Securitization is (normal) politics: Epistemological insights from Kenya’s forced migration and security experience

Abstract

1. Introduction

On 24 March 2021, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Kenya’s interior minister, Fred Matiang’i gave the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) two weeks to design a transition plan to close the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps. Citing security concerns, Matiang’i stated that there was no room for ‘further talks’, just an exit plan for the half a million refugees domiciled in the camps. This was not the first time the government had issued an exit directive for refugees. Referring to refugee camps, president Kenyatta a few years before argued that ‘It is not acceptable to us that a space that is supposed to provide safety and assistance is transformed to facilitate agents of terror and destruction’ (PSCU 2017, para 10). Spurred by intelligence reports showing that the terrorist attacks in 2013 and 2015 had been planned with the involvement of some ‘elements’ in the camps, the government ordered the closure of Dadaab in 2015, 2016, and 2019 (Aljazeera 2021; Editor 2021). It also mandated that all urban-based refugees return to camps, (Goitom 2016) and in 2014 human rights activists accused the police of profiling and discriminating against ethnic Somalis after the extraordinary round-up of refugees in Nairobi (Kenya National Commission for Human Rights 2014). Yet the camps remain open despite the proclamations by senior politicians to close them, and genuine concerns about security threats. In fact, since 2020, the number of registered refugees and asylum seekers has increased by 69% to over 830,000 in 2025 (UNHCR, 2025). The majority of refugees still live in camps in Dadaab and Kakuma, even as the number of urban refugees living in Nairobi grows (UNHCR 2025).

This research investigates the intricate relationship between securitization and politics in Kenya, focusing on forced migration and the narratives surrounding refugee camps like Dadaab and Kakuma. The Kenyan case demonstrates how political elites and local stakeholders invoke security rhetoric—that constructs refugees as sources of economic, social, and political threats—which justify extraordinary measures and advance broader political and economic agendas. These dynamics challenge existing securitization theory (ST), which predominantly frames such processes as a binary between normal and exceptional politics. By unravelling the entangled nature of politics and securitization, this study highlights how security discourses are constructed, contested, and adapted over time. In doing this the article argues for taking seriously the epistemological and ontological contributions of African contexts like Kenya to ST, countering their marginalization as outliers.

This study employed a qualitative approach to collect data between 2021 and 2023 through projects commissioned by the African Centre for Migration and Society at the University of the Witwatersrand (See Table 1). Primary data was gathered through key informant interviews (KII’s) with political elites, government officials, humanitarian actors, and global agencies in Nairobi, alongside fieldwork interviews in Turkana County with county officials, local leaders, and refugee representatives. Additionally, I participated in four workshops: the National Migration Policy Conference (Naivasha, 2021) and three Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF): Inclusive Urban Development and Mobility—Regional Network and Dialogue workshops (Addis Ababa, 2021; Lodwar, 2023; Koboko, 2023). These workshops provided key insights into how migration and security are framed by different actors and how securitization is contested within government departments. This multi-method approach ensured comprehensive data triangulation for analysing migration governance and security dynamics in Kenya and East Africa.

Kenya is both a migrant sending and receiving country. While the number of international migrants surpasses that of refugees by more than double, their trends have mirrored each other over the past three decades. Initially, there was a sharp increase between 1990 and 1995, followed by a steady twenty-year ascent, resulting in the Dadaab camp’s transformation (See Agwanda 2022). Originally accommodating 90,000 refugees from Somalia in 1991, it burgeoned into the world's largest refugee camp and became Kenya’s third-largest urban centre (Rawlence 2016). However, this upward trend altered course in 2015, coinciding with a decline in both migrant and refugee numbers due to governmental directives urging the closure of refugee camps and stricter regulations on migration pathways. Despite these efforts, the camps persist. Recent statistics show an uptick in refugee and asylum seeker figures, rising by nearly 70% per cent between 2020 and 2025 from 495,000 individuals (UNHCR 2025). The majority of refugees still live in camps in Dadaab and Kakuma, although there is a steady population of urban refugees in Nairobi, comprising 13 per cent of the total (UNHCR 2025). Although there are concerns around its implementation (Leghtas and Kitenge 2022), the Refugees Act of 2021 provides more opportunities, rights, protection, and solutions for refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya (The Republic of Kenya 2021). It aligns with Kenya’s commitments under the CRRF, the Global Compact on Refugees, and other international and regional instruments.

By engaging with the Kenyan case, this research fills a critical gap in the literature, addressing the under-representation of African contexts in ST. It demonstrates that African experiences—far from being peripheral—offer vital insights for rethinking the epistemological foundations of the field. The critique extends beyond Kenya, contributing to broader discussions on migration governance and security practices globally, and challenging traditional theories to better account for the complexities of non-Western political landscapes. The following section critiques ST by centring African contexts, specifically Kenya, to question the foundational binaries of norm/exception and politics/securitization. Using a temporal approach, the article then details how securitization unfolds from cycles of insecurity, political rhetoric, and institutional practices. Section 4 presents the empirical data demonstrating how refugee politics in Kenya is shaped by intersecting local, national, and global dynamics, which reinforce the mutually constitutive nature of securitization and politics. The conclusion highlights the implications for ST, arguing for a more nuanced understanding of securitization in Kenya. It critiques the portrayal of ‘normal’ politics as ‘good’, exposing the complicity of liberal democracy in the exclusion of securitized identities from due process.

