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Jesse Hambly, The normative property dualism argument, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 75, Issue 2, April 2025, Pages 517–538, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae028
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Abstract
In this paper, I develop an argument against a type of Non-Analytic Normative Naturalism. This argument, the Normative Property Dualism Argument, suggests that if Non-Analytic Normative Naturalists posit that normative properties are identical to natural properties and that such identities are a posteriori, they will be forced to posit that these properties that are both normative and natural have higher-order normative properties of their own.
metaethics, normativity, Normative Naturalism, Non-Analytic Normative Naturalism, The Property Dualism Argument
© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews.
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