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Janet Folina, Intuition Between the Analytic-Continental Divide: Hermann Weyl's Philosophy of the Continuum, Philosophia Mathematica, Volume 16, Issue 1, February 2008, Pages 25–55, https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkm017
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Abstract
Though logical positivism is part of Kant's complex legacy, positivists rejected both Kant's theory of intuition and his classification of mathematical knowledge as synthetic a priori. This paper considers some lingering defenses of intuition in mathematics during the early part of the twentieth century, as logical positivism was born. In particular, it focuses on the difficult and changing views of Hermann Weyl about the proper role of intuition in mathematics. I argue that it was not intuition in general, but his commitment to twodifferent types of intuition, which explains his rather unusual and tormented philosophy of the mathematical continuum.