2. Rethinking securitization in African contexts

This section critically re-examines ST by exploring how critiques, particularly those grounded in African contexts, challenge the theory’s assumptions about the separation of politics and securitization, and its applicability to African political realities. ST has played an important role in providing a framework for understanding how polities respond to human mobility. When Buzan published People States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations in 1983, he laid the foundation for a growing field of security studies that extended beyond the interstate and strategic military operations. Buzan and the Copenhagen school offer insights into how declarations by influential figures like president Kenyatta and Minister Matiang’i prompt the collective construction of threats, necessitating the temporary suspension of ‘ordinary’ laws in the name of ‘national security’. The Copenhagen school called this process ‘securitization’—the positioning through speech acts by a political leader an issue as a threat, which enables emergency measures and the suspension of ‘normal politics’, to deal with it. (Buzan 1983; Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998; Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008: 567).

By bringing security studies ‘into society’, these scholars showed that conceptions of threat and security are inter-subjective and socially constructed. Their studies offered a powerful explanatory framework for understanding responses to the ‘war on terror’, and how perceived environmental, energy, migration, and climate threats come to warrant extraordinary state responses. The rationale follows a simple logic: ‘our survival is threatened therefore we have the right to use extraordinary measures against the particular threat’ (Waever 1995: 46). By reifying migration as a force which endangers state sovereignty, human mobility is ‘elevated’ into the arena of ‘special politics’ (Waever 1995: 69). The normative goal for the Copenhagen school is to de-securitize, and allow rational politics and the social contract to prevail (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998).

Although securitization has provided an invaluable framework for revealing the mechanisms by which migration is socially constructed as a security threat, it contains significant blind spots. It is unable to explain, why, despite legitimate terror concerns, Matiangi’s and Kenyatta’s statements did not result in the extraordinary decanting of more than half a million refugees from Kenya’s camps. In fact, the Kenya Refugees Act of 2021, promulgated only eight months after Matiangi’s expulsion orders, is surprisingly progressive. The Act allows refugees in Kenya the right to inter alia: employment; basic services such as education, healthcare, social security and legal aid; freedom of movement within the country; a refugee identity card that is recognized as an official document; integrate into host communities and participate in local development plans (The Republic of Kenya 2021).

Understanding this turn of events requires an analytical lens that fundamentally reconsiders the binary norm/exception foundation upon which the ST is built. The notion that securitization actions are 'above normal politics' remains a central tenet of theories influenced by the Copenhagen School. Politics is seen as ‘good’, and securitization as inherently violent and lawless. Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde (1998) describe Africa as a continent that is run by ‘militias, mafias, clans, and gangs’ (p. 54) dominated by ‘disease-crime-population-migration circles’ (p. 127) and home to ‘remnants of tribal barbarians’ (p. 53) who ultimately form a ‘Hobbesian anarchy’(p. 69).

In well-developed states, armed forces and intelligence services are carefully separated from normal political life, and their use is subject to elaborate procedures of authorisation. Where such separation is not in place, as in many weak states (Nigeria under Abacha, the USSR under Stalin) or in states mobilised for total war, much of the normal politics is pushed into the security realm (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998: 28).

Striking in Buzan et al.’s work on securitization is a language that links Africa inextricably to dysfunction and barbarity. Sweeping references to the ‘various parts of Africa’ (p. 50), ‘much of Africa’ (p. 52), ‘most of Africa’ (p. 68), ‘several places in Africa’ (p. 54), ‘sub-Saharan Africa’ (p.88), erase the continent’s epistemological and ontological import in contemporary theories of securitization (Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2020).

As with any universalizing theory, securitization has faced numerous critiques (Huysmans 1998; Bigo 2002; Roe 2004). Some argue that the theory’s focus on discursive practices by dominant voices is blinded to the role that audiences (Léonard and Kaunert 2010; Côté 2016; Wertman and Kaunert 2022), and minorities play in the co-construction, and contestation of threat and security. Others illustrate how non-state humanitarian actors are also able to call for emergency measures that result in the suspension of ordinary politics (Watson 2011). But, these critiques accept the normal/exceptional dualism, with their arguments focusing on whose discursive acts (beyond the elite) result in society’s securitization.

With its location in a Eurocentric corpus, some authors question the concept’s universalism, asking whether securitization can travel beyond its European origins. Using examples from South Africa, Nigeria, China, and Kyrgyzstan, respectively, Wilkinson 2007; Vuori 2008; Ilgit and Klotz 2014; Ogbonna, Lenshie, and Nwangwu 2023 argue that securitization’s Eurocentrism can be overcome with some adjustments to its theory. In a provocative question, ‘[C]an the subaltern securitize’, Bertrand (2018) draws on postcolonial and feminist frameworks to explore how the Copenhagen Schools’ privileging of discursive acts both marginalizes and silences non-Western actors. While important, these critiques nevertheless retain the foundational premise that there is a distinction between normal and exceptional politics in securitization. Seeing security in this way ignores the embeddedness of threats and responses in complex international, national, and local political dynamics.

