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Katarzyna Bolonek-Lasoń, General quantum two-player games, their gate operators, and Nash equilibria, Progress of Theoretical and Experimental Physics, Volume 2015, Issue 2, February 2015, 023A03, https://doi.org/10.1093/ptep/ptv004
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Abstract
Two-player |$N$|-strategy games quantized according to the Eisert–Lewenstein–Wilkens scheme [Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)] are considered. Group-theoretical methods are applied to the problem of finding a general form of gate operators (entanglers) under the assumption that the set of classical pure strategies is contained in the set of pure quantum ones. The role of the stability group of the initial state of the game is stressed. As an example, it is shown that maximally entangled games do not admit nontrivial pure Nash strategies. The general arguments are supported by explicit computations performed in the three-strategy case.
1. Introduction
In two important papers [1, 2], Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein proposed a method that, given some classical non-cooperative game, allows the construction its quantum counterpart. The example they described provides a paradigm of a wide class of quantum games. Since then, the theory of quantum games has been a subject of intensive research [3–53].
In their attempt to justify the interest in quantum games, Eisert, Lewenstein, and Wilkens speculate that games of survival are already being played on a molecular level, where things are happening according to the rules of quantum mechanics. They also point out that there is an intimate connection between the theory of games and the theory of quantum communication.
The Eisert–Lewenstein–Wilkens (ELW) game can be played by purely classical means. To this end, one can compute (on a classical computer), according to the standard rules of quantum theory, the relevant probabilities (and payoffs), and toss coins that are appropriately biased on these values. However, it can happen that this is not physically feasible due to limited resources and time. In such a case, only quantum mechanics allows for an implementation of the game due to the existence of specific quantum correlations that, in general, break the Bell-like inequalities. In this respect, quantum games resemble quantum coding or quantum computing: the use of non-classical correlations can lead to high effectiveness.
Let us briefly describe the original ELW proposal [1]. One starts with a classical two-player (Alice and Bob) two-strategy (|$C$| (cooperate) and |$D$| (defect)) non-cooperative symmetric game, described in Table 1.
Strategies . | Payoffs . | ||
---|---|---|---|
player A . | player B . | player A . | player B . |
|$C$| | |$C$| | |$r$| | |$r$| |
|$C$| | |$D$| | |$s$| | |$t$| |
|$D$| | |$C$| | |$t$| | |$s$| |
|$D$| | |$D$| | |$p$| | |$p$| |
Strategies . | Payoffs . | ||
---|---|---|---|
player A . | player B . | player A . | player B . |
|$C$| | |$C$| | |$r$| | |$r$| |
|$C$| | |$D$| | |$s$| | |$t$| |
|$D$| | |$C$| | |$t$| | |$s$| |
|$D$| | |$D$| | |$p$| | |$p$| |
Strategies . | Payoffs . | ||
---|---|---|---|
player A . | player B . | player A . | player B . |
|$C$| | |$C$| | |$r$| | |$r$| |
|$C$| | |$D$| | |$s$| | |$t$| |
|$D$| | |$C$| | |$t$| | |$s$| |
|$D$| | |$D$| | |$p$| | |$p$| |
Strategies . | Payoffs . | ||
---|---|---|---|
player A . | player B . | player A . | player B . |
|$C$| | |$C$| | |$r$| | |$r$| |
|$C$| | |$D$| | |$s$| | |$t$| |
|$D$| | |$C$| | |$t$| | |$s$| |
|$D$| | |$D$| | |$p$| | |$p$| |
There are three main elements that determine the properties of an ELW game.
First, one chooses the classical payoff table, i.e., the values |$p$|, |$r$|, |$s$|, and |$t$|. The classical game is then uniquely defined. Some choices are more interesting than others. For example, if the classical payoffs obey |$t>r>p>s$|, the prisoner dilemma emerges on the classical level.
