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Umut Baysan, Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 66, Issue 265, October 2016, Pages 843–846, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv105
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Jaegwon Kim's contributions to philosophy of mind have focused on trying to find a place for mental phenomena in the causal order of events in the physical world. For decades, he has argued that mental properties can't be causally efficacious unless they are somehow reducible to physical properties—given the hypothesis that the physical world is causally closed. On this point, he has been an opponent of non-reductive physicalism (NRP), which accepts the broadly physicalist worldview but denies psycho-physical identities; according to NRP, mental properties are not identical with, but are realized by, physical properties. Kim's latest position is that some form of reduction may be possible for intentional mental properties (such as desires, beliefs, and so on) because they are ‘functionalizable’. Yet, he thinks that qualia aren't reducible to physical properties, because they are not functionalizable. In fact, for the last decade or so, Kim has accepted the limitations of physicalism with respect to qualia, and offered a form of property dualism about mental properties. Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World is an edited volume with contributions from some of the most distinguished philosophers in the literature who respond to Kim on pretty much every point mentioned in this paragraph.
