-
Views
-
Cite
Cite
Thiago Xavier de Melo, Essence and Naturalness, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 69, Issue 276, July 2019, Pages 534–554, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqz014
- Share Icon Share
Abstract
According to sparse modalism, the notion of essence can be analysed in terms of necessity and naturalness. In this paper, I develop and defend a version of sparse modalism that is equipped with a non-standard, relativized conception of naturalness. According to this conception, properties and relations can be natural to different degrees relative to different kinds of things, and relations can be natural to different degrees relative to different slots. I argue that this relativized version of sparse modalism can accommodate various cases that the standard, non-relativized version can’t. The alternative version can accommodate cases where a relation is essential to a relatum but merely necessary to another, cases where a property is essential to an object but merely necessary to another, and cases where a less-than-perfectly natural property is essential to an object.