- A crucial role is played by the gate operator |$J$| (entangler), which introduces quantum entanglement. It converts the classical game into a genuinely quantum one. Two assumptions are made concerning the form of |$J$|: (a) to preserve the symmetry of the game, |$J$| is symmetric with respect to the interchange of the players; (b) the quantum game entails a faithful representation of its classical counterpart. In the case of the original ELW game, (a) and (b) determine |$J$| up to one free parameter; namely,where |$\gamma$| is real and |$\sigma _2$| is the second Pauli matrix.(5)\[J=\exp \left ( -\frac {i\gamma }{2}\sigma _2\otimes \sigma _2\right ) ,\]
The properties of the ELW game also depend on the choice of the subset |$\Sigma$| of allowed strategies |$U_A$| and |$U_B$|. In general, |$\Sigma \subset {\textit {SU}}(2)$| because the trivial |$U(1)$| factor can be neglected. In the original Eisert et al. proposal, the allowed strategies belong to the 2D submanifold of |${\textit {SU}}(2)$|, which itself is not a group. This point of view was criticized by Benjamin and Hayden [3], who pointed out that there are no compelling reasons to impose such a restriction; it seems difficult to find a physical justification for the choice proposed by Eisert et al. We shall adopt the point of view presented in Ref. [3] and assume that the manifold of admissible strategies always forms a group.
The aim of the present paper is twofold. We generalize the ELW construction to the case of two-player |$N$|-strategy games. Again, the starting point is a non-cooperative classical game defined by an arbitrary symmetric payoff table. The quantum strategies of Alice and Bob are represented by arbitrary unitary matrices (neglecting the irrelevant overall phase factor), i.e., we assume that |$\Sigma = {\textit {SU}}(N)$|. The only nontrivial point consists in defining an appropriate entangler |$J$|. We demand, following the original ELW construction, that the resulting quantum game is symmetric and includes the classical game. It then appears that there exists a multiparameter family of acceptable entanglers |$J$| with the number of arbitrary parameters growing quadratically with |$N$|. As a result, we obtain a far-reaching generalization of the original ELW game.
Our second aim is to show that the group-theoretical methods provide quite a powerful tool for analyzing the general properties of quantum games. A good example is provided by the construction of the entangler |$J$|, which is based on considering the cyclic subgroup of the permutation group. Next, we show that an important role is played by the stability group of the initial state of the game. Its structure depends, to some extent, on the entanglement degree of |$\left | \Psi _{\rm in}\right \rangle$|; the maximally entangled state corresponds to a large stability group. As a result, maximally entangled games have peculiar properties. To see this, consider the |$N=2$| case. The relevant entangler is given by Eq. (5). The case of maximal entanglement corresponds to |$\gamma =\frac {\pi }{2}$|. It has been shown by Landsburg [28, 40, 41] that, for this value of |$\gamma$|, the game can be described in terms of quaternion algebra. Moreover, the resulting outcome probabilities depend only on the product of quaternions representing the strategies of Alice and Bob. This allows us to conclude, e.g., that no nontrivial (in the sense described below) pure Nash equilibrium exists. It has been shown in Ref. [45] that the quaternionic structure (and the real Hilbert space structure behind it) and nonexistence of Nash equilibria result from the structure of the stability group of the initial vector. In the present paper, we generalize this result. Although, for |$N>2$|, the quaternionic structure of the quantum game is lost, one can still show that, in the case of maximal entanglement, no nontrivial pure Nash equilibrium exists. This result is very general. It depends neither on the form of the classical payoff table nor on the actual form of the gate operator. The proof is very simple and is based on group-theoretical considerations. It shows the power of group-theory methods.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we describe the generalization of the ELW game to the case of |$N$| strategies. Then we prove that no nontrivial pure Nash equilibrium exists if the initial state is maximally entangled.
In Sect. 3, a wide class of entanglers is constructed for arbitrary |$N$|. The construction is based on simple use of the representation of the cyclic subgroup of the permutation group. It is shown that the number of free parameters is essentially determined by the rank of |${\textit {SU}}(N)$| and is proportional to |$N^2$|.
The case |$N=3$| is considered in more detail in Sect. 4. The general three-parameter gate operator is explicitly constructed. All values of the parameters leading to maximally entangled games are determined. Some non-maximally entangled games are considered that correspond to doubly degenerate or non-degenerate initial reduced density matrices. In a number of cases, the explicit form of the generators of the stability group is determined and is shown to agree with the general results obtained in Sect. 3.
Section 5 is devoted to some conclusions. A number of technical details are relegated to the appendices.
The present work is based on three papers [54–56].
