-
Views
-
Cite
Cite
Jean Paul Rabanal, Olga A Rud, Does Competition Affect Truth Telling? An Experiment with Rating Agencies, Review of Finance, Volume 22, Issue 4, July 2018, Pages 1581–1604, https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfx012
- Share Icon Share
Abstract
We use an experimental approach to study the effect of market structure on the incidence of misreporting by credit rating agencies. In the game, agencies receive a signal regarding the type of asset held by the seller and issue a report. The sellers then present the asset, with the report if one is solicited, to the buyer for purchase. We find that competition among rating agencies significantly reduces the likelihood of misreporting.
© The Authors 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Finance Association. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected]
This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://dbpia.nl.go.kr/journals/pages/about_us/legal/notices)
JEL
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Issue Section:
Articles
You do not currently have access to this article.