A Pragmatist critique of progressive realism in foreign policy

Abstract

What does it mean to be a pragmatist, and how does pragmatism inform foreign policy? These are important questions in the United Kingdom's context due to the recent ‘pragmatic’ turn of both Labour and Conservative politicians in the foreign policy sphere. The background to this move is a sense that history is moving in a different direction from the immediate post-Cold War trajectory. Instead of a future characterized by democratic peace, we are seeing the global renewal of great power competition. UK policy-makers thus see international order as ‘contested and volatile’.¹ In his foreword to the Integrated review refresh 2023, then-Prime Minister Rishi Sunak stated that Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and China's more aggressive stance towards its neighbours, were ‘threatening to create a world defined by danger, disorder and division—and an international order more favourable to authoritarianism’.² In response to this shift, Sunak argued the UK should stand up ‘to our competitors, not with grand rhetoric but with robust pragmatism’.³ Similarly, Labour's then foreign policy spokesperson David Lammy (from 2024 Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs) argued that the UK's ‘foreign policy must put pragmatism over ideology’,⁴ and the party's defence spokesperson, John Healey (who became Secretary of State for Defence), asserted that ‘Britain needs a national strategy, which is relentlessly pragmatic’.⁵

For these individuals, pragmatism boils down to recognizing the limits of British influence and avoiding ideological positions.⁶ Pragmatism in this sense could be a synonym for philosophical realism, i.e. accepting the way the world is; or a synonym for prudential realism, i.e. accepting that progressive change is difficult but still possible. Lammy has favoured the latter, framing Labour foreign policy as ‘progressive realism’. Here, pragmatism/realism is a means to a progressive end. Indeed, Lammy writes that foreign policy involves ‘using realist means to pursue progressive ends’, including taking ‘pragmatic steps’ to improve relations with other states. He rejects the notion that ‘idealism has no place in foreign policy’ but argues that policy-makers should be ‘realistic about the state of the world and the country's role in it’.⁷

Our argument as set out in this article is that there are potential problems in the pairing of progressivism and realism (and in the conflation of realism with pragmatism). Firstly, Lammy's pragmatism/realism could become so restraining that it misses progressive opportunities to promote democracy. In other words, by overemphasizing the need for stable relations with increasingly powerful authoritarian regimes, it loses its progressive edge. Secondly, seeing pragmatism/realism as a means towards (or a check on) progressive ends risks assuming the undemocratic position that those ends are given (by western powers) and beyond (multilateral) dialogue. This second danger is of course exposed by longstanding post-colonial critiques that ‘progressivism’ is little more than a revamp of western imperialism.⁸ We further argue that to avoid these potential problems pragmatism need not, and should not, be conflated with realism. Indeed, when pragmatism—rather than realism—is paired with progressivism it alerts progressive policy-makers to these two risks.

To make this argument we offer a definition of pragmatism that is separate from realism. To do this we draw on philosophical Pragmatism, a way of thinking that emerged in the United States in the late nineteenth century.⁹ This approach might seem far removed from the UK's foreign policy concerns in the twenty-first century, but it has nonetheless recently influenced British International Relations (IR) theory.¹⁰ It is important for a foreign policy audience, we argue, because it helps us understand that pragmatism is not just a statement on the means towards a fixed end, it is a statement about the constitution of those ends. In short, philosophical Pragmatism takes seriously the claim that we live in a culturally diverse, but constantly evolving, global society. That demands a degree of epistemic fallibilism. Particular cultures (and their state representatives) should not assume they know the ideal end-point of history. Those ideals can only command epistemic authority if they emerge from inclusive and deliberative (democratic) dialogue.

This influences foreign policy ends in the following way: unlike realists, who generally take cultural and political pluralism as fixed, and thus argue that the ends of foreign policy should be conservative (i.e. limited to advancing the national interest in the context of international order), Pragmatists see much stronger potential for progress, built on more fluid arrangements of democratic dialogue between a variety of local, national and international communities. This is a vision of inclusive global decision-making infused with a democratic ethos. Put like this, Pragmatism protects progressive politicians against the risks associated with the realist label, because Pragmatism itself is a progressive idea.

To make this argument, we structure the article as follows. The first section demonstrates how pragmatism and realism are often conflated in everyday foreign policy discourse before drawing on philosophical Pragmatism to better define progressive foreign policy in the contemporary age.¹¹ The main point here is that while Pragmatists share the realists' sense of prudence, recognizing the occasional need to compromise with authoritarian regimes to avoid the harmful consequences of ideological conviction, Pragmatists see greater scope for democratic progress, since even apparently fixed aspects like state identities are in a constant process of (re)constitution. Consequently, they are less predisposed than realists to settle for a non-democratic order in the name of an unsatisfactory and false stability.

