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Eleni Tsingou, How States Cooperate: Choosing from the Menu of Institutional Options, International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 4, December 2014, Pages 671–672, https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12174
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Extract
The study of international organizations has recently generated much work on the origins and effects of the policies and norms promoted by international organizations, as well as analyses based on rich accounts of the bureaucratic characteristics of institutions, and the skills and networks of the professionals inhabiting them. Institutional Choice and Global Commerce in many ways goes back to basics and is motivated by bigger questions: why do states choose particular institutional forms to cooperate, what is the repertoire of institutional options, and what makes the institutional status quo so enduring?
Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal have produced a compelling book that provides a thorough framework for addressing these questions. The proposed theory explains how boundedly rational actors make institutional choices. Aspiring to move beyond the limitations of rational design approaches while avoiding the deterministic elements of path dependency, the theory acknowledges the importance of rationality in choice and design, but draws from historical institutionalism to introduce constraining elements, in particular, the reluctance to disturb the status quo when institutional arrangements are deemed “good enough.” The framework, “USCC,” explains that, when faced with a cooperation problem or dilemma, states have four choices: they can choose to USE an existing institution, that is, a natural focal point for the issue area, SELECT among alternative institutional settings, CHANGE existing institutional arrangements, or CREATE a new institution and rules. The four USCC options are presented as a sequence in a decision tree, with states moving along the sequence when established arrangements are inadequate, or existing institutions are unwilling to take on a new issue, or are not in a position to adapt. In this framework, boundedly rational actors do not optimize, but rather have a sensible “threshold acceptability requirement” and choose, along the decision tree, the first institutional option that is considered satisfactory. The theory is illustrated and tested with cases from the institutional arrangements governing global trade.
