Competition Law (8th Edition)
Contents
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1. Introduction 1. Introduction
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2. Cost Concepts 2. Cost Concepts
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(A) Fixed costs and sunk costs (A) Fixed costs and sunk costs
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(B) Marginal cost (B) Marginal cost
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(C) Variable costs (C) Variable costs
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(D) Avoidable costs (D) Avoidable costs
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(E) Average variable cost (‘AVC’) (E) Average variable cost (‘AVC’)
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(F) Average avoidable cost (‘AAC’) (F) Average avoidable cost (‘AAC’)
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(G) Long-run incremental cost (‘LRIC’) (G) Long-run incremental cost (‘LRIC’)
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(H) Long-run average incremental cost (‘LRAIC’) (H) Long-run average incremental cost (‘LRAIC’)
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(I) Average total cost (‘ATC’) (I) Average total cost (‘ATC’)
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(J) Stand alone cost (J) Stand alone cost
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3. Exploitative Pricing Practices 3. Exploitative Pricing Practices
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(A) Arguments against direct control (A) Arguments against direct control
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(B) Alternatives to direct control (B) Alternatives to direct control
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(C) Approach in the EU and the UK (C) Approach in the EU and the UK
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(D) EU law (D) EU law
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(i) What is an excessive price? (i) What is an excessive price?
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(ii) Determining whether prices are excessive (ii) Determining whether prices are excessive
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(a) Cost/price analysis (a) Cost/price analysis
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(b) Comparison of a dominant firm’s prices (b) Comparison of a dominant firm’s prices
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(c) Yardstick competition (c) Yardstick competition
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(d) Excessive or disproportionate costs should be ignored (d) Excessive or disproportionate costs should be ignored
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(iii) Determining whether excessive prices are abusive (iii) Determining whether excessive prices are abusive
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(iv) Further objections to excessive pricing (iv) Further objections to excessive pricing
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(a) Excessive pricing that impedes parallel imports and exports (a) Excessive pricing that impedes parallel imports and exports
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(b) Excessive pricing that is exclusionary (b) Excessive pricing that is exclusionary
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(c) Excessive pricing and aftermarkets (c) Excessive pricing and aftermarkets
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(v) Buyer power – excessively low prices (v) Buyer power – excessively low prices
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(E) UK law (E) UK law
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(i) Findings of excessive prices (i) Findings of excessive prices
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(ii) Rejections of complaints about excessive pricing (ii) Rejections of complaints about excessive pricing
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(iii) Excessively low prices (iii) Excessively low prices
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4. Rebates that have Effects Similar to Exclusive Dealing Agreements 4. Rebates that have Effects Similar to Exclusive Dealing Agreements
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(A) Preliminary comments (A) Preliminary comments
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(B) EU law (B) EU law
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(i) Quantity and other permissible rebates (i) Quantity and other permissible rebates
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(ii) Exclusivity rebates and similar practices (ii) Exclusivity rebates and similar practices
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(a) The basic rule (a) The basic rule
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(b) Meaning of exclusivity rebate (b) Meaning of exclusivity rebate
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(c) Factors that are not relevant to establishing whether exclusivity rebates infringe Article 102 (c) Factors that are not relevant to establishing whether exclusivity rebates infringe Article 102
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(d) Objective justification (d) Objective justification
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(iii) Third category rebates (iii) Third category rebates
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(a) Two steps involved in assessing third category rebates (a) Two steps involved in assessing third category rebates
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(b) Relevant factors for the assessment of the effects of third category rebates (b) Relevant factors for the assessment of the effects of third category rebates
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(c) Objective justification (c) Objective justification
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(iv) The Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement Priorities (iv) The Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement Priorities
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(C) UK law (C) UK law
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5. Bundling 5. Bundling
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(A) EU law (A) EU law
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(i) Rebates having a tying effect (i) Rebates having a tying effect
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(ii) ‘Across-the-board’ rebates (ii) ‘Across-the-board’ rebates
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(iii) Delivered pricing as a tie-in (iii) Delivered pricing as a tie-in
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(iv) Bundling (iv) Bundling
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(B) UK law (B) UK law
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6. Predatory Pricing 6. Predatory Pricing
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(A) Introduction (A) Introduction
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(B) The Areeda and Turner test (B) The Areeda and Turner test
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(C) EU law (C) EU law
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(i) The rule in AKZO v Commission and subsequent cases (i) The rule in AKZO v Commission and subsequent cases
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(ii) Intention to eliminate competition (ii) Intention to eliminate competition
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(iii) Is it necessary to show the possibility of recoupment? (iii) Is it necessary to show the possibility of recoupment?