The second section demonstrates how this Pragmatist commitment to a democratic ethos relates to authoritarian regimes who, because they control the actions of a large proportion of the world's population, are necessarily part of any solution to global problems like climate change. Importantly, Pragmatists are committed to democracy as a means of cultivating global solidarity out of pluralism and channelling power (through multilateral organizations) to solve shared problems. In the current context of challenges to global cooperation, that means a commitment to democratic practices between (as well as within) nations. In foreign policy terms, that involves not just supporting the multilateral institutions of the liberal international order, but also a commitment to democratizing them in ways that cultivate the global public will. In the third and fourth sections we elaborate on how these arguments play out in two ‘hard cases’: responding to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and reforming global governance. We choose these cases as they entail engaging with authoritarian states, through cooperation or conflict, in ways that test the relationship between progressives, realists and Pragmatists.

Pragmatism and realism in foreign policy discourse

In everyday foreign policy discourse, pragmatism is synonymous with a sense of realism. To be pragmatic is to accept the world as it is and to compromise on a vision of the world as one would like it to be. Thus, former British foreign secretary Lord Carrington defined himself as a pragmatist because he found ‘that the gulf between what is theoretically desirable and what is practically attainable is so wide that it is sensible to concentrate almost exclusively upon the latter’.¹² The ‘theoretically desirable’ in this sense is often represented in terms of idealistic/realistic binaries. Values that are realistically attainable within a state—such as governance by the rule of law and justice where this is violated—are dismissed as idealistic and beyond the reach of foreign policy. For instance, another former Conservative foreign secretary, Lord Howe, advocated pragmatism because ‘foreign policy is very often not justiceable. Even if it is, justice isn't enforceable’.¹³

When pragmatism is used as a synonym for instrumentality, this kind of idealistic/realistic binary is also conflated with another binary: that of values/interests. If, for example, we are unable to defend and promote wider values such as justice (or democracy) through our foreign policy, then the only practical thing to do is to promote the national interest. The ‘pragmatic pursuit of the national interest’ is, in this way, set against other more ambitious goals, such as ‘upholding a system of international order’.¹⁴ These sentiments resonate with realism as a tradition of thinking in IR, with its emphasis on the survival of states, regardless of their internal make-up, in a morally and politically diverse international society. From George Kennan's devastating critique of First World War Wilsonianism to John Mearsheimer's more recent writings on the ‘delusions’ of liberal ‘dreamers’, realists have attacked policies based on what they see as a misplaced commitment to ideals.¹⁵

Our contention is that philosophical Pragmatism leads us to challenge these binaries, particularly definitions of pragmatism that see it as antithetical to the ‘ideological’ influence of democracy on foreign policy. We offer three points to support this argument. Firstly, and at its most basic level, philosophically informed Pragmatism rejects any foreign policy based on philosophical realism—the conservative argument that we should not aim for progress in international relations because tragedy is a persistent fact of international life.¹⁶ The philosophical Pragmatism of John Dewey, for instance, emerged from the Darwinian view that the things we see in front of us, and the situations we find ourselves in, have evolved to be that way.¹⁷ Pragmatists work, in other words, with a ‘processual’ rather than fixed ontology.¹⁸ To hold fixed notions of international relations and political possibility is, in this sense, unrealistic. In fact, doing so signals an ideological (rather than pragmatic) conservatism.

Of course, many realists would reject attempts to portray them as ideologues (and past realists like Hans Morgenthau acknowledged the state system was not eternal).¹⁹ However, a conservative predisposition can lead realist politicians to miss the progressive moment—as Henry Kissinger did with the human rights diplomacy of the 1970s.²⁰ A Pragmatist perspective, sensitive to the social processes by which identities, interests and situations are constructed, is more likely to identify the scope for progressive change.²¹ Dewey's student Sidney Hook captured this when he criticized the apparent ‘heroism’ of the realist who makes the tough decision to compromise on one's own preferred values because of the necessity created by the tragic moment. Unlike realism, Pragmatism can be

more serious, even more heroic … because it does not resign itself to the bare fact of tragedy or take easy ways out at the price of truth …. It does not conceive of tragedy as a preordained doom, but as one in which the plot to some extent depends upon us, so that we become creators of our own tragic history. We cannot then palm off altogether the tragic outcome upon the universe in the same way as we can with a natural disaster.²²

This, we argue, is important to guard against the conservative implication of pairing realism with progressivism. Pragmatists would resist the politician's misjudged (or instrumental) invocation of realism as a reason why they cannot support democratic values at the local, national, international and global levels.

