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Agency theory and congressional delegation to the executive Agency theory and congressional delegation to the executive
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Agency theory and the congressional dominance perspective Agency theory and the congressional dominance perspective
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Political transaction costs and congressional delegation to the executive Political transaction costs and congressional delegation to the executive
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The presidential dominance perspective The presidential dominance perspective
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Presidential dominance and the ex ante politics of delegation Presidential dominance and the ex ante politics of delegation
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Presidential dominance in the ex post politics of delegation Presidential dominance in the ex post politics of delegation
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Conclusions Conclusions
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References References
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34 Congress and the Executive Branch: Delegation and Presidential Dominance
Get accessB. Dan Wood is professor of political science, Cornerstone Fellow and Director of the American Politics Program at Texas A&M University.
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Published:02 May 2011
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Abstract
In many respects, the presidency envisioned by the founders of the American constitution was to be a passive agent of Congress. Historically under a monarchial rule, Americans have become greatly suspicious of executive power. As a result, a deliberate attempt was made to limit executive power through institutional design. Congress was granted powers to make policy while the Chief Executive was given no explicit policymaking powers. The president rather was given limited veto power to negate what was considered unwise policy. The concept of “congressional government” where the early presidents were viewed as clerks who simply carried out the will of Congress persisted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, in the modern form of American government, the concept of “congressional government” has changed. Today, the presidency is widely viewed as the centerpiece of the American political system. This article addresses some questions on Congress and the executive branch through the theoretical lenses of agency theory and transaction cost politics. It specifically aims to address questions such as: What were the changes that caused a more dominant presidency than was envisioned by the founders? Why did Congress cede power to the Executive? What were the consequences of congressional delegation for power relations between Congress and the Executive?
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