2. Two-player |$N$|-strategy quantum games
We see that the construction of the generalized ELW game proceeds along the same lines as in the original |${\textit {SU}}(2)$| case. There is, however, an important difference. Since the |${\textit {SU}}(2)$| group has rank one, the set of allowed gate operators |$J$| is parametrized by one real parameter |$\gamma$| (cf. Eq. (5)). For general |$N$|, there is much more freedom in the choice of |$J$|. In fact, as will be shown below, |$J$| depends on a number of free parameters growing proportionally to |$N^2$|. However, the explicit form of |$J$| is irrelevant to the problem discussed in the remaining part of this section.
The degree of entanglement of the initial state Eq. (7) depends on the actual values of the parameters entering |$J$|. For example, in the |$N=2$| case, the maximal entanglement is achieved by putting |$\gamma =\frac {\pi }{2}$| in Eq. (5). It is known that the resulting game possesses special properties. In fact, it has been shown that, unless some restrictions on |$\Sigma$| are imposed, to any move of Alice there corresponds a “countermove” of Bob that allows him to neutralize Alice's intentions (and vice versa) [3, 45]. This is easily seen in the quaternionic formalism introduced by Landsburg [28, 40, 41]. Since the strategies of Alice and Bob are elements of the |${\textit {SU}}(2)$| group, they can be represented by unit quaternions |$q_A$| and |$q_B$|. It appears that the outcome probabilities Eq. (3) depend only on their product |$q_A\cdot q_B$|. This property makes obvious the existence of countermoves.
Our aim here is to show that the existence of countermoves is the general property of maximally entangled games even if there is no underlying quaternionic structure (which exists only in the |$N=2$| case).
As a result, there is no pure Nash equilibrium unless, among |$N^2$| pairs of classical strategies, there exists one leading to the optimal outcomes for both Alice and Bob [28]. In this sense, there exist only trivial pure Nash equilibria.
One should stress that the existence of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria is not excluded. In fact, the Nash theorem can be generalized to quantum games [21]. In the simplest |$N=2$| case, the examples of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria are given in Refs. [2, 11].
Let us stress again that, in the above reasoning, neither the explicit form of the payoff table nor that of the gate operator |$J$| are necessary; only the geometry of unitary groups enters the game.
Finally, let us note that, given a fixed classical payoff matrix, pure Nash equilibria may not exist even if we deviate from the point of maximal entanglement. As an example, consider the |$N=2$| case. The relevant gate operator is given by Eq. (5) with |$\gamma$| varying in the interval |$\left \langle 0,\frac {\pi }{2}\right \rangle$|; |$\gamma =\frac {\pi }{2}$| corresponds to maximal entanglement. Assume that, apart from |$t>r>p>s$|, the payoffs (cf. Eq. (4)) obey |$r+p>t+s$|. Then no pure Nash equilibrium exists in the whole interval |$\gamma _B\lt \gamma \leq \frac {\pi }{2}$|, while, for |$\gamma \lt \gamma _B$|, there is an infinite number of them; here |$\sin ^2\gamma _B=\frac {p-s}{\left ( p-s\right ) + \left ( t-r\right ) }$| [19]. By taking, e.g., |$s=0$|, |$p=1$|, |$r=2$|, |$t=2+ \varepsilon$|, one obtains |$\sin ^2\gamma _B=\frac {1}{1+ \varepsilon }$|, so |$\gamma _B$| can be arbitrary close to |$\frac {\pi }{2}$|. Therefore, by an appropriate choice of payoff matrix, one obtains a game possessing Nash equilibria and as close to the maximal entanglement point as one wishes. On the other hand, for any |$\varepsilon >0$|, the nonexistence of Nash equilibria extends to non-maximally entangled games in some neighborhood of the maximally entangled one. However, the important point is that the nonexistence of Nash equilibria for the maximally entangled game is of purely group-theoretical origin, while otherwise the particular form of the payoff matrix is relevant.
3. Gate operators for |$N$|-strategy quantum games
in order to preserve the symmetry of the initial classical game, the gate operator |$J$| is symmetric under the exchange of the factors in the tensor product of Hilbert spaces ascribed to Alice and Bob;
all classical pure strategies are contained in the set of pure quantum ones.
Similar reasoning is valid if |$F$| is noninvertible. However, in all cases considered below, the gate operators yield invertible |$F$| matrices.