The second way philosophical Pragmatism rejects being used as a synonym for realism is its commitment to democracy as a means of problem-solving. As noted, it is common in foreign policy discourse to identify democracy as an end held by western liberal societies. In consequence, realists generally tell us that in a politically and culturally pluralistic world that end is beyond reach; or, at least, its pursuit usually backfires to make things worse. Pragmatism is sensitive to cultural and political pluralism. Since the social processes that construct political morality are bounded, we cannot assume an Archimedean point of moral objectivity, nor should moral philosophy waste its time searching for it.²³ But philosophers should be grounded and engaged in improving lived experiences (rather than setting abstract standards); they do that by solving problems through an immanent critique of existing practice. It is here that democracy retains its importance. Democracy is valued as a practical method of uncovering and solving problems, not as an abstract ideology or identity to assert moral hierarchy over another.

This influences foreign policy discourse because it brings in a ‘decentred’ conception of democracy. The well-known realist critique of the liberal internationalist's commitment to ‘democracy promotion’ focuses on democracy as an internal characteristic of certain (western or westernized) states. Pragmatists value democratic practices at that level. They also recognize, however, that a foreign policy that aims to democratize other states is difficult because, as Mearsheimer puts it, nationalism is ‘an enormously powerful political ideology’.²⁴ When liberals come up against that ideology their good intentions backfire. It does not follow, however, that democratic practices are irrelevant to foreign policy when nationalism is a powerful influence. The democratic ethos is still valuable as a method that helps to uncover and solve problems that emerge in relations between nations. Pragmatists thus share the realist's concern that foreign policy ethics be formulated within the context of cultural and political pluralism, but they also argue that should be done by first adopting a democratic sense of fallibilism and reflexivity, and then committing to a process of deliberation.²⁵ That is, states—including western states—should accept the provinciality of their preferred ideological position and should not assume that they alone know how best to govern the world's problems. They need not hide their preferred position, but they should ‘test’ its problem-solving potential in an inclusionary dialogue, the aim of which is to both identify and solve the problems of what Dewey called ‘associated living’ (i.e. problems created by interdependence).²⁶ Here, the willingness to (pragmatically) compromise is fundamental to the inclusive and deliberative (i.e. democratic) process of global problem-solving.²⁷ Pragmatism is thus endogenous to, not a replacement for, democratic practice.

Foreign policy discourse more commonly labels this process ‘multilateralism’. For the Pragmatist, however, multilateralism will not necessarily be progressive if states approach it with a realist attitude that puts an exclusionary conception of the national interest ahead of one that helps solve collective problems. Multilateralism only delivers the progressive goal of identifying and solving the problems of associated living if it can mobilize political will. It maximizes that possibility by being inclusive (i.e. democratic) so that the affected nations and peoples (Deweyan ‘publics’) feel part of the solution.²⁸ Liberals have begun to recognize this, as well as the subsequent need to reform the unwarranted exclusionary hierarchies of the western-led international order, citing a Deweyan form of democracy to support that case.²⁹

A willingness to (pragmatically) participate in and accept the outcomes of deliberative multilateralism resonates too with recent thinking in progressive foreign policy circles. We are cautious about the ‘progressive realist’ label for the reasons noted above. However, Nick Bisley and colleagues' progressive reading of E. H. Carr's realism has some overlap with what we prefer to call progressive  Pragmatism. While Bisley and colleagues underplay the importance of democracy as a deliberative practice between states, their emphasis on the ‘redistributive logic’ in Carr's work and progressive aspiration for a more ‘egalitarian, democratic and ecologically sustainable world order’ resonates with philosophical Pragmatism.³⁰ Likewise, Jonathan Gilmore's recent discussion of progressive foreign policy seeks to move away from ‘the primacy of exclusionary and neatly compartmentalized national communities’, the effect of which is to disregard democratization at the interstate level. His emphasis is on a foreign policy of ‘co-production’ between states and non-state actors and wider ‘publics’, which aligns with philosophical Pragmatism's desire for inclusivity in global governance.³¹

Progressive Pragmatism on the risks and benefits of inclusivity

This leads to a third way, in which the philosophical Pragmatist warns against the conflation of progressivism and realism. Clearly the Pragmatist's focus on practical problem-solving maps on to the use of the term ‘pragmatism’ in everyday foreign policy discourse. Indeed, it chimes with the realist critique of the role ideological conviction plays in international relations. It is better for international relations, the realist would say, if states put ideological differences to one side and concentrate on finding practical solutions to actual problems. It is important to acknowledge at this stage, however, the familiar dilemma in progressive foreign policy thinking that also challenges Pragmatists: how to relate to authoritarian regimes who pursue oppressive policies at home, but nevertheless ‘represent’ (at least in formal legal terms) and ‘mobilize’ (in political terms) significant portions of humanity. Is it not fundamentally anti-democratic, and therefore regressive, to legitimize these regimes by recognizing their place in multilateral forums and (re)distributing power to their benefit? The contradictions to which such questions allude are illustrated, for instance, by the perverse outcomes of elections to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), which often see regimes accused of human rights abuses elected to positions designed to hold human rights abusers to account.³² Does not democracy demand that we deny such regimes the social recognition and legitimacy they gain from multilateral practice by excluding them from international organizations? Are proposals that are based around the ‘league of democracies idea’ more progressive?

