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Tim Willasey-Wilsey, The army of Afghanistan: a political history of a fragile institution. By Antonio Giustozzi, International Affairs, Volume 92, Issue 6, November 2016, Pages 1550–1551, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12779
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The army of Afghanistan: a political history of a fragile institution. By Antonio Giustozzi. London: Hurst. 2015. 309pp. £35.00. ISBN 978 1 84904 481 3.
In the autumn of 2005, when Britain was considering its deployment to Helmand, I asked a group of military officers if they had studied the Soviet experience in Afghanistan (1979–89) and whether there were lessons to be learnt. Some had indeed read Russian texts, but the consensus around the table was that any comparisons were otiose. The Soviets had been occupiers, whereas the West was there with the consent of the population. The main difference, however, was that we now lived in an age of network-centric warfare. The Soviet experience was from a distant analogue era, whereas we were now digital warriors, with capabilities such as real-time fused intelligence, armed drones and laser-guided missiles.
A decade later we now know that cleverly implemented analogue warfare with some access to basic digital capability can defeat network-centric warfare. In this context, Antonio Giustozzi's fascinating book makes for sobering reading. We find that the Soviets made many of the same mistakes and had most of the same debates as the coalition. Like NATO, they allowed a dependency culture to develop, by which the Afghans left the big decisions to Soviet commanders and advisers. They also made the Afghan Army unsustainably large, aiming for 220,000 (p. 33), whereas NATO eventually opted for 195,000 (p. 147). The paucity of literate officers and non-commissioned officers made both figures unattainable. Corruption, desertion, drug-taking, ethnic tensions, poor administration, nepotism, occasional collusion with the enemy, impunity—these were all factors which the Soviets and NATO both encountered.