Recent critiques by Howell and Richter-Montpetit (2020) challenge securitization’s binary framing of normal/exceptional politics. They argue ‘securitization theory’s binary of normal politics versus exceptional security obscures the racial violence of ‘normal’ liberal politics’ (2020: 7). By highlighting the theory’s inherent hypocrisy and entrenchment in Eurocentrism, civilizationism, and anti-Blackness, they show how racism is ‘baked into securitizations theory’s conceptual apparatus and its core concepts of politics and security’ (Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2020: 17). While their racial critique rightly calls for a deep reflection of the canon’s colonial and racial foundations, this article is concerned with how these very foundations undermine the theory’s epistemological insights into the dynamics of migration, politics, and security in contemporary societies. Methodologically, ST marginalizes swathes of the non-Western world by categorizing them as outside of the realm of normal (read civilized) politics (Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2020). This sweeping generalization of entire political entities hampers knowledge production and undermines scholarly inquiry. The false dualism and the resultant methodological exclusion fail to capture the complexities of global geopolitical and local dynamics. By labelling African countries’ politics as inherently securitized and as such methodological outliers, the Copenhagen School obscures valuable analytical insights into how global, national, and local politics are implicated in the construction of securitization narratives and policies.

2.1 Framing threats and shaping identities: Securitizing human mobility in Kenya

Scholars analysing Kenya’s refugee regime have widely employed ST to highlight how humanitarian identities (Voppen 2017; Mwangi and Mwangi 2019; Agwanda 2022) and spaces (Mwangi and Mwangi 2024) are transformed into perceived security threats. Indeed, by transcending traditional military paradigms, ST has exposed the interplay of threat perceptions, political rhetoric, and governance in the construction of securitized identities in the country. As Agwanda notes:

This theory is relevant … as it captures how the migration discourse in Kenya has evolved towards emphasis on national security through extreme politicization of the issue to the extent that it has enabled the government to justify its concerns over national security threats and the necessary extraordinary measures needed in response to the threat (p. 726).

The securitization framework has provided critical insights into how Kenya’s securitization of human mobility has reconfigured humanitarian aid (Kimathi 2019), refugee identities (Abdi 2016; Gitonga 2018; Mwangi 2019; Agwanda 2022), and governance structures (Bachmann 2012). By framing refugees as existential threats, the state rationalizes the undermining of its commitments to international norms and statutes, while legitimizing violent and exclusionary practices (Okech 2018; Kimathi 2019; Mwangi 2019). This process underscores how securitization has not only transformed refugee governance but also facilitated state power consolidation under the guise of national security (Burns 2010; Brankamp and Glück 2022). While ST has been instrumental in illuminating the evolution of Kenya’s refugee regime, some scholars have highlighted its limitations in fully accounting for Kenya’s complex socio-political context [e.g. Gitonga (2018) argues that Copenhagen School’s audience definition ignores actors that are important in the Kenyan context]. Nevertheless, much of the Kenyan literature on securitization implicitly accepts the dualism between normal governance and emergency politics, reinforcing the assumption that extraordinary measures are distinct from everyday political practices.

Brankamp and Glück’s work presents a notable exception to this trend (Brankamp and Glück 2022). Drawing on historical continuities and geographical variations they illustrate the long-standing relationship between encampment, counter-insurgency, and state control, suggesting that securitization is deeply embedded in the state’s practices beyond just exceptional measures (Brankamp and Glück 2022). While their analysis hints at the fundamental flaw in ST, their focus is not on a normative or epistemological critique of the theory itself, which remains the central concern of this article.

This critique of the norm/exception binary sets the stage for an exploration of how securitization unfolds in practice. In Kenya, securitization is not only a discursive act but also a process that is institutionalized, embedded, and cyclical, challenging ST’s assumptions.

3. Security and statecraft: Kenya’s refugee politics and institutional practices

This section advances a longue-durée approach to securitization, emphasizing its temporal, historical, institutional, and political dimensions, setting the stage for a deeper exploration of how colonial and postcolonial bureaucratic practices have shaped Kenya’s security governance (See Figure 1). Examining the Kenyan context across time reveals there is no rupture between ‘extraordinary’ and ‘normal’ politics. A temporal analytical approach provides insight into contextual factors that ‘constrain or limit the securitization process’ (Bourbeau 2011: 3, emphasis in original). What results is a hodgepodge of security actions applied unevenly across space and time (McDonald 2008), challenging the linear progression of perceived threat-political rhetoric-implementation of extraordinary measures implied in traditional ST. These security practices evolve not as isolated responses to external threats (Abrahamsen 2005) but as dynamic power negotiations between global, national, and local actors (Bigo 2014), making securitization a process of contestation rather than a simple linear progression.

Figure 1

Timeline of Kenya’s migration and security response. 

