Conclusion: radical politics

It commonly happens, where ideas are widely used, that they come to have many meanings, not all of them consistent. Liberty, equality and fraternity can be understood in many ways, and much of this book has been concerned with drawing out the implications of different interpretations. In this concluding section, I want to take a narrower, more specific, focus on the concepts. Any simplification runs the risk of misrepresenting the situation, and there is always the danger that selective consideration will hide as much as it reveals. It seems to me, though, that these ideas still have a special place in radical and left-wing ideas, and I wanted to consider the relationship between the concepts in that light.

For 200 years, the principles of the French Revolution have been part of the discourse of radical politics. Radical thought has followed different directions since, and many of the ideas current in the Revolution have been superseded by others. There are strands of socialist and radical thought concerned with a wide range of other issues, such as culture, pacifism and environmentalism. Another significant strand, Marxism, was heavily influenced at first by the French Revolution, but conventional Marxist analysis detached itself from the political mainstream. (Marx and Engels considered that liberty was a bourgeois value³²⁸ and that thinking about equality beyond the elimination of class differences was pointless.³²⁹ Marxism had little to say about the values and ideas covered in this book, and I have had little to say about Marxism in consequence. I have reviewed the core of Marxist ideas in another book.³³⁰) However, for the democratic socialist parties which guided the development of Europe, particularly after the Second World War, understanding the relationship of these values is a core element in understanding their motivation and approach. It is not putting it too strongly to say that liberty, equality and fraternity – the values of the Revolution – came to define socialist thought. Self writes:

The rallying cry of the French Revolution – equality, liberty and fraternity – now constitute essential socialist values. It would be foolish to deny conflicts between interpretations of these values. … However, the point is that the values must not just be taken separately but related within a coherent socialist philosophy.³³¹

Their application is, however, conditioned by different understandings of the terms, and I think it can be argued that the varying interpretations underlie differences in the patterns of socialist thought.

Political approaches are ‘radical’ when they propose fundamental social change. Many of the principled approaches I have considered in this book are radical in that sense. They begin from the common proposition that the way things are is not the way they ought to be. Beginning from a sense of moral principle implies that new structures and relationships have to be created. The test of whether this can be said to be ‘fundamental’ depends on how far and how deep such reforms go, but the very idea that change can be made on moral grounds is controversial.

Where radicals consider liberty, equality or fraternity, the kind of social policy they come to favour differs according the emphasis they place on each. The radicals of the political left tend to begin from social or collective understandings of social problems (although that is not necessarily the case) and on the face of the matter they might be expected to have some important perspectives in common. Liberty, equality and fraternity are closely related, but they do lead in different directions, with a different emphasis on values and approaches. The easiest way to illustrate this is by three extremes, or ideal types, although it is important to recognise that in real life hardly anyone fits into an idealised model.

The left-wing libertarian is committed to liberty first and foremost. The object of social policy is liberation, which is achieved through empowerment, the encouragement of diversity and participation through democracy. The aim for each person is the expression of that person’s legitimate aspirations and choices, and so the realisation of the person’s interests. Social welfare is developmental, allowing people to become what it is possible for them to become. Many libertarians would add to this list the removal of elements of society which make people vulnerable, exploited and oppressed, but this is not essential to the ideal type, because the same arguments motivate those who argue for equality. In this model, the arguments for equality and fraternity are largely reducible to arguments for liberty. A left-wing libertarian justifies the struggle against inequality because inequality restricts liberty.

Socialism’s fundamental purpose – indeed the purpose of the equality which we seek – is the extension of liberty. … It is a commitment to organise society in a way which ensures the greatest sum of freedom, the highest total amount of real choice.³³²

Inequalities imply oppression, and oppression restricts people’s choice, and prevents them from achieving their potential. Solidarity is important because the capacity to act can only be fully realised through collective action. Fraternity is a means to empower people and give them capacities.

I am not sure that anyone precisely meets the specifications of the model outlined here, but there are elements of this kind of libertarianism in the work of Paolo Freire. Freire, working in the context of a developing country, favoured community education and action as a means to liberation. Freire is passionate about freedom.

