
Published online:
02 September 2009
Published in print:
19 June 2008
Online ISBN:
9780191577437
Print ISBN:
9780199548477
Contents
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1 The Story Behind “Markets Work” 1 The Story Behind “Markets Work”
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2 Imperfect Public Good Mechanisms 2 Imperfect Public Good Mechanisms
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2.1 Some Important Concepts 2.1 Some Important Concepts
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2.2 Majority Rule 2.2 Majority Rule
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2.3 Demand‐revealing Mechanisms 2.3 Demand‐revealing Mechanisms
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2.4 Which is Better: MR or VCG? 2.4 Which is Better: MR or VCG?
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2.5 Which Mechanisms are Best? 2.5 Which Mechanisms are Best?
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3 Can we Say “Voting Works?” 3 Can we Say “Voting Works?”
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3.1 The Bayesian Approach 3.1 The Bayesian Approach
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3.2 A Bayesian Characterization of Interim Incentive EfficientMechanisms 3.2 A Bayesian Characterization of Interim Incentive EfficientMechanisms
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3.3 “Voting Works” in Large Bayesian Environments 3.3 “Voting Works” in Large Bayesian Environments
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3.4 “Voting Works” in Large Environments 3.4 “Voting Works” in Large Environments
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3.5 Some Doubts 3.5 Some Doubts
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3.6 Multidimensional Issues Spaces 3.6 Multidimensional Issues Spaces
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4 An Aggressive Conclusion 4 An Aggressive Conclusion
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References References
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Chapter
27 Voting and Efficient Public Good Mechanisms
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John Ledyard
John Ledyard
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology
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John Ledyard is the Allen and Lenabelle Davis Professor of Economics and Social Sciences at the California Institute of Technology.
Pages
479–501
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Published:02 September 2009
Cite
Ledyard, John, ' Voting and Efficient Public Good Mechanisms', in Donald A. Wittman, and Barry R. Weingast (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (2008; online edn, Oxford Academic, 2 Sept. 2009), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0027, accessed 29 Apr. 2025.
Abstract
This article discusses the processes for the allocation and financing of public goods. It first discusses markets and market processes. It explores whether there are any conditions under which voting processes are good mechanisms for the allocation of and taxing for public goods. It is determined that there are similar results for voting and public goods.
Series
Oxford Handbooks
Collection:
Oxford Handbooks Online
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