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The State of the Field(s) The State of the Field(s)
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Two‐Level Games Two‐Level Games
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Information, Institutions, and Two‐ Level Games Information, Institutions, and Two‐ Level Games
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Congress, Delegation, and Two‐ Level Games Congress, Delegation, and Two‐ Level Games
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Opening the International Black Box Opening the International Black Box
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Delegation for Self‐Restraint Delegation for Self‐Restraint
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Delegation and American Trade Policy Delegation and American Trade Policy
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Delegation and Human Rights Delegation and Human Rights
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Information and Approval Seeking Information and Approval Seeking
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Presidents, Public Opinion, and Approving the Use of Force Presidents, Public Opinion, and Approving the Use of Force
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Information, Bias, and the Logic of Approval Seeking Information, Bias, and the Logic of Approval Seeking
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Elections, Presidents, and Trade Policy Elections, Presidents, and Trade Policy
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Conclusions and Future Directions Conclusions and Future Directions
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References References
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30 Presidents and International Cooperation
Get accessJon Pevehouse is Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin.
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Published:02 May 2010
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Abstract
This article starts by briefly outlining the state of the field of international relations and domestic politics and examines how this literature has developed over the years. It also reports some of the recent literature on two-level games — i.e., the idea that presidents simultaneously play a bargaining game at the domestic level (with Congress) and at the international level (with other states). Then, new literature that links presidents to questions of international cooperation, in particular, cooperation that occurs within international organizations, is presented. The article concentrates on the core theoretical and empirical debates in the literature surrounding the presidency and international cooperation. It is suggested that presidents have incentives to limit their own policy autonomy in order to gain bargaining leverage domestically. Much of the exciting research in international relations lies at the border with American politics.
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