
Contents
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I The Place of Mind in Nature I The Place of Mind in Nature
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1. Jaegwon Kim's ‘Mental Causation’. 1. Jaegwon Kim's ‘Mental Causation’.
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2. David Papineau's ‘The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism’. 2. David Papineau's ‘The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism’.
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3. E. J. Lowe's ‘Dualism’. 3. E. J. Lowe's ‘Dualism’.
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4. Sven Walter's ‘Epiphenomenalism’. 4. Sven Walter's ‘Epiphenomenalism’.
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5. Julie Yoo's ‘Anomalous Monism’. 5. Julie Yoo's ‘Anomalous Monism’.
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6. Lynne Rudder Baker's ‘Non‐reductive Materialism’. 6. Lynne Rudder Baker's ‘Non‐reductive Materialism’.
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7. Robert Van Gulick's ‘Functionalism’. 7. Robert Van Gulick's ‘Functionalism’.
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8. Ansgar Beckermann's ‘What is Property Physicalism?’. 8. Ansgar Beckermann's ‘What is Property Physicalism?’.
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9. Barbara Montero's ‘What is the Physical?’. 9. Barbara Montero's ‘What is the Physical?’.
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10. Howard Robinson's ‘Idealism’. 10. Howard Robinson's ‘Idealism’.
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11. William Seager's ‘Pansychism’. 11. William Seager's ‘Pansychism’.
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II The Nature of Consciousness and the Place of Consciousness in Nature II The Nature of Consciousness and the Place of Consciousness in Nature
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12. John Perry's ‘Subjectivity’. 12. John Perry's ‘Subjectivity’.
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13. David M. Rosenthal's ‘Higher‐order Theories of Consciousness’. 13. David M. Rosenthal's ‘Higher‐order Theories of Consciousness’.
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14. Michael Tye's ‘Representationalist Theories of Consciousness’. 14. Michael Tye's ‘Representationalist Theories of Consciousness’.
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15. Alex Byrne's ‘Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities’. 15. Alex Byrne's ‘Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities’.
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16. Joseph Levine's ‘The Explanatory Gap’. 16. Joseph Levine's ‘The Explanatory Gap’.
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17. Katalin Balog's ‘Phenomenal Concepts’. 17. Katalin Balog's ‘Phenomenal Concepts’.
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18. David J. Chalmers's ‘The Two‐dimensional Argument Against Materialism’. 18. David J. Chalmers's ‘The Two‐dimensional Argument Against Materialism’.
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III Intentionality and Theories of Mental Content III Intentionality and Theories of Mental Content
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19. Daniel Dennett's ‘Intentional Systems Theory’. 19. Daniel Dennett's ‘Intentional Systems Theory’.
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20. Frances Egan's ‘Wide Content’. 20. Frances Egan's ‘Wide Content’.
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21. Gabriel Segal's ‘Narrow Content’. 21. Gabriel Segal's ‘Narrow Content’.
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22. Fred Dretske's ‘Information‐theoretic Semantics’. 22. Fred Dretske's ‘Information‐theoretic Semantics’.
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23. Ruth Garrett Millikan's ‘Biosemantics’. 23. Ruth Garrett Millikan's ‘Biosemantics’.
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24. Robert J. Matthews's ‘A Measurement‐theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes’. 24. Robert J. Matthews's ‘A Measurement‐theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes’.
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25. Ralph Wedgwood's ‘The Normativity of the Intentional’. 25. Ralph Wedgwood's ‘The Normativity of the Intentional’.
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26. Christopher Peacocke's ‘Concepts and Possession Conditions’. 26. Christopher Peacocke's ‘Concepts and Possession Conditions’.
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27. José Luis Bermúdez's ‘The Distinction between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content’. 27. José Luis Bermúdez's ‘The Distinction between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content’.
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28. Tim Crane's ‘Intentionalism’. 28. Tim Crane's ‘Intentionalism’.
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29. Michelle Montague's ‘The Content of Perceptual Experience’. 29. Michelle Montague's ‘The Content of Perceptual Experience’.
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30. George Graham, Terence Horgan, and John Tienson's ‘Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind’. 30. George Graham, Terence Horgan, and John Tienson's ‘Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind’.
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IV Self, Unity of Consciousness, and Personal Identity IV Self, Unity of Consciousness, and Personal Identity
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31. Galen Strawson's ‘The Self’. 31. Galen Strawson's ‘The Self’.
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32. Paul Raymont and Andrew Brook's ‘Unity of Consciousness’. 32. Paul Raymont and Andrew Brook's ‘Unity of Consciousness’.
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33. Tamar Szabó Gendler's ‘Personal Identity and Metaphysics’. 33. Tamar Szabó Gendler's ‘Personal Identity and Metaphysics’.
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V A Variety of Mental Abilities V A Variety of Mental Abilities
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34. Colin McGinn's ‘Imagination’. 34. Colin McGinn's ‘Imagination’.
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35. Louise Antony's ‘Thinking’. 35. Louise Antony's ‘Thinking’.
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36. John Heil's ‘Language and Thought’. 36. John Heil's ‘Language and Thought’.
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37. John Campbell's ‘Consciousness and Reference’. 37. John Campbell's ‘Consciousness and Reference’.
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38. Krista Lawlor's ‘Memory’. 38. Krista Lawlor's ‘Memory’.
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39. Jesse Prinz's ‘Emotions: Motivating Feelings’. 39. Jesse Prinz's ‘Emotions: Motivating Feelings’.
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40. Alfred R. Mele's ‘Intention and Intentional Action’. 40. Alfred R. Mele's ‘Intention and Intentional Action’.
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VI Epistemic Issues VI Epistemic Issues
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41. Adam Morton's ‘Folk Psychology’. 41. Adam Morton's ‘Folk Psychology’.
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42. Anita Avramides's ‘Other Minds’. 42. Anita Avramides's ‘Other Minds’.
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43. Cynthia Macdonald's ‘Introspection’. 43. Cynthia Macdonald's ‘Introspection’.
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44. Jessica Brown's ‘Semantic Externalism and Self‐Knowledge’. 44. Jessica Brown's ‘Semantic Externalism and Self‐Knowledge’.
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45. Kent Bach's ‘Self‐deception’. 45. Kent Bach's ‘Self‐deception’.
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References References
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Introduction
Get accessBrian P. McLaughlin is Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey.
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Published:02 September 2009
Cite
Abstract
The philosophy of mind is a core area of philosophy. It has roots tracing back to ancient Greece, where the idea that the soul is distinct from the body originated. Philosophy of mind flourished during much of the period from the publication in the seventeenth century of René Descartes's magnificent works on the mind to the first quarter of the twentieth century, which closed with the publication of C. D. Broad's The Mind and Its Place in Nature. With the rise of behaviourism in the second quarter of that century, however, philosophical interest in the mind waned. Still, some mid-twentieth-century work stands out. With the fall of behaviourism in the late 1950s and early 1960s and the rise of cognitive science, interest in the mind and in its place in nature was renewed — and with enormous vigour. Since then research in the philosophy of mind has been booming.
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