. Dretske's...

... regarding the ontological status of information and on the notion of information’s flow are drawn. The chapter closes with a brief discussion of Dretske’s attempt to base a semantic notion of information on Shannon’s theory. It is argued that the attempt is not successful. In general, the grounds on which...

... skepticism verificationism Dretske Fred Nozick Robert counterfactual McGinn Colin McDowell John Moorean sensitivity condition for knowledge Williamson Timothy Hand Michael Cohen Stewart contextualism contextualist DeRose Keith Hawthorne John invariantism invariantist Lewis David Sosa...

...’) is commonly thus supported. Well-known argument by Fred Dretske is selected for critical examination, which leads into the assessment of externalist notions of defeasibility. Certain fundamental presuppositions of these externalist arguments are identified and questioned. The problem of how our belief...