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Figure 1 illustrates major terror events, policy and institutional responses, and political rhetoric around securitization in Kenya. As shown, the policy actions, and rhetoric around counter-terrorism, are intricately intertwined with the management of migration and refugee flows. The trajectory of Kenya’s counter-terrorism journey is influenced by two pivotal events: the 1998 US embassy bombings and the 2011 Kenyan invasion of Somalia. Following the US embassy bombings in Nairobi in 1998, which occurred during a period of rising refugee numbers in the country, Kenya’s investment in security infrastructure experienced a notable surge. Positioned as a key player in the global ‘War on Terror’, Kenya received substantial financial assistance, totalling USD 9.2 billion between 2002 and 2017, making it the fourth-largest recipient of US counter-terrorism funding, trailing only behind Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq (Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism 2018). UK investments are to the tune of GBP 7 million a year, which includes technical assistance, establishment of a terrorism court, building an anti-terrorism police unit, joint training, and so on (British High Commission Nairobi 2022). While these funds strengthened Kenya’s security infrastructure, they also entrenched donor-driven priorities, complicating efforts to align external agendas with domestic realities (Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen 2006; Nzau 2020). This influx of funding, coupled with the threat posed by Al Shabaab in neighbouring Somalia, has perpetuated tensions and violence within Kenya. The 2011 invasion of Somalia by the Kenyan army further solidified Kenya’s position as an important US ally in the fight against terrorism. However, rather than quelling the threat, the invasion seemed to embolden groups like Al Shabaab, who vowed to intensify their attacks within Kenya in retaliation for the occupation of their territories (Dhaaysane 2022).

This temporal perspective allows us to see securitization as cyclical, with security measures institutionalized over time through legislative, judicial, and societal dynamics. For instance, the 2016 attempt to close Dadaab refugee camp highlighted these contestations: while framed as a security imperative, it faced significant resistance, culminating in a High Court ruling that deemed it unconstitutional (Namwaya 2016; Agwanda 2022). This reflects a process of constant negotiation, where policies oscillate between restrictive security frameworks and human rights-oriented interventions, challenging the binaries of ‘normal’ versus ‘extraordinary’ politics central to Copenhagen School theory (McDonald 2008; Bourbeau 2011).

Furthermore, this approach critiques ST’s universalizing assumptions. Kenya’s policies are co-constructed by global powers and transnational logics, as seen in USA and UK’s influence on border management, surveillance, and counter-terrorism strategies (Shabibi 2020a, 2020b; Lauterbach 2021; British High Commission Nairobi 2022). The adoption of frameworks like the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework in 2017 reflects both compliance with international norms and the local advocacy for human rights (Open Society Foundations 2013). Far from a mere technical response to threats, Kenya’s security regime reflects a dynamic interplay of power, where policies are contested and reshaped across temporal and institutional dimensions. This challenges the reductionism of ST and underscores the need to account for context-specific, iterative processes that define security practices in contexts like Kenya.

4. Negotiating boundaries: the fluidity of normal and extraordinary politics in Kenya's securitization

Drawing on empirical evidence, the following paragraphs demonstrate how the distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘extraordinary’ politics is not a fixed boundary, but a fluid and constructed category. By examining the interactions between local, national, and global actors, the sections reveal how power dynamics at these various levels converge to shape Kenya’s securitization politics, showing how the division between normal and extraordinary politics is an artificial construct.

4.1 Inter-Governmental tensions: national vs. local perspectives on migration security

There has been a mindset shift … Some years ago the government was talking about repatriation, now they are able to see the benefits of having refugees around.¹

Following the Copenhagen School’s logic, the pronouncement to close refugee camps in Kenya would have precipitated the extraordinary measures required to decant over half a million displaced people out of the country. However, this national security-centric agenda immediately faced formidable challenges from local politicians and communities. The pushback from local stakeholders underscores the entanglement of so-called emergency politics with everyday political contestations at the local level. Initially perceived as burdensome, the call for refugee integration within local communities has reshaped investment strategies. Programs such as the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and the UNHCR are increasingly channelling resources into communities hosting refugees, aiming to develop infrastructure, schools, healthcare facilities, and other essential services. For instance, the EUTF’s project, ‘Enhancing self-reliance for refugees and host communities in Kenya’, injected over €33 million into infrastructure development benefiting both host and refugee populations in the Kakuma-Kalobeyei corridor (EUTF n.d.). The strategy of including host communities in resource distribution offers a politically palatable incentive for refugee integration into local development plans. But it pits local authorities against the national securitization agenda, particularly when such policies threaten local development gains.

Municipal planners, at the forefront of local service delivery, play a key role in making the case for refugee integration (Kihato and Landau 2024). The rationale is often pragmatic. From sanitation to garbage removal, urban services do not distinguish between a refugee and a local (Landau et al. 2017); municipal performance is judged on serving a geographic area. As a Turkana county official remarked, ‘[w]hen you are providing services like town cleaning and garbage collection you realise you have a huge problem because you have to take care of a [refugee] population that was not originally considered in the budget allocation’.² The logistical challenges of service provision, such as sanitation, water, and infrastructure, demand that urban planners and local administrators incorporate displaced populations into their planning and budgeting processes. This recognition of refugees as part of the local fabric has led local authorities to push national governments for the inclusion of refugees in planning and budgeting processes (Kihato and Landau 2020). By integrating refugees into urban development plans, local officials are better able to provide urban services, which are hindered when national policies ‘invisibilize’ displaced populations.

