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Mark Povich, Linnebo on Analyticity and Thin Existence, Philosophia Mathematica, Volume 32, Issue 3, October 2024, Pages 332–357, https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkae017
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Abstract
In his groundbreaking book, Thin Objects, Øystein Linnebo argues for an account of neo-Fregean abstraction principles and thin existence that does not rely on analyticity or conceptual rules. It instead relies on a metaphysical notion he calls “sufficiency”. In this short discussion, I defend the analytic or conceptual-rule account of thin existence.
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