4. The case of three strategies
In the previous section, a fairly general construction of entanglers for |$N$|-strategy quantum games was described. We will now restrict our considerations to the |$N=3$| case. This will allow us to give an explicit characterization of the most general matrices representing classical strategies and to find explicitly the values of parameters yielding a maximally entangled game. Moreover, in some cases (including those corresponding to maximal entanglement), the generators of the stability subgroup |$G_s$| are computed.
. | |$U_1$| . | |$U_2$| . | |$U_3$| . |
---|---|---|---|
|$\lambda _1$| | 1 | 1 | |$\varepsilon$| |
|$\lambda _2$| | 1 | |$\varepsilon$| | 1 |
|$\lambda _3$| | 1 | |$\varepsilon ^2$| | |$\varepsilon ^2$| |
. | |$U_1$| . | |$U_2$| . | |$U_3$| . |
---|---|---|---|
|$\lambda _1$| | 1 | 1 | |$\varepsilon$| |
|$\lambda _2$| | 1 | |$\varepsilon$| | 1 |
|$\lambda _3$| | 1 | |$\varepsilon ^2$| | |$\varepsilon ^2$| |
. | |$U_1$| . | |$U_2$| . | |$U_3$| . |
---|---|---|---|
|$\lambda _1$| | 1 | 1 | |$\varepsilon$| |
|$\lambda _2$| | 1 | |$\varepsilon$| | 1 |
|$\lambda _3$| | 1 | |$\varepsilon ^2$| | |$\varepsilon ^2$| |
. | |$U_1$| . | |$U_2$| . | |$U_3$| . |
---|---|---|---|
|$\lambda _1$| | 1 | 1 | |$\varepsilon$| |
|$\lambda _2$| | 1 | |$\varepsilon$| | 1 |
|$\lambda _3$| | 1 | |$\varepsilon ^2$| | |$\varepsilon ^2$| |
- |$\rho =\dfrac {2\pi }{3}$|, |$\sigma =\tau =0$|(61)\begin{align} G_1&=\left ( \lambda _1-\sqrt {3}\lambda _2+ \frac {2}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _1-\sqrt {3}\lambda _2+ \frac {2}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_2&=\left ( \sqrt {3}\lambda _2+ \lambda _3+ \lambda _4-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \sqrt {3}\lambda _2+ \lambda _3+ \lambda _4-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_3&=\left ( \lambda _3+2\lambda _6+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _3+2\lambda _6+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_4&=\left ( \lambda _2+ \lambda _5\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _2+ \lambda _5\right ) \\ G_5&=\left ( 4\lambda _2+ \sqrt {3}\lambda _3+2\lambda _7-3\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( 4\lambda _2+ \sqrt {3}\lambda _3+2\lambda _7-3\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_6&=\left ( \lambda _1-\frac {1}{2}\lambda _4+ \frac {1}{4}\lambda _6-\frac {3\sqrt {3}}{4}\lambda _7-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I\\ &\quad +I\otimes \left ( \lambda _1-\frac {1}{2}\lambda _4+ \frac {1}{4}\lambda _6-\frac {3\sqrt {3}}{4}\lambda _7-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_7&=\left ( \lambda _2-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _4-\lambda _5-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{4}\lambda _6+ \frac {1}{4}\lambda _7+ \frac {3}{2}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I\\ &\quad +I\otimes \left ( \lambda _2-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _4-\lambda _5-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{4}\lambda _6+ \frac {1}{4}\lambda _7+ \frac {3}{2}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_8&=\left ( \lambda _3-\lambda _4-\frac {1}{2}\lambda _6-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _7\right ) \otimes I+I\otimes \left ( \lambda _3-\lambda _4-\frac {1}{2}\lambda _6-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _7\right ) \end{align}
- |$\sigma =\frac {2\pi }{3}$|, |$\rho =\tau =0$|(62)\begin{align} G_1&=\left ( \lambda _1-\sqrt {3}\lambda _7+ \frac {2}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _1-\sqrt {3}\lambda _7+ \frac {2}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_2&=\left ( -\lambda _3+2\lambda _4+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( -\lambda _3+2\lambda _4+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_3&=\left ( -\lambda _3+ \lambda _6+ \sqrt {3}\lambda _7-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( -\lambda _3+ \lambda _6+ \sqrt {3}\lambda _7-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_4&=\left ( \lambda _2-\lambda _7\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _2-\lambda _7\right ) \\ G_5&=\left ( \sqrt {3}\lambda _3+2\lambda _5-4\lambda _7+3\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \sqrt {3}\lambda _3+2\lambda _5-4\lambda _7+3\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_6&=\left ( \lambda _1+ \frac {1}{4}\lambda _4+ \frac {3\sqrt {3}}{4}\lambda _5-\frac {1}{2}\lambda _6-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I\\ & \quad +I\otimes \left ( \lambda _1+ \frac {1}{4}\lambda _4+ \frac {3\sqrt {3}}{4}\lambda _5-\frac {1}{2}\lambda _6-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_7&=\left ( \lambda _2-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{4}\lambda _4-\frac {1}{4}\lambda _5-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _6+ \lambda _7+ \frac {3}{2}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I\\ &\quad +I\otimes \left ( \lambda _2-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{4}\lambda _4-\frac {1}{4}\lambda _5-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _6+ \lambda _7+ \frac {3}{2}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_8&=\left ( \lambda _3+ \frac {1}{2}\lambda _4-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _5+ \lambda _6\right ) \otimes I+I\otimes \left ( \lambda _3+ \frac {1}{2}\lambda _4-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _5+ \lambda _6\right ) \end{align}
- |$\tau =\frac {2\pi }{3}$|, |$\rho =\sigma =0$|(63)\begin{align} G_1&=\left ( \lambda _1-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _1-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_2&=\left ( \lambda _5+ \lambda _7\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _5+ \lambda _7\right ) \\ G_3&=\left ( \lambda _2+ \sqrt {3}\lambda _3-2\lambda _5\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _2+ \sqrt {3}\lambda _3-2\lambda _5\right ) \\ G_4&=\left ( \lambda _4+ \lambda _6-\frac {2}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _4+ \lambda _6-\frac {2}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_5&=\left ( 2\lambda _3+ \lambda _4-2\sqrt {3}\lambda _5-\lambda _6\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( 2\lambda _3+ \lambda _4-2\sqrt {3}\lambda _5-\lambda _6\right ) \\ G_6&=\left ( \lambda _1+ \lambda _4+ \lambda _6+ \sqrt {3}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I+I\otimes \left ( \lambda _1+ \lambda _4+ \lambda _6+ \sqrt {3}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_7&=\left ( \lambda _2+ \frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _4+ \frac {1}{2}\lambda _5-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _6-\frac {1}{2}\lambda _7\right ) \otimes I\\ & \quad +I\otimes \left ( \lambda _2+ \frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _4+ \frac {1}{2}\lambda _5-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _6-\frac {1}{2}\lambda _7\right ) \\ G_8&=\left ( \lambda _3+ \frac {1}{2}\lambda _4+ \frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _5-\frac {1}{2}\lambda _6-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _7\right ) \otimes I\\ &\quad +I\otimes \left ( \lambda _3+ \frac {1}{2}\lambda _4+ \frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _5-\frac {1}{2}\lambda _6-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _7\right ) \end{align}
- |$\rho =\frac {4\pi }{3}$|, |$\sigma =\tau =\frac {2\pi }{3}$|(64)\begin{align} G_1&=\left ( \lambda _1+ \sqrt {3}\lambda _2+ \frac {2}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _1+ \sqrt {3}\lambda _2+ \frac {2}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_2&= \left ( -\sqrt {3}\lambda _2+ \lambda _3+ \lambda _4-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( -\sqrt {3}\lambda _2+ \lambda _3+ \lambda _4-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_3&=\left ( \lambda _3+2\lambda _6+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _3+2\lambda _6+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_4&=\left ( \lambda _2+ \lambda _5\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _2+ \lambda _5\right ) \\ G_5&=\left ( 4\lambda _2-\sqrt {3}\lambda _3+2\lambda _7+3\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( 4\lambda _2-\sqrt {3}\lambda _3+2\lambda _7+3\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_6&=\left ( \lambda _1-\frac {1}{2}\lambda _4+ \frac {1}{4}\lambda _6+ \frac {3\sqrt {3}}{4}\lambda _7-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I\\ & \quad +I\otimes \left ( \lambda _1-\frac {1}{2}\lambda _4+ \frac {1}{4}\lambda _6+ \frac {3\sqrt {3}}{4}\lambda _7-\frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_7&=\left ( \lambda _2+ \frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _4-\lambda _5+ \frac {\sqrt {3}}{4}\lambda _6+ \frac {1}{4}\lambda _7-\frac {3}{2}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I\\ & \quad +I\otimes \left ( \lambda _2+ \frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _4-\lambda _5+ \frac {\sqrt {3}}{4}\lambda _6+ \frac {1}{4}\lambda _7-\frac {3}{2}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_8&=\left ( \lambda _3-\lambda _4-\frac {1}{2}\lambda _6+ \frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _7\right ) \otimes I+I\otimes \left ( \lambda _3-\lambda _4-\frac {1}{2}\lambda _6+ \frac {\sqrt {3}}{2}\lambda _7\right ) . \end{align}
