Abstract

This contribution argues for the recognition of digital integrity as a human right, either as a right on its own or as an interpretative principle for related rights. The right to digital integrity represents a legal norm that crystallizes a certain vision of the individual, as well as the protections that he/she ought to be afforded in a world where digital technologies are omnipresent and pervasive. The main function which digital integrity would fulfil as a human right is a consistency-providing function between the protection of human dignity, the protection of freedom and the protection of privacy. Digital integrity is a concretization of the protection of human dignity in terms of the specific threats that are posed by digital technologies. It serves to promote a substantial definition of what freedom should be about and how this freedom relates to the protection of privacy in informational matters. This contribution illustrates this claim by outlining a republican view of digital integrity and exemplifying its impact on related rights.

This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://dbpia.nl.go.kr/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)
You do not currently have access to this article.