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Alliances and the Communist Deterrence Failure of Fall 1950 Alliances and the Communist Deterrence Failure of Fall 1950
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Why the U.S. Crossing of the 38th Parallel Was Hard to Deter Why the U.S. Crossing of the 38th Parallel Was Hard to Deter
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Why Deterrence Was Still Possible Why Deterrence Was Still Possible
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Why did the Communists Respond so Slowly to Inchon? Why did the Communists Respond so Slowly to Inchon?
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Asian Communist Alliances and PRC Strategy in Korea Asian Communist Alliances and PRC Strategy in Korea
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Kim Finally Cries Uncle, Stalin Orders Out for Intervention, and Beijing Balks Kim Finally Cries Uncle, Stalin Orders Out for Intervention, and Beijing Balks
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U.S. Alliance Policy and Failed Coercive Diplomacy in Northern Korea U.S. Alliance Policy and Failed Coercive Diplomacy in Northern Korea
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Windows and War: Mao Pulls and Stalin Pushes the CCP Politburo into Korea Windows and War: Mao Pulls and Stalin Pushes the CCP Politburo into Korea
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Stalin Nearly Accepts Defeat but China Saves the DPRK Stalin Nearly Accepts Defeat but China Saves the DPRK
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Worse than a Monolith in Indochina: Mao’s Assistance to Vietnam Before and During the Korean War Worse than a Monolith in Indochina: Mao’s Assistance to Vietnam Before and During the Korean War
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The First Indochina War The First Indochina War
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3 Alliance Problems, Signaling, and Escalation of Asian Conflict
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Published:April 2011
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Abstract
This chapter examines two intrawar deterrence failures in Korea in late summer and fall 1950, both of which were related to alliance politics. It shows that lack of coordination and mistrust in the communist camp rendered the alliance incapable of sending clear and timely signals of resolve to the United States that might have deterred the Americans from crossing the 38th parallel in the crucial three weeks following Douglas MacArthur's successful Inchon landing. This same lack of coordination undercut communist efforts at coercive diplomacy. U.S. policies in the early weeks of the Korean War had a powerful impact on strategic thinking in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China about the long-term implications of the military defeat of the North Korean communist regime and the unification of the Korean peninsula under a government friendly to the United States.
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