Refugees can be vital to the growth and sustainability of marginalized areas like Turkana. And local officials have taken notice. As an International Labour Organisation (ILO) official said, ‘the governor of Turkana is a star when discussing the role of local government in the management of refugees. He realized that Turkana is so marginalized, and that the only reason there were services, growth, and jobs is because there are refugees’.³ This sentiment is echoed by local officials, one of whom remarked, ‘we have the World Bank, we have the European Union, the Danish and so many other donors. Do you think they would come here if it weren’t for the Kakuma refugee camp?’⁴ Communities themselves also acknowledge the benefits. A representative pointed out ‘[w]e have developed thanks to the refugees; our roads are nice thanks to the UNHCR and other partners. So, if the government were to close the camps today, I am really sure I would riot’.⁵ These reflections underscore how local administrations and communities recognize that a securitization-focused national agenda threatens the flow of resources which are vital to the region.

Furthermore, the presence of refugees has catalysed the restructuring of what were once considered marginal towns like Dadaab and Kakuma into municipalities with significant stature at national and global platforms. According to the Urban Areas and Cities Act of 2011, an area with a population of over 250,000 can be considered a municipality, which after a city is the second largest local government entity. Without the refugee count, Kakuma and Dadaab do not make municipal status. So when the Refugees Act of 2021 paved the path for the integration and inclusion of refugees in local population registers (The Republic of Kenya 2021) the standing of local bureaucrats increased, as their entities became full-fledged municipalities. Institutionally, the elevation of Kakuma and Dadaab has effectively meant that they gain entitlements from the national government and acquire greater constitutional authority to plan, access, and manage resources (Republic of Kenya 2011). It is no wonder then that local elites resist the closure of camps as it would undermine their new-found relevance and influence within the national polity. The vested interests of local bureaucrats in maintaining refugee populations further highlight the inseparability of normal and extraordinary politics.

For the first time in Kakuma, we are having a new municipality that is, according to the Kenyan law, classified in terms of population. So, for the first time we have been considered an urbanized population and granted municipal status. The same has also happened in Dadaab. Kakuma started and Dadaab joined. That is something that we can pride ourselves as a county. Dadaab and Kakuma are now municipalities thanks to the count of refugees.⁶

This integration of refugees into local development plans has created a politically appealing incentive for local elites and communities who see refugees as crucial to the economic and infrastructural growth of their regions (Kihato and Landau 2024). This alignment of local interests with refugee integration challenges securitization’s simplistic normal/extraordinary binary. As long as refugees continue to contribute to the betterment of marginalized host communities by fostering investments in critical infrastructure, such as education, healthcare, and transportation, the incentive to host them persists, despite opposition based on security concerns.

4. Intra-governmental dynamics: divergent departmental views on securitization

While different levels of government engage in complex negotiations over the securitization of migration, the debate extends within national government itself, where various departments grapple with differing views on the best approach to migration security. As this section shows, the internal contestation within the national government highlights the varied perspectives on migration and displacement, revealing the complexities of political dynamics within the governance structure.

Over the years, changes in the administration of refugees have led to greater militarization of refugee affairs. The Refugee Act of 2006, created the pathway for the formation of the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) in 2007. But following a series of attacks after the Kenyan invasion of Somalia, including the high profile Westgate (2013) and Garissa College (2015) atrocities, the DRA was disbanded and a new Refugee Affairs Secretariat was established as the government announced the closure of camps in 2016. The disbanding of the DRA was controversial. Officers considered to be close to UNHCR, and as such too ‘humanitarian minded, were replaced by officers who had built their careers in the military and other security branches…’ (Brankamp 2019). Camp management too was handed over to people with a security background (Brankamp and Glück 2022).

One of the biggest challenges is that migration is with the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government. This is a super minister, the minister of all ministers more powerful the vice president … the challenge now is that different departments speak different languages, and they all follow the money.⁷

If the politics of securitization between different actors within the migration ecosystem⁸ appear significant, internal tensions within national government are also notable. Securitization processes within government are dominated by a security cluster which includes the Minister of Defence, Minister of Interior, and the intelligence services. While they wield considerable power over security policies, their decisions have an impact on how other government departments function. To understand how this works within the migration ecosystem in Kenya we need to analyse how the National Coordinating Mechanism on Migration (NCM) works.

Founded in 2016, the NCM is a government-led, inter-agency platform that coordinates, collaborates, and shares information on migration issues in Kenya. The NCM Secretariat is hosted by the Directorate of Immigration and Citizen Services which coordinates the body’s activities and oversees its technical working groups. It is a broad base of actors including the intelligence, immigration, police, and border management officials as well as the ministries of health, labour and social protection, foreign affairs, treasury and planning, civil society. With a broad participant list, the NCM’s objective is to foster more inclusive dialogues on migration that go beyond security considerations to include wide-ranging issues around the economy, labour markets, and social development. In the words of a member of the Secretariat:

the NCM is intended to support open discussions on migration and build capacity amongst government stakeholders to see migration as a normal thing, not just a bad thing, or about security. But to the security sector, migration is not a normal thing.⁹

Within national government, there is a tussle between those who see migration as a threat, and those that see it as part of a normal sociopolitical process. The NCM sits within the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, the ministry with a ‘super minister’ mentioned before, and is headed by a director general (not a more senior permanent secretary). The secretariat relies primarily donor funding and its ‘normalizing’ mission becomes overshadowed by the financial might of the security sector. Consequently, engaging in holistic multidimensional discussions about migration is challenging:

