Abstract
This book focuses on the significance of ostension in first word learning, which it distinguishes from ostensive definition. It begins by discussing ostension in contemporary philosophy, especially in the work of Quine, Davidson, and Gadamer. It explores relevant empirical findings in psychology, evolutionary anthropology, and neuroscience. It offers original studies of four representative historical thinkers whose work enriches the understanding of ostension: Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Augustine, and Aristotle. Building on these philosophical and empirical foundations, the book offers a meticulous analysis of the philosophical issues raised by ostension. First, it examines the phenomenological problem of whether embodied intentions are manifest or inferred, and it argues that they are manifest in bodily movement. Second, it focuses on the problem concerning which concept of mind allows ostensive cues to be intersubjectively available, and it argues that the mirroring of animate minds, on display in animate movement, makes ostensive acts possible. Third, it examines the epistemological problem of how ostensive cues, notoriously ambiguous, can be correctly understood, and it argues that human nature and perception provide natural constraints on that ambiguity. Fourth, it examines the metaphysical problem of the ultimate status of the key terms in the argument: animate movement, language, and mind. It argues for the centrality of manifestation, which cannot be reduced to physical motion, for making sense of ourselves, our speech, and our thought. The book argues that taking ostension seriously has far-reaching implications for thinking about language and the practice of philosophy.
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