Progressive Pragmatists, we argue, would recognize the challenge. At the same time, they would see as impractical the desire to purify international arrangements of hypocrisy. Such arrangements can in fact expose hypocrisy in ways that mobilize reflexive and reformed behaviour.³³ An approach committed only to working with like-minded democracies can, moreover, be self-defeating. Ostracizing authoritarian regimes does not always improve the lives of ordinary people in authoritarian states. Moreover, global problems cannot be solved by liberal democracies alone. Reconstructing ideological blocs risks reviving civilizational hierarchies, which may provoke nationalist and authoritarian backlashes against progressive agendas.³⁴ A Pragmatist ethos thus focuses on practical ways of promoting progressive values even though they might lead to positions that appear compromised and outcomes that are suboptimal. In this respect, the progressivism of the philosophical Pragmatist resonates with the non-perfectionist ethics and the never-ending task of finding workable solutions to multiple problems.³⁵

There is a danger with this argument, of course. If, instead of accepting the need for creative diplomacy, the Pragmatist resigns themselves to the perversity of the UNHRC, the ‘reality’ of a Russian sphere of influence in eastern Ukraine or the ongoing occurrence of crimes against humanity, and does so because they accept ‘that's just the way the world is’, then at that moment their position not only stops being progressive but also stops being Pragmatist.³⁶ At that point, the Pragmatist becomes a realist. We are not claiming progressive Pragmatism is a comfortable ethos, nor that progress toward a better world is linear. But the non-perfectionist ethic of progressive Pragmatism sees in the uncomfortable situation a reason to reflect rather than give up. It sees the need to reimagine the problem and to rethink strategy.

For example, one reason for the perverse outcomes at the UNHRC is the fact that human rights (as a practice rather than a moral end) is perceived to be less helpful for improving lived experiences in the developing world than the Chinese model of development aid.³⁷ Such an argument would surely cause progressive Pragmatists in the UK and elsewhere to reflect on the wisdom of cutting international aid programmes while simultaneously advocating human rights. As part of that self-reflection, policy-makers need to democratize the deliberative process, which involves including non-state as well as state actors. The encouraging thing about the recent turn to pragmatism/realism in UK foreign policy is that it has shown signs of moves in that very direction. Former UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly, for instance, acknowledged that ‘the voice of the poor is not always being heard. Even on matters that directly concern them.’³⁸ Similarly, Lammy argued that the UK had to ‘once again become a leader in development’ by building ‘long-term win–win partnerships’ based on trade ‘rather than following an outdated model of [aid-based] patronage’.³⁹ The main point here, however, is that Pragmatism is less predisposed than realism to drop a progressive commitment to democracy. This is because, as noted above, while realists see democracy as a moral value internal to states, pragmatists view democratic practices (i.e. inclusion and deliberation at all levels) as effective forms of problem solving that are not confined to state boundaries. Specific situations may demand ‘invidious choices’ be made.⁴⁰ But in that context the Pragmatist will be committed to creatively ‘squaring the circle’ of promoting democracy at all levels of human interaction.

Before illustrating these differences between progressive Pragmatism and progressive realism with two ‘hard cases’ for British foreign policy, it is worth recapping the three main points introduced in the first part of the article. Firstly, philosophical Pragmatism rejects foreign policy based on philosophical realism, or the conservative argument that we should not aim for progress in international relations because tragedy is a persistent fact of international life. By pairing his realism with progressivism, Lammy is clearly rejecting its conservative implications. We argue, however, that Pragmatism provides a better basis for progressive foreign policy, being grounded in empirical reality but seeing this as in constant flux and so open to positive change. It is this openness to change that makes it resistant to a needless conservativism.⁴¹

Secondly, Pragmatism is progressive because it sees in democratic practices the means to resolve the problems that emerge from associated living at all levels of social interaction. In this respect, it remains progressive while sharing the realist's rejection of moralism. Again, Lammy's realism seemingly rejects moralism; it is willing to include authoritarian regimes in multilateral processes to solve global problems. We argue, however, that by pairing progressivism with Pragmatism, British foreign policy would be more conscious of the benefits of a reflexive, inclusionary and deliberative (i.e. democratic) multilateralism. That guards against the kind of conservative realism that legitimizes unwarranted international hierarchies.

