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Brian Kogelmann, Justice, Diversity, and the Well-Ordered Society, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 67, Issue 269, October 2017, Pages 663–684, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqw082
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Abstract
One unchanging feature of John Rawls’ thought is that we theorize about well-ordered societies. Yet, once we introduce justice pluralism—the fact that reasonable people disagree about the nature and requirements of justice, something Rawls eventually admits is inevitable in liberal societies—then a well-ordered society as Rawls defines it is impossible. This requires we develop new models of society to replace the well-ordered society in order to adequately address such disagreements. To do so, we ought to remain faithful to those reasons Rawls has for introducing the idea of the well-ordered society in the first place. It is shown that two models that resemble closely Rawls’ model of the well-ordered society but are also capable of dealing with justice pluralism do not perform well when judged against such criteria. Yet a new model of the well-ordered society—one that looks radically different from what Rawls originally imagined—does succeed.
