
Contents
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1. Williams's Internalism 1. Williams's Internalism
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2. Other Internalisms 2. Other Internalisms
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3. Williams's Internalism: Pro and Con 3. Williams's Internalism: Pro and Con
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4. Reasons, Oughts, and Rationality 4. Reasons, Oughts, and Rationality
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Appendix of Propositions Appendix of Propositions
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7 Duty, Rationality, and Practical Reasons
Get accessDavid McNaughton is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Florida State University and at Keele University. He is the author of Moral Vision (1988) and (with Eve Garrard) of Forgiveness (2010), and of a number of papers on ethics, philosophy of religion, and the relations between the two. He has recently finished editing Joseph Butler’s moral writings for Oxford University Press, and is currently writing a book with Piers Rawling on their approach to practical reasons.
Piers Rawling is Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Florida State University. He has wide-ranging interests, and has published papers on decision theory, ethics (with David McNaughton), philosophy of language, various other areas of philosophy, and quantum computing (with Stephen Selesnick). He is co-editor (with Alfred Mele) of The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (2004), and is currently writing a book with David McNaughton on their approach to practical reasons.
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Published:02 September 2009
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Abstract
This article presents a view on which practical reasons are facts, such as the fact that the rubbish bin is full. This is a non-normative fact, but it is a reason for one to do something, namely take the rubbish out. This article sees rationality as a matter of consistency (failing to notice that the rubbish bin is full need not be a rational failure). And it sees duty as neither purely a matter of rationality nor of practical reason. On the one hand, the rational sociopath is immoral. But, on the other, morality does not require that one always acts on the weightiest moral reasons: one may not be reasonably expected to know what these are. This article criticizes various forms of internalism, including Williams's, and it tentatively proposes a view of duty that is neither purely subjective in Prichard's sense, nor purely objective.
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