Thirdly, the Pragmatist commitment to democratic practice operates at all levels of human interaction. Democratizing multilateral forums by including marginalized (including non-democratic) states helps mobilize international solidarity in the face of global problems, but that can itself be exclusionary of publics not represented by the states system. Again, we argue that by pairing this kind of progressivism with Pragmatism, British foreign policy can guard against the realist's state-centric (and elitist) approach to multilateral problem-solving. To illustrate how these three points, which in our view constitute progressive Pragmatism, help guide British foreign policy, we apply them to policy in two hard cases: responding to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and global governance in the face of climate change.

Progressive Pragmatism and managing conflict

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, following military intervention in 2014 and years of subversion, has resulted in humanitarian, economic and energy crises, impinged on sovereignty, threatened European security, brought forth alleged acts of genocide and atrocities against civilians, and heightened the risk of nuclear war with regular threats of nuclear retaliation. At stake were important progressive norms like national self-determination, democracy, international law, peace and human rights. This was a key test of British foreign policy, and in this case we believe the UK's response was consistent with progressive Pragmatism—with some caveats. These caveats are important when thinking about the way in which the conflict is fought and how it will be concluded, for these are considerations that will have an impact on the strength and sustainability of the peace going forward.

To recall, the UK laid the groundwork for supporting Ukrainian self-defence from 2015 via Operation Orbital, which provided training for more than 22,000 troops.⁴² As the emerging intelligence picture in 2021/22 suggested Russia intended to intervene en masse, UK and US policy-makers sought to deter Russia by engaging in ‘prebuttal’; releasing intelligence on Russia's plans, undermining Russian disinformation efforts and giving notice of the consequences of invasion.⁴³ Once the intervention launched on 24 February 2022, the UK was in the vanguard of supplying Ukraine with the means for its defence. It provided 5,000 next-generation light anti-tank weapons, vital in repelling the initial assault.⁴⁴ The UK was the first state to commit to supplying main battle tanks when it promised 14 Challenger 2 tanks, on 14 January 2023—prompting allies such as Germany and the United States to make their own contributions. It pledged in May 2023 to send Ukraine Storm Shadow cruise missiles,⁴⁵ enabling dramatic and often successful attacks on strategic targets such as the Black Sea fleet, Kerch bridge and command posts across the various fronts. Meanwhile, between June 2022 and November 2023 the UK trained 50,000 Ukrainian troops as part of the ongoing UK-led Operation Interflex.⁴⁶

Providing this level of assistance was, we argue, consistent with a progressive Pragmatist foreign policy.⁴⁷ Defending Ukrainian self-determination and democracy are progressive aims—provided they reflect the desires of the Ukrainian people.⁴⁸ It was not certain prior to the invasion that Ukraine would have the will to resist, but groundwork like Operation Orbital provided the means. Once Ukraine's population demonstrated that will, it made sense for the UK to meet its obligations under the Budapest memorandum (1994) and assist its government. The question then became how to do so without risking the escalation of violence both horizontally (to other parts of Europe, especially NATO members) and vertically (to the use of nuclear weapons). Gradually increasing support was a logical strategy to test Russian reactions and manage that risk—aligning with the experimental approach of Pragmatism.

The threat of escalation was real, and here a Pragmatist concern for managing the consequences of power overlapped with the realist's ethic of prudence. Russian President Vladimir Putin had issued nuclear threats prior to February 2022, and in September he suggested that Russia would ‘use all the means at our disposal’ to defend conquered territories.⁴⁹ Thus, there was a non-trivial risk of nuclear escalation that had to be factored into the UK's response. UK policy was prudent, as it navigated a Pragmatic course between the extremes of direct confrontation with Russia or acquiescence in aggression. In doing so, it also maintained cross-party support at home.

It did not have to be that way. Significant voices were advocating different paths. For example, immediately following the invasion Tobias Ellwood, the chair of the House of Commons defence select committee, called on NATO to enforce a no-fly zone in support of Ukrainian defensive action.⁵⁰ Both the defence of a sovereign state under international law and the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes were cited as justification for taking such an action.⁵¹ Although the aims of this policy could be seen as progressive (to defend Ukrainian self-determination and international law, as well as democratic and humanitarian values), in practice, no-fly zones usually require the elimination of ground-to-air missile defences, the establishment of air dominance and continuous policing of the air space.⁵² Thus, it would likely have involved direct confrontation between the UK and Russian forces (with attendant risks of war between nuclear powers). For this reason, we as Pragmatists consider this to be an imprudent course of action.

