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Sean Aas, What We Argue About When We Argue About Death, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine, Volume 49, Issue 4, August 2024, Pages 399–413, https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhae016
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Abstract
The literature on the determination of death has often if not always assumed that the concept of human death should be defined in terms of the end of the human organism. I argue that this broadly biological conceptualization of human death cannot constitute a basis for agreement in a pluralistic society characterized by a variety of reasonable views on the nature of our existence as embodied beings. Rather, following Robert Veatch, I suggest that we must define death in moralized terms, as the loss of an especially significant sort of moral standing. Departing from Veatch, however, I argue that we should not understand death in terms of the loss of all moral status whatsoever. Rather, I argue, what we should argue about, when we argue about death, is when and why people lose their rights-claims to the protection and promotion of their basic bodily functioning.
