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Matthew Jagel, Arming East Asia: Deterring China in the Early Cold War, Journal of American History, Volume 111, Issue 3, December 2024, Page 617, https://doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jaae240
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As Chinese regional aspirations and aggressiveness gain strength in the twenty-first century, the ability of the United States to maintain regional partnerships to deter an assertive President Xi Jinping is of continuing vital importance. As argued by Eric Setzekorn in Arming East Asia, President Dwight D. Eisenhower built the framework of a post–World War II strategic presence in East Asia whereby a cost-effective yet sustainable U.S. regional foundation is buttressed by trained and armed allies to serve as a deterrent to the People's Republic of China. The mutual security program provided a key complementary piece to Eisenhower's “New Look” nuclear deterrence strategy. It is this framework, argues Setzekorn, that is needed today to counter “Chinese militarization of the South China Sea, border provocations with India, and continued threats to Taiwan” (p. 176).
This study begins with the transition from Harry S. Truman to Eisenhower and ends with the change to John F. Kennedy's New Frontier. While generally chronological in format, Arming East Asia dedicates chapters to South Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam and Thailand, and Japan. Korea, for example, provided a solid testing ground for how much involvement in internal affairs the United States should have. South Korean president Syngman Rhee's insistence on large-scale military funding, which U.S. officials feared would be used to instigate war, caused U.S. policy makers to limit “South Korean capabilities to undertake independent operations” (p. 48). Yet officials believed a sustained U.S. effort was still needed, and by the time Rhee left office, a sizeable, stable, and capable South Korean military stood ready.