The argument that the UK and NATO should move one step closer to nuclear exchange with Russia in the name of humanitarian intervention strikes us as odd.⁵³ We accept, however, that those seeking to defend democracy in Ukraine might disagree while still claiming to be Pragmatic. The issue is a disagreement on empirics rather than ethos. Both sides might be exercising judgement in context, and some might have believed direct military exchanges between NATO and Russia would not risk escalation to a nuclear level. There is scope within a shared ethos for disagreement on empirical matters and political judgement: after all, the original philosophical Pragmatists who entered public debate on the use of force reached different positions.⁵⁴ We would add, however, that what keeps the progressive a Pragmatist (and not an ideologue) is a determination to examine the predispositions—e.g. militarist, or liberal interventionist—they bring to the deliberative process of assessing consequences. What Dewey called ‘conscientious reflection’ helps decision-makers avoid being unduly influenced by inappropriate habits, emotions, norms or narratives, and facilitates deliberation in the public interest.⁵⁵ In that sense, progressive Pragmatism forestalls the realist critique that progressive foreign policy inevitably elides into liberal internationalism.⁵⁶

Here our progressive Pragmatist position aligns with Lammy's progressive realism. Lammy explicitly rejects Blairite ‘liberal interventionism’ while arguing that ‘the United Kingdom must continue supporting Ukraine’.⁵⁷ Realism, however, could pull British foreign policy in a different direction. For well-known realist voices like Mearsheimer, the ‘taproot of the trouble’, was less Russian imperialism than it was ‘a larger [western] strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia's orbit and integrate it into the West’.⁵⁸ From this perspective, the alleged mistakes that were made prior to 2014—including the West's backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine—were repeated prior to 2022.⁵⁹ Increased military cooperation between the West and Ukraine, and NATO's June 2021 recommitment to the 2008 Bucharest Declaration, which stated that Ukraine would become a member of the alliance, are all cited as western incitements.⁶⁰ Since Russia is always going to be more committed to this issue, and more capable of bringing force to bear in its neighbourhood than outside powers, western powers should have accepted a Russian sphere of influence—or so the argument goes.

Despite some characterizations, Mearsheimer's realism is other-regarding. He argues that the war has been an ‘unmitigated disaster’ for Ukrainians. Their fate, which is to suffer war or live peacefully under Russian domination, is an example of what Stephen Walt calls the ‘enduring relevance’ of tragic realism.⁶¹ This kind of realism, however, is fundamentally at odds with our three-point definition of progressive Pragmatism. Firstly, the implication that one should accept a Russian sphere of influence as a fact of life needlessly restricts the policy options that were (and are) available to defend Ukrainian self-determination and democracy.⁶² Secondly, this particular definition of (neo-)realism tends to impose abstract language (e.g. ‘orbit’) in ways that silence the lived experience of ‘publics’—e.g. the Ukrainian people—who are necessarily part of any solution to the problems of European insecurity. In this respect, the ‘peace’ proposed by this kind of realism is neither democratic (it is in fact elitist) nor is it stable.⁶³ Nor is it realistic in a practical sense, since it overlooks the negative consequences of a great power peace which rewards aggression while denying self-determination.⁶⁴ To be sure, nothing in a progressive Pragmatist ethos rules out a negotiated settlement to the Ukraine conflict if the circumstances are right. Progressive Pragmatists, however, would be concerned if, in the name of realism (or opportunity costs), UK foreign policy imposed a peace on the Ukrainian people and their government.⁶⁵ Lammy's progressive realism does not suggest that, but our point is that by attaching progressive policies to ‘realism’—rather than ‘Pragmatism’—UK policy is more likely to take that turn.

A final point follows on from our three-part definition of progressive Pragmatism. While the focus of Lammy's progressive realism is understandably the defence of Ukrainian democracy, progressive Pragmatism extends our thinking beyond this to question how a strategy for sustainable peace might tackle the root cause of European insecurity. Whether that cause lies in Russian insecurity or Russian imperialism, both of these have been socially constructed through interactions with the western ‘Other’.⁶⁶  How that Other defends Ukrainian democracy—and defend Ukrainian democracy it should—will influence the prospect of reintegrating a future Russia into a more stable European security community. It might seem idealistic, utopian even, to consider a future where Russia is integrated into such a community.⁶⁷ But then the 1970s peace and democracy movements, working under the cover of superpower detente, were also dismissed as utopian when they asserted to heads of state that their Cold War practices were anachronistic in the context of a growing cosmopolitan consciousness. That was until their ideas of ‘common security’ took root in a Russian elite that was looking to recover from governance failures and a more democratic civil society began to emerge.⁶⁸ That possibility—however remote it might be, given the current imperialist character of the Russian state—challenges progressive Pragmatists in search of better security practice. Progressive processual interaction in this instance involves opposing Russian imperialism while ‘esteeming’ (or ontologically securing) those aspects of the Russian Self that recognize the Ukrainian Self.⁶⁹ It involves, in other words, supporting everyday relational work to rebuild transnational solidarities across a Europe that includes a future Russia.⁷⁰ Again, our point here is that tragic realism does not even think in these terms. Its elitist and state-centric conception of peace might for that reason lead progressives to forget this political possibility. That is why we argue Pragmatism is a better partner than realism for foreign policy progressives.

