Abstract

The Return of the Taliban, by Hassan Abbas, provides a detailed narrative of the Taliban’s resurgence and the political dynamics in Afghanistan. The book offers a chronological and thematic analysis, covering the Taliban’s history, ideological foundations, internal dynamics, and international interactions. It divides the Taliban’s history into three phases: Taliban 1.0 (1994–2001), Taliban (2003–18), and Taliban 3.0 (post-2018). The book critically examines the circumstances leading to the Taliban’s return to power, focusing on the USA–Taliban peace deal of February 2020 and the later fall of Kabul. The analysis extends to the governance challenges faced by the Taliban, their internal rivalries, ideological foundations, and their international relations. The book explores the Taliban’s governance philosophy and the practical difficulties they face, highlighting contradictions within their ideology. It also provides insights into the Taliban’s internal power struggles and their ideological underpinnings influenced by Deobandis. The book concludes with an analysis of the Taliban’s international relations and speculates on their prospects. Despite its comprehensive approach, the book is critiqued for several shortcomings. These include superficial coverage of certain topics, limited economic analysis, potential Western-centric biases, and an overemphasis on political and military aspects at the expense of social, cultural, and economic dimensions. Methodologically, the book relies heavily on secondary sources, leading to a potential selection bias and limiting the depth of analysis. The book’s speculative conclusions on the future of the Taliban also lack empirical support.

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