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Michael J. Nelson, The Battle for the Court: Interest Groups, Judicial Elections, and Public Policy, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 133, Issue 4, Winter 2018, Pages 760–762, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12840
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How do judicial elections affect judicial policymaking? The answer to this question has interested lawmakers, lawyers, and scholars for decades. The Battle for the Court tackles this question, drawing on data on Ohio Supreme Court elections over the past four decades to explain the role that Ohio’s voters, judges, and interest groups have played in the development of tort law in that state. With a focus on tort law—a much-understudied topic in political science—and its nuanced take on interest group mobilization in judicial elections over time, this book has much to teach scholars of American politics generally, especially those who are interested in the tangled relationship between campaign finance and policymaking. This book should be required reading for those—inside and outside of the academy—interested in how elections shape policymaking in the states.
The book opens with an overview of tort policy in Ohio, examining how plaintiffs and defendants have varied over time in their success at Ohio’s highest court. This changing playing field is essential, as it represents the baseline to which voters, candidates, and interest groups react as they plot their electoral strategies. The analysis reveals a surprising variability in tort decisions over time and demonstrates that justices had stable pro- or anti-plaintiff tendencies in their decision-making. Perhaps surprisingly, the authors demonstrate that these widespread shifts in Ohio tort policy are due to membership change rather than within-justice responsiveness to external pressures.