Progressive Pragmatism and global governance

Multilateralism has been the mainstay of progressive foreign policy in the UK.⁷¹ It is also valued by those who draw foreign policy guidance from philosophical Pragmatism. This is because, as we noted above, multilateralism expands the community of inquiry, helping to discover the problems that emerge from associated living on a global scale and to mobilize the political solidarity that is necessary to solve them. In this way, the UN is still valued as the international forum that best approximates, at least in scope, a global public. The problem is that the UN is imbued with state hierarchies operating to protect the special interests of some at the expense of others. Hierarchy is not necessarily inconsistent with the idea of the public interest. There is, however, a profound sense that the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), charged with a responsibility for international peace and security, do not have the power to meet that challenge—or that they have the power, but are acting irresponsibly.

This is the problem (and opportunity) of growing multipolarity in the face of mounting global challenges. The rise of China and India, along with the growing significance of middle powers like Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico and Japan, is decentring power from its traditional European concentration; and yet three of the five permanent members of the UNSC are located in Europe, and these three play an extensive role in the Council's working practices.⁷² New and emerging powers are elected to the UNSC, but the two-year term limit is restrictive. The progressive Pragmatist response should be to commit to UNSC reform as a way of better aligning that institution with this new distribution of power.

Interestingly, Lammy's realism seems to have restrained the progressive approach to this issue. The UN does not feature in his ‘case’ for progressive realism. That stands in stark contrast to the Pragmatism of his Conservative predecessor, James Cleverly, who stated the UK ‘wants to welcome Brazil, India, Japan and Germany as permanent members of the UN Security Council, alongside permanent African representation’.⁷³ Rather, Lammy's focus for reform lies on watering down the veto of permanent members in a way that is clearly directed at Russia.⁷⁴

Despite its place in progressive (if not realist) hearts, however, Pragmatism is not ideological about the UN's place in global governance. Global governance is adapting via the expansion of global clubs and shifting agendas and leadership. This has an impact on global responses, which may cause unease for progressives, but it also opens new modes of addressing shared challenges. For instance, India's hosting of the G20 in 2023 demonstrated its emergence as a more powerful actor with its own priorities. The set of watered-down ‘generalized principles’ proposed in the G20's statement on the situation in Ukraine was disappointing, relative to the need to condemn and defeat Russian aggression (see above).⁷⁵ Yet the stress on development, through green financing and digital public infrastructure, showed how new leadership can lead to innovation and policies that reflect a wider set of needs. ⁷⁶ The inclusion of the African Union also bolstered the G20's claim to represent a range of actors in the global economy.

A progressive Pragmatist foreign policy can thus be open-minded in its approach to global governance and assess each forum in terms of its problem-solving value. That said, there are important considerations informing such judgements. The ‘minilateralism’ of diplomatic clubs may make problem-solving appear easier, but that could be a false benefit if these arrangements do not see the problem in its entirety. Minilateralism was defined by Moisés Naim as ‘the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem’. Naim calculated that, in climate governance, the ‘magic number’ was 20, because the world's top 20 carbon polluters account for around 75 per cent of global emissions.⁷⁷ The problem, as Robyn Eckersley noted, was that the obstacles to a comprehensive climate agreement lay within the group of major emitters. In that sense, excluding the lower-emitting states would do little to address the problem (and would reduce political pressure to find a solution from the broader group of those adversely affected).⁷⁸

How does this relate to Lammy's progressive realism? Lammy's realism involves ‘the pursuit of ideals without delusions about what is achievable’.⁷⁹ Such an approach might lead to a preference for minilateral arrangements, because they are more likely to ‘achieve’ consensus than inclusionary multilateral arrangements. The difficulties that Eckersley identifies plague this kind of realism, however. By excluding those affected by a problem in order to achieve consensus, it in fact does not even recognize the problem it is meant to be solving. If Naim's definition was applied to climate governance, for example, the concerns of small island states would be excluded and both ‘the problem’ and ‘the solution’ would be constituted in ways that could hardly be described as progressive. A progressive Pragmatist foreign policy would take this critique of diplomatic clubs seriously and guard against it in a way progressive realism might not. As noted in our three-point definition of progressive Pragmatism, it would stress the value of democratizing multilateral governance so that ‘publics’ (i.e. those affected by a practice such as carbon emissions) are included in the processes that constitute the problem and the solution. The critique applies equally to those proposals to reform the G7 into a D10 of ‘leading democracies’ and to expand the BRICS grouping⁸⁰ into an anti-liberal club. It risks defining governance in ideological terms, rather than its political usefulness in addressing global challenges.⁸¹

