... algorithms Fundamental algorithms Process relevance Language of thought LOT hypothesis Activation vectors Distributed activation states High dimensional vector space Symbolic cognitive theory structures of Activity patterns Feldman Jerome Connectionist realization representation of symbol...

... connectionism Nonrepresentationalism Systematicity Dual-Process Models Representation Language of Thought Compositional Semantics In 1987, Jerry Fodor came to the University of California, San Diego to present his now-famous systematicity argument(s) against the connectionist outlook on cognitive...

...This book is concerned with three central puzzles regarding the nature of mind and their statements. The first problem states that while the language of thought (LOT) approach, which is a computational theory, is correct, the cognitive mind is noncomputational. The second problem is concerned...

...This chapter discusses pragmatic atomism as a psychological element of language of thought’s (LOT) referential semantics and features. Ironically, the conceptual atomism created here is drawn from LOT’s traditional adversary — concept pragmatism. This is the reason why the chapter begins...

... of central system problem of Computational theory of mind CTM Language of thought LOT approach ix–x Mental state individuation problem of Naturalism Frege cases Meaning and symbolic mental states problem of the relation between Algorithmic view conception account of mental symbols Atomism xi...

...This chapter discusses Jerry Fodor’s view regarding the apparent shortcoming of language of thought (LOT). According to Fodor, LOT fails to account for the central system that is responsible for man’s ability to connect unrelated concepts, enabling the creativity and flexibility of human thought...

...This chapter provides an account of the nature of language of thought’s (LOT) mental symbols. Through a two-fold dialectical strategy, an argument is presented to make the case that LOT and computational theory of mind (CTM) should type symbols based on the role they play in the algorithms...

...This chapter posits that language of thought’s (LOT) symbols are algorithmic in nature, and that they are distinguished by the role they play in computation. Three arguments will be presented in this chapter to make this case. The first argument claims that the classicist approach taken by LOT...

...This chapter illustrates how the Frege cases pose major problems for language of thought (LOT) due to its neo-Russellian semantics that directly oppose its symbolic view of thinking. If this criticism is accepted, the soundness of any theory of psychological explanation based on neo-Russellianism...

...Interrogates Adams and Aizawa’s attempt to protect the intracraniality of “true cognition” by excluding the transcraniality of natural language from cognitive processing. This attempt is first traced back to Fodor’s (1975) language-of-thought hypothesis (LOTH), with a brief history...