
Contents
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Introduction Introduction
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1. Cooper's Solution: Virtuous Motivation as a Constitutive Means to Eudaimonia 1. Cooper's Solution: Virtuous Motivation as a Constitutive Means to Eudaimonia
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2. Gottlieb's Solution: Pushing Desire for Eudaimonia into the “Background” 2. Gottlieb's Solution: Pushing Desire for Eudaimonia into the “Background”
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3. Indirect Eudaimonism: A Possible Parfitian Solution? 3. Indirect Eudaimonism: A Possible Parfitian Solution?
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4. Sherman on Friendship 4. Sherman on Friendship
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5. Practices, Virtue, and External Eudaimonism 5. Practices, Virtue, and External Eudaimonism
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5.1. Four Kinds of Practice 5.1. Four Kinds of Practice
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5.2. MacIntyre on the Structure of Practices 5.2. MacIntyre on the Structure of Practices
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The Structure of Practices The Structure of Practices
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The Structure of Friendship The Structure of Friendship
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5.3. Marx on Unalienated Labor 5.3. Marx on Unalienated Labor
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5.4. Rawls on Practices 5.4. Rawls on Practices
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5.5. Hursthouse's Habituation Version of External Eudaimonism 5.5. Hursthouse's Habituation Version of External Eudaimonism
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6. Watson's Pure Aretaic Naturalism 6. Watson's Pure Aretaic Naturalism
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7. Social Holist Eudaimonism as a Radical Solution? 7. Social Holist Eudaimonism as a Radical Solution?
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7.1. MacIntyre's Joint Goods 7.1. MacIntyre's Joint Goods
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(1) Projectively Determined Conditions of Eudaimonia (1) Projectively Determined Conditions of Eudaimonia
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(2) Abstract versus Concrete Goals (2) Abstract versus Concrete Goals
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(3) Targetable and Nontargetable Common Goods (3) Targetable and Nontargetable Common Goods
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7.2. Brink and Spinoza 7.2. Brink and Spinoza
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8. Conclusion: Toward a Rejection of the Transmission Principle 8. Conclusion: Toward a Rejection of the Transmission Principle
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8 Contemporary Solutions to the Paradox and Their Problems
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Published:July 2007
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Abstract
Beginning with two commentaries on Aristotle, this chapter focuses on themes in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, including Alasdair MacIntyre's accounts of practices and common goods. The evaluation of these theories, which shows that they support the existential conception of striving will, is aimed at resolving the paradox of eudaimonism, including ideas proposed by MacIntyre, John Cooper, Paula Gottlieb, and Gary Watson, and argues that none avoids the need to postulate projective motivation. This helps explain why the revival of virtue ethics has been unable to show how the goals we ought to pursue and the virtues required to sustain pursuit of them are fully traceable to (or explainable from) the telos of human psychology or the nature of human agency. This chapter argues that the same paradox arises in neo-Aristotelian accounts of friendship and MacIntyre's account of practices; for projective motivation plays a key role in both these phenomena. The views of Nancy Sherman, Karl Marx, John Rawls, Rosalind Hursthouse, David Brink, and Baruch Spinoza are also considered.
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