This is the great humanistic and historical task of the oppressed: to liberate themselves and their oppressors as well…. Freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift. It must be pursued constantly and responsibly. Freedom is not an ideal located outside of man; nor is it an idea which becomes myth. It is rather the indispensable condition for the quest for human completion. … The pedagogy of the oppressed…makes oppression and its causes objects of reflection by the oppressed, and from that reflection will come their necessary engagement in the struggle for their liberation.³³³

I think it could reasonably be argued that Freire’s emphasis on collective action might be seen as implying a primary commitment to solidarity, rather than liberty. However, the emphasis on education, capacity, oppression and liberation is fundamental to his case.

The radical egalitarian stands for the elimination of disadvantage, in treatment, opportunity and outcome. Egalitarians emphasise the principles of fairness and social justice, arguing that everyone should have access to the conditions of civilisation which otherwise are available only to some. The provision of welfare is both a method by which redistribution can be brought about, and an outcome of such a redistribution. ‘Ethical socialists’ made the establishment of greater equality central to their conception of the good society.

It is true here, as it is of the other models, that it is difficult to find anyone who holds to this approach without simultaneously appealing to other moral principles. This is particularly true of egalitarian thought, which is driven by a strong sense of moral priorities. In different ways, however, the traditional appeal of Marxism or the anarchism of William Godwin might be seen as examples of this approach. Both approaches are fuelled by moral indignation at social disadvantage. Marxism appealed to the argument that people were being exploited by a dominant class.³³⁴ Godwin’s position is individualistic, and based in the view that political institutions should serve the welfare of all citizens without fear or favour. He contrasts that position with the existing hierarchy of privilege.³³⁵

As a principle, opposition to disadvantage is defensible in its own right, and it does not require reference to other principles like liberty or fraternity to be justifiable. A proponent of equality can see greater liberty as a desirable by-product of social justice, or as a subordinate principle. For Tawney, liberty was simply the principle of equality in another guise:

…liberty is, in fact, equality in action, in the sense, not that all men perform identical functions or wield the same degree of power, but that all men are equally protected against the abuse of power, and equally entitled to insist that power shall be used, not for personal ends, but for the general advantage.³³⁶

This might be seen as a restriction on liberty: in so far as equality implies a redistribution of powers, the liberty of some people is achieved at the expense of the liberty of others. However, even for those for whom liberty is of paramount importance, it is not difficult to justify an argument for increasing the liberty of people who have none.

The justification for fraternity by egalitarians is more direct. Because equality is a social principle, it is difficult to distinguish it wholly from mutual aid: both, in practice, imply a degree of generalised social responsibility and redistribution. Fraternity is both the means to developing the conditions of civilisation for all, and a justification for doing so. Egalitarian arguments emphasise the importance of reducing social divisions as a means of promoting integration. ‘Social institutions’, Tawney wrote,

…should be planned, as far as is possible, to emphasise and strengthen, not the class differences which divide, but the common humanity which unites, them.³³⁷

The radical collectivist begins with an emphasis on community, solidarity and mutual aid. Collective action is both a means to a desired end and an end in itself. As a means to an end, cooperation and mutual aid make it possible for people to achieve things they could not achieve otherwise. As an end in itself, collective action indicates respect for other people and recognition of mutual responsibilities. Henry Tam thinks it implies equality:

…an inclusive community would not tolerate any hierarchical supremacy based on wealth, race, religion, sex, or any form of group allegiance.³³⁸

Liberty and equality are not simply reducible to fraternity, but they may be subordinate – as they were in Soviet Russia. Liberty can be enhanced through group action. The form of freedom which is valued is the power to act that comes through cooperation and social capital. Greater equality may be seen as requisite for the reduction of sources of conflict, and the development of fellow-feeling. The form of equality which is valued by the radical collectivist is not so much the elimination of disadvantage as the establishment of social bonding through common sentiments and patterns of behaviour – the kind of equality identified in America by de Tocqueville.³³⁹

This kind of radical collectivism is well represented by Petr Kropotkin, the Russian anarchist. Kropotkin saw mutual aid and collective action as the most effective way of meeting human needs. Beyond this, he believed it was central to moral conduct and human improvement.

That mutual aid is the real foundation of our ethical conceptions seems evident enough. … The higher conception of ‘no revenge for wrongs’, and of freely giving more than one expects to receive from his neighbours, is proclaimed as being the real principle of morality – a principle superior to mere equivalence, equity, or justice, and more conducive to happiness. And man is appealed to, to be guided in his acts…by the perception of oneness with each human being.³⁴⁰

Another way of representing these models is outlined in Table 1. The concepts in the table, and the relationship to liberty, fraternity and equality, have been discussed in the course of the book. It is possible to read down each column, ignoring the others; each makes sense as a model in its own right. But it is not necessary to do so – many of those on the left would accept several principles from across the table, and place different emphases on them.

