
Contents
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5 Constitutional History of the Colombian Paradox (1886–2016): Hegemony, Exception, and Postponement
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12.1 Constitutionalism and Constitutions in Uruguay 12.1 Constitutionalism and Constitutions in Uruguay
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12.1.1 The 1830 Constitution 12.1.1 The 1830 Constitution
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12.1.2 The 1918 Constitution 12.1.2 The 1918 Constitution
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12.1.3 The 1934 Constitution 12.1.3 The 1934 Constitution
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12.1.4 The 1942 Constitution 12.1.4 The 1942 Constitution
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12.1.5 The 1952 Constitution 12.1.5 The 1952 Constitution
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12.2 Rights and Hierarchy of International Protection Instruments 12.2 Rights and Hierarchy of International Protection Instruments
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12.3 The Current Constitution 12.3 The Current Constitution
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12.3.1 Separation of Powers 12.3.1 Separation of Powers
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12.3.2 Territorial Distribution of Power 12.3.2 Territorial Distribution of Power
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12.3.3 Constitutional Reform 12.3.3 Constitutional Reform
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12.3.4 Direct Democracy Mechanisms 12.3.4 Direct Democracy Mechanisms
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12.4 Control of Constitutionality 12.4 Control of Constitutionality
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12.5 The Uruguayan Constitutional Dogmatics 12.5 The Uruguayan Constitutional Dogmatics
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12.6 Conclusion 12.6 Conclusion
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12 Uruguay
Get accessGianella Bardazano, Professor, University of the Republic.
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Published:13 January 2022
Cite
Abstract
According to dogmatic literature on Uruguayan Constitutional history, one of its main characteristics is the link between the successive reforms of the Constitution and the corresponding agreements between the main political parties. This is confirmed by an analysis of the Uruguayan constitutional processes from the perspective of the theory of law and political science. This central feature, at the same time, relates to the institutional significance—manifest in reform processes—that political agreements between parties have had. The constitutional reforms of 1917, 1934, 1942, 1952, and 1966 were total reforms, each of which completely replaced the text of the previous constitution in place. The reforms approved in 1912, 1932, 1936–1938, 1942, 1989, 1994, 1996, and 2004, were, instead, partial in nature. As Uruguayan scholars correctly point out, all those reforms were supported by broad agreements among the main political parties. However, the facet I would like to stress is the specific power-sharing purpose of those agreements—that is, the agreements that motivated and guided reforms were directed to the quite express goal of co-participation of the main political parties in government. This is a descriptive chapter that addresses, in the first place, the Uruguayan constitutional evolution on the basis of the aforementioned central characteristic of that process (i.e. successive adjustments to the political parties’ power-sharing mechanisms) to, then, expose the central elements of the current Constitution under the same light.
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