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(iv) Defences (iv) Defences
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(v) Are the standards of AVC and ATC always appropriate? (v) Are the standards of AVC and ATC always appropriate?
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(vi) The Commission’s approach to predation in its Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement Priorities (vi) The Commission’s approach to predation in its Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement Priorities
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(vii) Predatory price cutting and cross-subsidisation (vii) Predatory price cutting and cross-subsidisation
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(viii) Selective price cutting but not below cost (viii) Selective price cutting but not below cost
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(a) Eurofix-Bauco/Hilti (a) Eurofix-Bauco/Hilti
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(b) Irish Sugar v Commission (b) Irish Sugar v Commission
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(c) Compagnie Maritime Belge v Commission (c) Compagnie Maritime Belge v Commission
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(d) Post Danmark (d) Post Danmark
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(D) UK law (D) UK law
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(i) Napp Pharmaceutical (i) Napp Pharmaceutical
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(ii) The Aberdeen Journals case (ii) The Aberdeen Journals case
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(iii) EW&S (iii) EW&S
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(iv) Cardiff Bus (iv) Cardiff Bus
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(v) Cases where predatory pricing was not established (v) Cases where predatory pricing was not established
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7. Margin Squeeze 7. Margin Squeeze
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(A) The economic phenomenon (A) The economic phenomenon
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(B) EU law (B) EU law
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(i) Is the accused undertaking operating on an upstream and a downstream market? (i) Is the accused undertaking operating on an upstream and a downstream market?
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(ii) Does the accused undertaking hold a dominant position in the upstream market? (ii) Does the accused undertaking hold a dominant position in the upstream market?
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(iii) Do the dominant firm’s upstream and downstream prices allow an undertaking as efficient as the dominant firm to compete on the downstream market? (iii) Do the dominant firm’s upstream and downstream prices allow an undertaking as efficient as the dominant firm to compete on the downstream market?
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(iv) Is the margin squeeze capable of producing anti-competitive effects? (iv) Is the margin squeeze capable of producing anti-competitive effects?
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(v) Is there an objective justification for the margin squeeze? (v) Is there an objective justification for the margin squeeze?
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(vi) The Commission’s decisional practice (vi) The Commission’s decisional practice
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(C) UK law (C) UK law
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(i) Findings of unlawful margin squeeze (i) Findings of unlawful margin squeeze
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(ii) Rejections of complaints about margin squeezes (ii) Rejections of complaints about margin squeezes
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8. Price Discrimination 8. Price Discrimination
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(A) The meaning of price discrimination (A) The meaning of price discrimination
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(B) EU law (B) EU law
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(i) Does the accused undertaking have a dominant position? (i) Does the accused undertaking have a dominant position?
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(ii) Has the dominant undertaking entered into equivalent transactions with other trading parties? (ii) Has the dominant undertaking entered into equivalent transactions with other trading parties?
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(iii) Is the dominant undertaking guilty of applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions? (iii) Is the dominant undertaking guilty of applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions?
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(iv) Could the discrimination place other trading parties at a competitive disadvantage? (iv) Could the discrimination place other trading parties at a competitive disadvantage?
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(v) Is there an objective justification for the discrimination? (v) Is there an objective justification for the discrimination?
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(C) UK law (C) UK law
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9. Pricing Practices that are Harmful to the Single Market 9. Pricing Practices that are Harmful to the Single Market
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(A) Excessive pricing that impedes parallel imports and exports (A) Excessive pricing that impedes parallel imports and exports
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(B) Geographic price discrimination (B) Geographic price discrimination
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(C) Rebates that impede imports and exports (C) Rebates that impede imports and exports
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18 Abuse of dominance (2): pricing practices
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Published:30 July 2015
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Abstract
This chapter examines how EU and UK competition authorities deal with abusive pricing practices. It begins by introducing the cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive. It then deals in turn with exploitative pricing practices; rebates and other practices that have an effect similar to exclusive dealing agreements; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices that are harmful to the single market. In each section, the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and by the EU Courts will be considered first, followed by cases in the UK. Reference will be made where appropriate to the Commission's Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.
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