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Nuno Garoupa, Purging Disloyal Courts in Democratic Transitions and Judicial Preferences, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Volume 18, Issue 3, November 2024, Pages 474–489, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijae030
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ABSTRACT∞
In this article, I examine court-purging in democratic transitions through the lens of judicial preferences. Specifically, I address the debate on how court-purging during a democratic transition affects the likelihood of future court-purging. I argue that the prevailing assumption is one of static, sincere judicial preferences. In contrast, I explicitly recognize the role of dynamic judicial preferences and incentives. This recognition suggests that transitional court-purging could be minimal and cautious, while the broader judicial context may eventually achieve the same policy outcomes. The dynamic perspective is crucial for understanding past court-purging strategies and for informing the conceptual debate about the rule of law in transitional justice.
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