
Contents
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1. Introduction: Sensible Materialisms and Entia Successiva 1. Introduction: Sensible Materialisms and Entia Successiva
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1.1 The Varieties of ‘Sensible Materialism* 1.1 The Varieties of ‘Sensible Materialism*
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1.2 Chisholm's Entia Successiva Argument 1.2 Chisholm's Entia Successiva Argument
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1.3 Warning: Criteria of Personal Identity not Included 1.3 Warning: Criteria of Personal Identity not Included
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1.4 To be Tender-Minded or Tough-Minded? 1.4 To be Tender-Minded or Tough-Minded?
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2. Denying (P2) 2. Denying (P2)
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2.1 The ‘Too Many Minds’ Objection 2.1 The ‘Too Many Minds’ Objection
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2.2 The Doctrine of Temporal Parts 2.2 The Doctrine of Temporal Parts
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2.3 How Temporal Parts Help Block ‘Too Many Thoughts’ 2.3 How Temporal Parts Help Block ‘Too Many Thoughts’
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2.4 Rejecting Temporal Parts and Introducing Shared ‘Tropes’ 2.4 Rejecting Temporal Parts and Introducing Shared ‘Tropes’
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2.5 ‘Too Many Thinkers’ and Too Many Temporal Parts 2.5 ‘Too Many Thinkers’ and Too Many Temporal Parts
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3. Denying (P1) 3. Denying (P1)
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3.1 Coincidentalism and Two-Category Theories 3.1 Coincidentalism and Two-Category Theories
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3.2 Coincidentalism: ‘The New Dualism’ 3.2 Coincidentalism: ‘The New Dualism’
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3.3 Two-Category Theories: Processes and Logical Constructions 3.3 Two-Category Theories: Processes and Logical Constructions
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3.4 No Such Things as Masses of Matter 3.4 No Such Things as Masses of Matter
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3.5 Van Inwagen's Theory, and a Modified Version 3.5 Van Inwagen's Theory, and a Modified Version
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3.6 Persons Made of Atomless Gunk 3.6 Persons Made of Atomless Gunk
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3.7 A More Complex Analysis of ‘Consisting of the Same Matter’ 3.7 A More Complex Analysis of ‘Consisting of the Same Matter’
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3.8 Atomless Gunk Leads to Michael Burke's Theory 3.8 Atomless Gunk Leads to Michael Burke's Theory
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3.9 Michael Burke and the Case of the Disappearing Matter 3.9 Michael Burke and the Case of the Disappearing Matter
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4. Conclusion: An Argument for Dualism? 4. Conclusion: An Argument for Dualism?
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4.1 Exhausting the Ontological Options 4.1 Exhausting the Ontological Options
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References References
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16 Material People
Get accessDean Zimmerman is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. His research interests include the nature of time and persistence, and God's relation to temporal things. He is editor or co‐editor of several books in metaphysics and philosophy of religion, including: The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford, 2003), Persons: Human and Divine (Oxford, 2007), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (Blackwell, 2007), and the series Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.
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Published:02 September 2009
Cite
Abstract
Dualism and materialism are competing answers to the question each of us may ask with the words ‘What am I?’ (spoken in a metaphysical tone of voice, with emphasis on the word ‘am’). The following (admittedly somewhat stipulative) working definition of ‘dualism’ will suffice for present purposes: the doctrine that no human being is an object composed entirely of the kinds of physical stuff that make up rocks and trees and the bodies of animals, but that each of us is, instead, something quite different—a substance that has sensory experiences, thoughts, and emotions, but shares almost nothing in common (except, perhaps, spatial location) with the physical objects that surround us or with their fundamental constituents (electrons, quarks, and so on). By ‘materialism’, the article means the doctrine that each human being is an object all of whose parts are, ultimately, made of the same kinds of physical substances as rocks and trees and the bodies of animals.
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