Of course, the UN, at least through its Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) remains the centrepiece of global climate governance. But here too a progressive Pragmatist foreign policy would aim to reform the exclusionary hierarchies that stand in the way of problem-solving action. The hope of the UNFCCC is that the ‘pledge and review’ process of its annual Conference of the Parties (COP) ratchets up state ambition to slow the rate of global warming. The issue, well illustrated at COP26, which was held in Glasgow in 2021, is how private interests are represented at the COP: with a clear imbalance of power working against public interests. For example, the refusal at Glasgow to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies, which amounted to US$5.9 trillion in 2020, was linked to the presence of the fossil fuel industry at the conference.⁸² Indeed, it was reported that not only did this industry have the largest delegation at the summit, but it was ‘larger than the combined total of the eight delegations from the countries worst affected by climate change in the past 20 years’.⁸³ In that context, inclusive multilateralism among states is not going to meet the challenge of climate change. This is because states are themselves influenced by special interests bent on defending current (but unsustainable) practices.

The progressive Pragmatist answer to the problem is not to abandon inclusive multilateralism, but to democratize it. In this instance, a progressive Pragmatist foreign policy would seek to democratize the COP by encouraging equal participation from renewable energy suppliers; or by forming alliances with the countries worst affected by climate change to balance the power of the fossil fuel industry. Unfortunately, recent UK foreign policy has taken a regressive step in this regard. Delays in phasing out combustion engine vehicles, the lifting of rules to improve energy efficiency and a slower transition to lower-emission heat pumps led Parliament's Climate Change Committee to doubt the UK's ability to meet its pledges.⁸⁴ That weakens the UK's position as a leader in the COP process. It is difficult to shame states for not committing to tackle the problem when they can reasonably dismiss those efforts as hypocrisy. This also points to another problem. Both the main parties argued prior to the 2024 general election that UK governments will not address the climate change challenge if they do not take the electorate with them, but here again the progressive Pragmatist answer is more democracy rather than ‘realistic’ compromise.⁸⁵ Instead of dividing publics by framing the issue in terms of another front in a generational culture war, collective solidarity and purpose can be forged through inclusive and deliberative practices, perhaps following Gilmore's model of citizen assemblies, allowing non-elite publics to contribute to discussion.⁸⁶

Conclusion

Our aim in this article has been to develop a Pragmatist foreign policy ethos. This is difficult because of the way pragmatism (with a lower case p) is understood in everyday foreign policy discourse. It is generally conflated with being realistic about one's influence and prudently tailoring one's ends to fit available means. In that respect, pragmatism is often used interchangeably with realism and the ethic of consequence (rather than conviction) it holds in relation to power. We noted in this context how this definition of pragmatism has informed recent foreign policy discourse, not least the articulation of progressive realism by the current UK foreign secretary, David Lammy. ⁸⁷ Our concern with this marriage of progressive goals and realism was twofold: that the latter could in practice influence policy-makers too strongly, so that they miss progressive opportunities as and when they arise; and secondly, because realism is a means to a progressive end, policy-makers may assume that those ends are given and not subjects for democratic discussion. One can argue that, as foreign secretary, Lammy has steered policy in a progressive direction. Dropping UK objections to International Criminal Court involvement in the Gaza situation and suspending some arms export licences to Israel can be cited to support this claim.⁸⁸ That does not mean, however, that the risks we point to are not real.

To mitigate these risks, we have argued that a progressive foreign policy is better paired with the guidance that emerges from philosophical Pragmatism. This is for three reasons. Unlike realists, Pragmatists are more aware of the constructed and processual (rather than essential and fixed) nature of social problems. In that awareness, they will be 1) less sceptical and more creative in the pursuit of progress; 2) less inclined to compromise on multilateral practices, and 3) more committed to the democratization of those practices as a method of uncovering and solving practical problems. Lammy's realism appears on paper to be conscious of all this. After all, he writes that ‘realism without a sense of progress can become cynical and tactical’.⁸⁹ Indeed, our hope is that UK foreign policy does not adopt the realist's cynicism towards progress. Our point, however, is that Lammy might better protect progressivism against the conservative pull of realism if he paired it with Pragmatism.

Footnotes

Author notes