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Artashes Karapetyan, Jens Soerlie Kvaerner, Maximilian Rohrer, Inefficient Regulation: Mortgages versus Total Credit, Review of Finance, Volume 28, Issue 1, January 2024, Pages 311–351, https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfad023
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Abstract
We estimate the willingness-to-pay to bypass a loan-to-value (LTV) cap. Our identification relies on exogenous variation in debt exempt from the LTV regulation that can only be used as a substitute for a personal mortgage. Our baseline estimate reveals that homebuyers pay 7.3 Swedish Kroner (SEK) to avoid 1 SEK of equity down payment. The supply of debt not part of the LTV calculation increased by approximately 50% within 2 years after the LTV regulation. Financially weaker households drive the results.
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