The three models are not separate in practice; many socialists would accept that all of these principles are valuable, and would seek to achieve all simultaneously. There tends to be the assumption that each element necessarily leads to each other element; and one finds that people who wholeheartedly advocate one model are able to justify the other elements in terms of that model. But people put different emphases on different elements within the structure, so that outcomes which appear to be compatible in fact tend in different directions. Liberty emphasises the developmental aspects of welfare; equality, the redistributive impact; fraternity, the rights and obligations associated with mutual aid. The libertarian model values diversity; fraternity favours citizenship and community; egalitarianism emphasises needs, rights and justice. In cases where the principles differ, the dominant elements may come into conflict.

There is no unified ‘right wing’, any more than there is a monolithic left. The differences on the ‘right’ between liberal individualists and conservatives are profound, and often deeper than the apparent differences between left and right. Many of the objections considered in this book to ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity are conservative ones, based in a different understanding of society. There are three main patterns of opposition from the political right.

The first is exemplified by the arguments of Edmund Burke, who argued for a resistance to general principles of all kinds. This position is partly founded in the complexity of social structures, which make it difficult to determine what the likely impact of any policy might be. It is partly because of distrust of the values which the left espouse: some conservative scepticism is based in a cynical view of human nature, and grand ideals are sometimes dismissed as the disguise for people’s true motives. More fundamentally, however, it is also because general principles are not very reliable in specific cases. Burke argues that the apparent purity and simplicity of many basic principles is a snare: their application leads inevitably to the disregard of other important factors which need to be balanced against them. He proposes, instead, a pragmatic approach, where policies are tried and tested in small ways before they can be applied more generally.³⁴¹

The second pattern of opposition is the position of liberal individualists like Hayek and Nozick.³⁴² The thinkers of the ‘new right’ are not necessarily opposed to liberty, equality or fraternity, but they understand them from a distinct perspective. They interpret society individualistically rather than collectively. Liberty is generally interpreted in negative terms, as the absence of constraint, rather than in positive terms as the power to act. The main threat to it is paternalist intervention by the state. Equality is conceived narrowly in terms of treatment of people as equals, without bias or prejudice. It stands for equality before the law, and sometimes for equality of opportunity in the sense of the ability of the best to rise. Fraternity is represented in terms of social cohesion and the organic nature of society – a complex series of overlapping social networks and solidarities. It is brought about through the complex mutual interaction of individuals, and as such it is subordinate to the role of the individual. There is some ambiguity as to whether their arguments are truly opposed to radical thought. In their own way, they can be as moralistic and zealous for change as the doctrines they criticise. They have been referred to as ‘the radical right’.³⁴³ Their arguments are, however, conservative in effect: Norman Barry describes the ‘new right’ as a fusion of liberal and conservative thought.³⁴⁴ Hayek argues against well-intentioned intervention in society, while Nozick criticises ‘patterned’ approaches to distributive justice.

The third pattern of opposition comes from those who believe in social order. The arguments from the left depend on the view that social relationships can be altered on normative grounds, and that they should be. Part of the conservative response has been that there is much else in the structure of society which is valuable; against liberty, equality and fraternity, there are good arguments for social order, inequality and independence. Conservatives may take the view that social structure, moral obligation and social order require development and protection rather than systemic change. To Fitzjames Stephen, liberty, equality and fraternity was:

…something more than a motto. It is the creed of a religion. I am not the advocate of Slavery, Caste and Hatred…[but] when used collectively the words do not typify, however vaguely, any state of society which a reasonable man ought to regard with enthusiasm or self-devotion.³⁴⁵

Liberty, equality and fraternity are not, of course, the only values which guide social policy, nor even the principal aims. When the Pétain government tried, during the Second World War, to re-orient French life, they arranged for the slogan liberté, égalité, fraternité on municipal buildings to be replaced by another: travail, famille, patrie, or ‘work, family, country’. Conflicts in social policy are usually based, not on direct disagreement about specific principles, but between priorities and approaches relating to a range of desired aims. That, however, would be the subject for another book.