- |$\rho =\frac {\pi }{3}$|, |$\sigma =\tau =0$|(66)\begin{align} G_1&=\left ( \lambda _1-\sqrt {3}\lambda _2+ \frac {2}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _1-\sqrt {3}\lambda _2+ \frac {2}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_2&=\left ( \lambda _3+ \lambda _4-\sqrt {3}\lambda _5-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _3+ \lambda _4-\sqrt {3}\lambda _5-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_3&=\left ( \lambda _3+2\lambda _6+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _3+2\lambda _6+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_4&=\left ( \sqrt {3}\lambda _1+ \lambda _2-\sqrt {3}\lambda _4-\lambda _5-2\lambda _7\right ) \otimes I\\ & \quad +I\otimes \left ( \sqrt {3}\lambda _1+ \lambda _2-\sqrt {3}\lambda _4-\lambda _5-2\lambda _7\right ) \end{align}
- |$\rho =\pi$|, |$\sigma =\tau =0$|(67)\begin{align} G_1&=\left ( \lambda _1-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _1-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_2&=\left ( -\lambda _3+2\lambda _4+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( -\lambda _3+2\lambda _4+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_3&=\left ( \lambda _3+2\lambda _6+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _3+2\lambda _6+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_4&=\left ( \lambda _2-\lambda _5+ \lambda _7\right ) \otimes I+I\otimes \left ( \lambda _2-\lambda _5+ \lambda _7\right ) \end{align}
- |$\sigma =\frac {\pi }{2}$|, |$\rho =\tau =0$|(68)\begin{align} G_1&= \left ( \lambda _1-\lambda _2-\lambda _5-\lambda _7+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _1-\lambda _2-\lambda _5-\lambda _7+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_2&=\left ( -\lambda _3+2\lambda _4+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( -\lambda _3+2\lambda _4+ \frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_3&=\left ( 2\lambda _2-\lambda _3+2\lambda _5+2\lambda _6+2\lambda _7-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I\\ &\quad -I\otimes \left ( 2\lambda _2-\lambda _3+2\lambda _5+2\lambda _6+2\lambda _7-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_4&=\left ( 2\lambda _1+ \lambda _2+ \lambda _3+ \lambda _5-2\lambda _6+ \lambda _7+ \sqrt {3}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I\\ &\quad +I\otimes \left ( 2\lambda _1+ \lambda _2+ \lambda _3+ \lambda _5-2\lambda _6+ \lambda _7+ \sqrt {3}\lambda _8\right ) \end{align}
- |$\tau =\frac {\pi }{2}$|, |$\rho =\sigma =0$|(69)\begin{align} G_1&=\left ( \lambda _1-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _1-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_2&=\left ( \lambda _4+ \lambda _6-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I-I\otimes \left ( \lambda _4+ \lambda _6-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_3&=\left ( \lambda _2-\lambda _3+ \lambda _5+2\lambda _6-\lambda _7-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \otimes I\\ & \quad -I\otimes \left ( \lambda _2-\lambda _3+ \lambda _5+2\lambda _6-\lambda _7-\frac {1}{\sqrt {3}}\lambda _8\right ) \\ G_4&=\left ( \lambda _2+ \lambda _3+ \lambda _4+ \lambda _5-\lambda _6-\lambda _7\right ) \otimes I+I\otimes \left ( \lambda _2+ \lambda _3+ \lambda _4+ \lambda _5-\lambda _6-\lambda _7\right ) . \end{align}
5. Discussion
Let us summarize our results. We have constructed a wide class of quantum versions of two-player |$N$|-strategy classical symmetric non-cooperative games. Such a construction basically amounts to determining the entangler (gate operator) that introduces quantum correlations into the game. The only assumptions concerning the gate operator are that it preserves the symmetry of the classical game with which we started and that the classical game is faithfully represented in its quantum counterpart. The resulting gate operator depends on the number of parameters and can be expressed in terms of elements of the Cartan subalgebra of |${\textit {SU}}(N)$|. Its fairly general construction, valid for any |$N$|, presented in Sect. 3, relies on the representation of the group of cyclic permutations of |$12\ldots N$|. The detailed calculations performed in Sect. 4 for the |$N=3$| case strongly suggest that the construction presented in Sect. 3 is the most general one.
