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Eileen John, Imagining and Knowing: The Shape of Fiction, by Gregory Currie, Mind, Volume 130, Issue 520, October 2021, Pages 1393–1401, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa081
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Gregory Currie’s Imagining and Knowing is a bracing, salutary book. It should prompt lively counterargument, but the book also conveys a hope for change rather than battle. Currie hopes to trigger more responsible, cogent philosophical thinking and method, specifically concerning the role of fiction in learning. (Currie focuses on literary fiction, and I do the same, but he notes that his arguments apply more generally to the class of all fictions.) Currie’s overarching claim is that arguments for the cognitive benefits of engaging with fiction, offered by those I will refer to as cognitivists, ‘ought to take account of, and ought ideally to cohere with, the best work in experimental psychology’ (p. 106). Because cognitivists’ arguments typically do not provide or respond to relevant empirical evidence, they fail to support their conclusions. Currie goes beyond this critical project in making a number of bold claims, as his reflection on empirical research leaves him doubtful about ‘the extent to which fictions are ever reliable sources’ of cognitive improvement (p. 81, emphasis in original). The book draws on an enviable wealth of knowledge in philosophy, psychology, literature and other fields, and it is valuable in the way it shares that knowledge, offering a kind of annotated guide to research into human cognition. I will not come close to noting the range of issues that are incisively addressed. I very much enjoyed reading this book, despite being the possible target of some real zingers. What if I am one of the ‘mentalizing couch-potatoes who prefer the easy option of understanding characters in soap operas rather than doing the hard work of understanding each other’ (p. 124)? Worse, perhaps a philosopher’s ‘lack of evidence is disguised by the author managing to suggest that their own manifestly civilized values and demeanour are evidence enough for the claim’ (p. 5). Ouch! What I try to convey here, in responding to Currie’s arguments, is a mixture of agreement, appreciation, strong disagreement and desire to cast a different light on some of the claims and methods that motivate his criticisms.