It is unfortunate that the voices of other government clusters such as the economic cluster, are not so strong in the discussions in the National Coordinating Mechanism. Their suggestions for a more balanced policy are not heard. In the end, it’s the security cluster that seems to win the arguments to close borders.¹⁰

Debates within the NCM over migration policy often reveal some of the tensions that exist between government departments. Officials from government departments like the national treasury, planning, and the central bank, for example, caution against the securitization of migration which impacts negatively on development and growth. At a platform meeting, one official pointed out:

Nobody wants the law to work better than the exchequer. If a foreigner is accused of investing with criminal money, use the law to adjudicate. But have an open visa policy with countries that are attractive to Kenyan enterprise … provide permanent residency for wealth managers, establish a migrant complaint unit, and enhance asset and property rights for migrants and foreigners¹¹.

Within the national administration a spectrum of viewpoints exists regarding displacement, migration, and security, highlighting the complexity of decision-making processes and their outcomes. While the security discourse retains prominence, its hegemony is continually challenged within and between government departments.

4.3 Securitization in practice: colonial inheritance and refugee politics

This section demonstrates that Kenya’s securitization narrative, though gaining prominence after pivotal events like the 1998 US embassy bombings and the 2011 military intervention in Somalia, is rooted in deeply institutionalized bureaucratic practices established well before these moments. These practices, shaped by historical and political contexts, created the foundation upon which securitization could emerge and evolve. As securitization permeates everyday bureaucratic activities and normative functions (Bigo 2002, 2014), analysing it requires situating Kenya’s security apparatus within both its historical trajectory and contemporary realities, while accounting for the complex interplay of politics, power, and economic imperatives.

Since their colonial beginnings, Kenya’s security forces have been marked by violence, political harassment, and repression (Elkins 2005; Anderson 2002, 2012; Throup 2017). The underlying ethos and architecture of the police and security forces remained unchanged even after Kenya’s independence. Security forces have continued to serve the interests of postcolonial administrations, consolidating power, quelling political opponents, and justifying repressive measures, as evidenced by their complicity in post-election violence¹² (Kenya Commission of Enquiry into Post-Election Violence 2008; Namwaya 2016; Henry 2017). The recent instances of police violence and the forced abduction of protestors critical of current President William Ruto’s regime further reinforce this argument (Mule 2024; Mbaku 2025). Even in the absence of overt violence, the strategic reassignment of security personnel is employed to influence electoral outcomes, thereby skewing the playing field to the advantage of the incumbent (Hassan 2017). Seemingly, security’s raison d’être has been ‘preserving public order and security’ and ‘maintaining political incumbency and expediency’ (Otiso and Kaguta 2016: 222). Kenya’s political leaders have exploited security threats to legitimize authoritarian actions and maintain their grip on power (Kivoi 2020). And, corruption and violence remain endemic across the security system—police, paramilitary, and intelligence—and accountability mechanisms remain weak despite attempts at reform (Human Rights Watch 2017a, 2017b).

Securitization is not only about elite discourses and extraordinary measures; it is deeply embedded in everyday bureaucratic practices of surveillance and control (Bigo 2014). These practices operationalize the framing of certain populations as security threats, thereby justifying extraordinary measures. This interplay complicates the distinction between securitization and normative state functions. Furthermore, corruption within Kenya’s police and security apparatus exacerbates these issues, selectively reinforcing the securitization of specific groups (Simpson, Rhoad, and Odhiambo 2010; Simpson 2013; Mwangi 2019) while undermining overall state capacity. It is true that corruption does not necessarily negate securitization processes.¹³ However, it complicates securitization dynamics in ways that can bolster or undermine the efficacy of extraordinary political manoeuvres. A politicized police service grappling with tribalism, favouritism, and bribery not only erodes its foundational principles, but also raises questions around its capacity to implement emergency measures effectively. Counter-terrorism efforts have been compromised by corruption and the violation of Muslims’ fundamental rights and freedoms, which has, in turn, exacerbated religious radicalization (Mwangi 2023). Furthermore, corruption also provides the scaffolding that supports terror activities. It ‘fuels terrorism by undermining counterterrorism measures and providing extremists with access, funding and motivation’ (Gilchrist and Eisen 2019: para 3). For instance, Kenya’s Defence Forces, have been accused of aiding Al-Shabaab to smuggle sugar worth USD 200 million across the Kenya Somalia border (The Economist 2015). During the Westgate mall bombing, looting by soldiers (Pflanz 2013) highlighted the vulnerability of securitization processes, revealing that assumptions of security being immune to the ‘politics of the belly’ as unfounded.

Additionally, at the highest level of the state, senior security officials have been implicated in diverting funds from national coffers to secret bank accounts (Business Daily 2020), and lucrative tender scams for security-related contracts sometimes go unfulfilled (Meservey 2015). When government officials and networks exploit security for personal enrichment, it not only erodes public trust and accountability but also undermines the process of securitization itself. This misuse of security for illegitimate private gain fundamentally challenges the notion that security is somehow detached from the realm of politics.

