...The surge seemed successful at first, especially because it coincided with the Anbar Awakening spreading through Sunni communities. Violence levels plummeted. However, the U.S. administration was still being manipulated by the Iraq government, which continued its sectarian agenda. More importantly...

...This chapter details the thinking that eventually led to the surge. Obama’s patience waned while bureaucratic frictions and problems with the Karzai government continued to impede progress. U.S. departments and agencies continued to write and execute individual plans within bureaucratic silos...

... approach. International Security Assistance Forces—Afghanistan ISAF Petraeus General David H Biddle Stephen Afghanistan Availability heuristics Surge Iraq Petraeus Heuristics are rules of thumb that people use to find adequate, albeit imperfect, answers to difficult questions. ¹...

...This chapter sheds light on how the success of the surge was assessed. As the surge was underway, each agency and department continued to assess the conflict within its silo, using different metrics and drawing different conclusions. With no interagency authority below the President, and the latter...

... Surge Sectarianism Most people feel losses more intensely than gains, argues Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman; they would rather not lose than gain the same value. ¹ Of course, some people are far more tolerant of loss—such as professional risktakers in the financial markets—but, within...

...Why was the U.S. unsuccessful in turning successes achieved during the surge into a durable political outcome? This chapter offers three related arguments: the desire to withdraw reduced U.S. bargaining leverage; the reduction in violence led U.S. officials to overestimate Maliki’s inclusiveness...