In the original ELW game (|$N=2$|), all classical strategies, both pure and mixed, are represented by pure quantum ones. This is no longer the case for general |$N$|. By the construction, all pure classical strategies are still represented by pure quantum ones. However, as is shown in Appendix C, the mixed classical strategies are, in general, encoded by mixed quantum ones.
Some insight into the structure of the quantum game is provided by group theory. We have shown that an important role is played by the stability group |$G_s$| of the initial state of the game. The effective manifold of games (pair of strategies of Alice and Bob) has been defined as the coset space |${\textit {SU}}(N)\times {\textit {SU}}(N)/G_s$|. It should be stressed that two pairs of strategies corresponding to different points of the effective manifold do not necessarily lead to different outcomes. First, the latter may coincide due to the specific form of the payoff table. Moreover, the probabilities |$\left | \left \langle k,k'|\Psi _{\rm out}\right \rangle \right | ^2$| do not depend on the phase of |$\left | \Psi _{\rm in}\right \rangle$|. Therefore, the definition of the stability subgroup could be generalized by including the possibility that |$\left | \Psi _{\rm in}\right \rangle$| is multiplied by an overall phase. Two games differing by an element of such a generalized “stability” subgroup yield the same outcome.
Note again that, in order to determine the group-theoretical structure of |$G_s\subset {\textit {SU}}(N\times {\textit {SU}}(N))$|, we do not need to work with the realization of |${\textit {SU}}(N)\times {\textit {SU}}(N)$| in terms of pairs of special unitary matrices; it suffices to take two copies of |${\textit {SU}}(N)$| consisting of sets of matrices related by similarity transformations (in general not unitary and different for both factors of |${\textit {SU}}(N)\times {\textit {SU}}(N)$|); the group structure remains unchanged. Only at the final step does one have to invoke unitarity, which again is related to the maximal entanglement assumption.
However, the definition of stability group given in this paper is sufficient for our purposes. The most important point is that the maximally entangled game corresponds to the stability group that is basically the diagonal subgroup of |${\textit {SU}}(N)\times {\textit {SU}}(N)$|. This allows us to show, using simple group-theoretical considerations, that Bob can “neutralize” any Alice move (and vice versa). As a result, no nontrivial pure Nash equilibrium exists for maximally entangled games.
For non-maximal entanglement, the relation between the degree of entanglement and the structure of the stability group is rather loose. However, the following important property holds. Let us denote by |$\left ( g_1,g_2\right )$|, |$g_{1,2}\in {\textit {SU}}(N)$|, the elements of stability group |$G_s$| and let |$Pr_1\left ( g_1,g_2\right ) =g_1$|. Then, for non-maximal entanglement, |$Pr_1G_s \varsubsetneq {\textit {SU}}(N)$|. By inspecting the reasoning presented in Sect. 2, we conclude that nontrivial pure Nash equilibria are now a priori allowed and their actual existence depends on the particular choice of payoff table.
General considerations were presented in Sects. 2 and 3 and are supported by explicit computations in the |$N=3$| case. The basically most general form of the gate operator was found and the values of parameters leading to maximal entanglement were determined. We also gave the explicit form of the generators of stability group |$G_s$| for selected cases, including both maximal and non-maximal entanglement.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Professor Piotr Kosiński (Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Physics and Applied Informatics, University of Lódź, Poland) for helpful discussion and useful remarks. This research is supported by the NCN Grant no. DEC-2012/05/D/ST2/00754. I am grateful to the anonymous referee for valuable remarks that helped to improve the manuscript considerably.