In a process mired in politics, police reform is characterized as a practice of ‘meddling through’ (Osse 2016: 907). After the passing of a new constitution in 2010, a new law, the National Police Service Act of 2011 was enacted. The act proposed sweeping changes to policing including turning the police force into a police service, unifying the command structures between formally distinct structures, and importantly, setting up accountability mechanisms (Diphoorn 2019). Among these was an Internal Affairs Unit, and an Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) both responsible for monitoring and investigating police misconduct. In addition to these statutory bodies is a Police Reform Working Group, a coalition of human rights organizations that advocates for police reform and accountability. However, despite efforts at reform, institutional challenges persist (Hope 2015; Diphoorn 2019; Kivoi 2022). Political directives to enhance security measures falter due to police resistance towards underfunded oversight bodies. This resistance undermines potential avenues for accountability, perpetuating weaknesses in the security apparatus (IPOA 2019). And factors such as poor working conditions, a lack of professionalism, political interference in policing decisions, low public trust hinder the security force’s capacity to execute effective securitization processes (Mageka 2015). Unpacking the complexities of securitization demands situating it within both historical and contemporary frameworks which reveal the intersection of politics, power, and economic exigencies woven into the fabric of security institutions.

4.4 Donor aid, geopolitics and the war against terror

This section analyses the role of donors and global stakeholders, revealing political and economic interests behind securitization in Kenya. Relationships between Kenya and its counter-terrorism allies, the UK and USA, may appear to be collaborative efforts against terrorism, but they actually underscore how aid is manipulated to advance state agendas (Petrikova and Lazell 2022). This dynamic is evident in the strategic manoeuvres employed by the countries to achieve their respective goals. Securitization is intricately entwined with Realpolitik, where nation-states manoeuvre and negotiate relationships to advance their individual agendas and priorities. Kenya’s strategic significance for USA extends beyond the fight against terrorism. Its location on the East African coast, coupled with housing one of the largest US embassies globally, underscores its importance for regional activities (Shabibi 2020b). Operating ‘in the service of external’ (Mogire and Agade 2011: 485) and more powerful interests (Nzau 2023: 399), this geopolitical positioning makes Kenya a critical ally not only in combating terrorism, but also in facilitating broader US interests in the region. The recent decision by Kenya to deploy its police force to Haiti underscores both the considerable constitutional and civil society pushback against this policy, as well as the lengths to which the country’s ruling elite will go in their strategic alliance with USA (Cotrino 2024; Kimeu and Phillips 2024; Reuters 2024). This move not only highlights the complex interplay of domestic opposition and international alignment but also reveals the broader geopolitical motivations and power dynamics at play. Like all forms of aid, funding for security is influenced by a broader political agenda and instrumentalized as part of foreign policy donor interests (Davey 2012; Hilhorst 2018). The US government’s involvement in Kenya exemplifies how international organizations influence security policies through decision-making, agenda setting, and funding priorities (Cornish 2019). Aid becomes a tool for promoting soft power, facilitating diplomatic negotiations, or advancing security agendas under the guise of global stability (Sueres 2016; Muguruza 2020). As an anchor state in the war on ‘terror’ and a ‘stabilizer’ in the wider Eastern African region’, Kenya has received significant funding for training, equipment, and arms from USA (Nzau 2023: 397). As mentioned earlier, the country is the fourth-largest recipient of counter-terrorism funding (Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism 2018).

Yet, even security funding that would seem immune from normal politics in ST, is anything but. In 2005, USA sought to ensure that American soldiers who committed human rights violations would be shielded from prosecution by the International Criminal Court (Oluoch 2005; Mazzetti 2006). To pressure the Kenyan authorities, USA withheld military funding, using it a bargaining chip. In a memo leaked Wikileaks dated 2005, Ambassador William Bellamy remarked, ‘Despite intensive Embassy lobbying over the past year, and the cut off of military assistance, the Kenyan government still resists signature of the Article 98 agreement with the US’ (The Nation 2020: para 4). The Kenyan government refused to acquiesce and the US government eventually resumed its security aid, realizing that the stability of the region and its operations in the Horn of Africa were in jeopardy. As the then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked, cutting military assistance to Kenya is ‘sort of the same as shooting ourselves in the foot’ (Mazzetti 2006: para 25). This realpolitik gamesmanship underscores how securitization intersects with global politics.

The convergence of securitization and geopolitics is further exemplified by how Kenya’s allies turn a blind eye on the country’s human rights abuses. Kenya’s former vice-president Kalonzo Musyoka observations highlight this:

I cannot remember any serious reprimand [for human rights abuses] … Absolutely not. The West is acting selectively. We have a government that has been involved in extrajudicial killings and they are treated with ‘kid gloves’ by the West … when it comes to the war on terror, there is absolutely no accountability.

