
Contents
Cite
Extract
ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονέειν
Heraclitus, D113
Heraclitus’s fragment 113 does not mean merely that phronesis is common to all; it also, and primarily, indicates that commonality is constituted by the capacity to make the instrumental judgments that the Greeks called phronesis.
Heidegger started Being and Time by suggesting that philosophy had forgotten the question of being. He failed to add that the notion of the single, unified being that he discovered in Greek thought faced a problem recognized since antiquity, namely, the problem of how to account for action: Can actions be different if they are part of the all-encompassing and hence unchanging being? Can anything be other than a mere modification of being if it constitutes a totality outside of which nothing exists? By repressing this problem, Heidegger instituted a forgetting of the answer that the ancients provided, which emphasized the ethical and political import of instrumental judgment, or phronesis. The Greeks thought that we can account for action only by understanding being through its effects. Heraclitus’s fragment points out, in this context, that the effects of being register in thinking that the ends of action are always situated in a material context of relations that includes others. Phronesis is an ethical and a political virtue, grounded in a materialist ontology.
Sign in
Personal account
- Sign in with email/username & password
- Get email alerts
- Save searches
- Purchase content
- Activate your purchase/trial code
- Add your ORCID iD
Purchase
Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.
Purchasing informationMonth: | Total Views: |
---|---|
January 2025 | 1 |
Get help with access
Institutional access
Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:
IP based access
Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.
Sign in through your institution
Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.
If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.
Sign in with a library card
Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.
Society Members
Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:
Sign in through society site
Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:
If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.
Sign in using a personal account
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.
Personal account
A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.
Viewing your signed in accounts
Click the account icon in the top right to:
Signed in but can't access content
Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.
Institutional account management
For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.