
Contents
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1. Causation: Fundamental Ontological Issues 1. Causation: Fundamental Ontological Issues
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2. Causal Laws and Causal Relations: Singularist, Anti‐Singularist, and Intermediate Approaches to the Relation of Causation 2. Causal Laws and Causal Relations: Singularist, Anti‐Singularist, and Intermediate Approaches to the Relation of Causation
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3. Causal and Non‐Causal States of Affairs: Reductionism versus Non‐Reductionism 3. Causal and Non‐Causal States of Affairs: Reductionism versus Non‐Reductionism
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3.1 Major Divisions within Reductionism 3.1 Major Divisions within Reductionism
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3.2 Major Divisions within Non‐Reductionism 3.2 Major Divisions within Non‐Reductionism
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3.3 Alternative Views: The Main Options 3.3 Alternative Views: The Main Options
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4. Humean Reductionist Approaches to Causation: Some Important Alternatives 4. Humean Reductionist Approaches to Causation: Some Important Alternatives
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4.1 Anti‐Singularist, Humean Reductionist Approaches 4.1 Anti‐Singularist, Humean Reductionist Approaches
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4.2 A Singularist, Humean Reductionist Approach 4.2 A Singularist, Humean Reductionist Approach
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5. Non‐Humean Reductionist Approachesto Causation: Two Alternatives 5. Non‐Humean Reductionist Approachesto Causation: Two Alternatives
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5.1 A Singularist Approach: Ultimate Dispositional Properties 5.1 A Singularist Approach: Ultimate Dispositional Properties
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5.2 An Anti‐Singularist, Non‐Humean, and Reductionist Approach: Strong Laws 5.2 An Anti‐Singularist, Non‐Humean, and Reductionist Approach: Strong Laws
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6. Non‐Reductionist Approaches to Causation 6. Non‐Reductionist Approaches to Causation
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6.1 Singularist Accounts and the Direct Observability Claim 6.1 Singularist Accounts and the Direct Observability Claim
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6.2 An Anti‐Singularist, Non‐Reductionist Approach to Causation 6.2 An Anti‐Singularist, Non‐Reductionist Approach to Causation
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6.3 An Alternative Singularist Account: Causation as an Irreducible, Theoretically Specified Relation 6.3 An Alternative Singularist Account: Causation as an Irreducible, Theoretically Specified Relation
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Further Reading Further Reading
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References References
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18 Causes, Laws, and Ontology
Get accessMichael Tooley is Distinguished College Professor in Philosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder. His publications include Causation: A Realist Approach (Oxford University Press, 1987); Time, Tense, and Causation (Oxford University Press, 1997); ‘Causation: Reductionism Versus Realism’ in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50, Supplement (1990); ‘The Nature of Causation: A Singularist Account’ in D. Copp (ed.), Canadian Philosophers: Celebrating Twenty Years of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary 16 (1990); and ‘Causation and Supervenience’ in M. Loux and D. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2003).
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Published:02 January 2010
Cite
Abstract
Different approaches to causation often diverge very significantly on ontological issues, in the case of both causal laws, and causal relations between states of affairs. This article sets out the main alternatives with regard to each. Causal concepts have surely been present from the time that language began, since the vast majority of action verbs involve the idea of causally affecting something. Thus, in the case of transitive verbs describing physical actions, there is the idea of causally affecting something external to one — one finds food, builds a shelter, sows seed, catches fish, and so on — while in the case of intransitive verbs describing physical actions, it is very plausible that they involve the idea of causally affecting one's own body — as one walks, runs, jumps, hunts, and so on.
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