<?xml version="1.0"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:prism="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/prism/">
  <channel>
    <title>IMA Journal of Management Mathematics Open Access</title>
    <link>https://dbpia.nl.go.kr/imaman</link>
    <description>
    </description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 08:46:32 GMT</lastBuildDate>
    <generator>Silverchair</generator>
    <item>
      <title>Optimal Interest Rates and Repayment Penalties under Strategic Delay in Microfinance Lending</title>
      <link>https://dbpia.nl.go.kr/imaman/advance-article/doi/10.1093/imaman/dpag042/9016051?rss=1</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;span class="paragraphSection"&gt;&lt;div class="boxTitle"&gt;Abstract&lt;/div&gt;Strategic repayment delay is a major concern for microfinance institutions because it affects loan recovery and financial sustainability. This paper develops a discrete-time Markov chain model of individual repayment dynamics using data from a Ghanaian microfinance institution (MFI) to examine how interest rates and late-repayment penalties affect borrower incentives and lender sustainability. Borrowers transition among applicant, beneficiary, delay, permanent exclusion, and reapplication states. We derive expected discounted wealth across these states and formulate a constrained optimization problem that maximizes borrower wealth subject to MFI sustainability and an incentive-compatibility condition that prevents strategic delay. The model yields explicit expressions for the optimal interest rate and penalty and establishes a feasibility condition linking timely repayment probability, borrower revenue, and lending cost. Results show that, without penalties, delaying repayment can generate greater expected wealth than timely repayment, while higher interest rates further weaken repayment incentives. A feasible interest-rate–penalty combination exists only when timely repayment exceeds 52.5%, given borrower revenue equal to twice the capital lent and a lending cost of 5% of the amount lent. As this probability increases from $55\%$ to $85\%$, the optimal interest rate falls from $90.91\%$ to $23.53\%$, while the optimal penalty is non-monotonic. Using the data-based permanent-exclusion rate of $\alpha _{2}=0.3020$, the observed repayment rate of $46.08\%$ falls below the feasibility threshold, making individual lending infeasible under the present assumptions.&lt;/span&gt;</description>
      <prism:startingPage xmlns:prism="prism">dpag042</prism:startingPage>
      <prism:doi xmlns:prism="prism">10.1093/imaman/dpag042</prism:doi>
      <guid>http://doi.org/10.1093/imaman/dpag042</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>