Former Kenyan vice president, Kalonzo Musyoka (Lauterbach 2021: para 23)

The West’s leniency towards Kenya’s human rights abuses might be explained by the fact that both USA and UK fund and are closely linked to Kenya’s security contentious apparatus. Research shows that the paramilitary police unit has perpetuated abuses with the support and guidance of the CIA and M16 (Human Rights Watch 2014; Namwaya 2016). Further, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and the National Counter Terrorism Centre, were set up with the support of USA and UK in 2003. A year later, the clandestine CIA-backed Rapid Response Team was formed as an elite unit of combatants, trained in USA to counter terrorism. The Rapid Response Team has been accused of carrying out extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and other abuses. (Human Rights Watch 2014, 2015; Lauterbach 2021) Investigative journalists claim that the team receives orders directly from their CIA handlers and that US embassy pays a portion of the salaries (Shabibi 2020a, 2020b; Lauterbach 2021). Kenya’s role in the global war on terror extends beyond mere cooperation; it implicates Western intelligence and military interventions on its sovereign soil.

Realpolitik involves strategic negotiations between partners, where asymmetries in funding and power do not preclude mutual leverage and influence. Kenya’s influence lies in its geopolitical position within the east African region, and this is not lost to its political elites. Activists and humanitarian actors suggest that refugees are merely pawns in a larger geopolitical manoeuvre (Deng 2022), and a former National Assembly speaker accused the administration of blackmail in in refugee repatriation (Hajir 2020). By exploiting its geopolitical position in the Horn of Africa (as a reliable Western ally in an unstable region) and capitalizing on European anxieties about African migration to Europe, the country’s ruling elite strategically leverages for financial concessions (Neil 2016). The phenomenon of refugee ‘commodification’, referring to the practice of states using asylum seekers and refugees as bargaining chips in aid negotiations, has become increasingly important in refugee studies (see Freier, Micinski, and Tsourapas 2021 for a comprehensive discussion). Viewed through this perspective, Kenyatta and Matiangi’s speeches are performative acts, directed not (only) towards a domestic audience, but rather the international donor community (Tsourapas 2019). Acting as ‘rentier states’ (Tsourapas 2019) reliant on refugee hosting for economic gains and geopolitical positioning, countries like Kenya utilize threats of expulsion as a means of aid extraction (Micinski 2023). Arguably, this tactic of ‘blackmail’ and ‘extraction’ may have bolstered security funding to the nation (Micinski 2023), but it has effectively marginalized Kenya’s Muslim community, exacerbated tensions with neighbouring Somalia, and fuelled rather than quelled tensions (Mwangi 2021). By strategically employing discourse to use refugees as bargaining chips in negotiations for aid, Kenya’s elite blur the distinction between normal and extraordinary politics, undermining its effectiveness in the war against terror.

5. Conclusion

In examining Kenya’s migration-security nexus, this article advocates for a re-evaluation of the foundational concepts that underpin ST. Departing from the theory’s temporal focus on the discursive act, this analysis transcends the binary classification of ‘normal’ versus ‘exceptional’ politics, uncovering the intricate web of local, national, and global political dynamics shaping Kenya’s migration and security landscape. Through this lens, it reveals the legislative and policy processes, judicial interventions, engagements with international frameworks, and the pragmatic realities of realpolitik that shape Kenya’s migration regime. This analysis suggests that ST cannot fully account for the entangled realities of state control, local politics, realpolitik, and humanitarian governance, in the construction and contestation of securitized identities.

While the originators of ST portray Africa through a reductionist lens of dysfunction and barbarism (see Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998; Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2020), the Kenyan case offers a compelling counterpoint. Contesting these oversimplified narratives, civil society organizations in the country have advocated for pragmatic legislation, enhanced refugee protections, and comprehensive security sector reform. Additionally, the Kenyan judiciary has played a crucial role in safeguarding refugee rights, often acting as a counterbalance to government actions. This nuanced engagement unveils a multifaceted and evolving political landscape that subverts the facile characterization of Africa as intrinsically unruly. Importantly, methodologically centring Kenya in the debate offers insights into the complexities of security and migration that transcend American and Eurocentric theoretical analyses.

The normative implications of STs normal/extraordinary binary reverberate well beyond Kenya. This article has unveiled the international scaffolding that upholds the infrastructure of securitization in Kenya, shedding light on liberal democracy’s inherent contradictions and inconsistencies. By constructing the global north as the standard bearer of democracy and moral virtue (normal politics) and country’s like Kenya as savage and primitive, ST not only obscures the complexities of refugee governance in developing contexts: it conceals the contradictions and harms of the liberal democratic order.

Kenya’s case is not an anomaly, but a lens through which we can better understand how security and governance are entangled far beyond the global South. If securitization is deeply embedded in everyday political life in Kenya, then the very premise of a clear divide between normal and extraordinary politics in liberal democracies must be questioned. The Kenyan case forces us to confront how liberal democracies legitimize their own exclusionary and violent practices—not as aberrations, but as part of their governing logic. In this sense, the study does not merely contribute to debates on African politics; it calls for a fundamental reckoning with the epistemological assumptions that structure global security studies.

Ultimately, the project of desecuritization emerges not merely as a transition from ‘extraordinary’ to ‘normal’ politics, but as a profound interrogation of the very foundations of ‘normal’ politics itself. The future of a humane, dignified, and inclusive migration governance system lies in the re-evaluation of the norms, values, and structures that underpin liberal democracy; as well as a critical examination of the epistemological assumptions that inform our understanding of security and migration in the twenty-first century.

Funding

No funding to be recorded.

Conflict of interest statement

None declared.

Notes

References