
Contents
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1 Causality 1 Causality
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2 Counterfactuals 2 Counterfactuals
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3 Exploring Three Basic Questions about Causality 3 Exploring Three Basic Questions about Causality
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3.1 Psychological and Linguistic Analysis 3.1 Psychological and Linguistic Analysis
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3.2 Ontological Questions 3.2 Ontological Questions
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3.3 Epistemological Questions 3.3 Epistemological Questions
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4 The Humean and Neo‐Humean Approach to Causation 4 The Humean and Neo‐Humean Approach to Causation
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4.1 Lawlike Generalities and the Humean Regularity Approach to Causation 4.1 Lawlike Generalities and the Humean Regularity Approach to Causation
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4.2 The Asymmetry of Causation 4.2 The Asymmetry of Causation
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4.3 Summary 4.3 Summary
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5 Counterfactual Definition of Causation 5 Counterfactual Definition of Causation
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5.1 Lewis's Counterfactual Approach to Causation 5.1 Lewis's Counterfactual Approach to Causation
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5.2 The Virtues of the Counterfactual Definition of Causation 5.2 The Virtues of the Counterfactual Definition of Causation
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5.3 Controlled Experiments and Closest Possible Worlds 5.3 Controlled Experiments and Closest Possible Worlds
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5.4 Problems with the Counterfactual Definition 5.4 Problems with the Counterfactual Definition
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6 Experimentation and the Manipulation Approach to Causation 6 Experimentation and the Manipulation Approach to Causation
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7 Pre‐emption and the Mechanism Approach to Causation 7 Pre‐emption and the Mechanism Approach to Causation
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7.1 Pre‐emption 7.1 Pre‐emption
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7.2 Mechanisms, Capacities, and the Pairing Problem 7.2 Mechanisms, Capacities, and the Pairing Problem
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7.3 Multiple Causes and Mechanisms 7.3 Multiple Causes and Mechanisms
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8 Four Approaches to Causality 8 Four Approaches to Causality
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8.1 What is Causation? 8.1 What is Causation?
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8.2 Causal Inference with Experimental and Observational Data 8.2 Causal Inference with Experimental and Observational Data
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9 Going beyond the Neyman—Rubin— Holland Conditions for Causation 9 Going beyond the Neyman—Rubin— Holland Conditions for Causation
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9.1 The Neyman—Rubin—Holland (NRH) Theory 9.1 The Neyman—Rubin—Holland (NRH) Theory
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9.2 Ontological Definition of Causal Effect Based upon Counterfactuals 9.2 Ontological Definition of Causal Effect Based upon Counterfactuals
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9.3 Finding a Substitute for the Counterfactual Situation: The Independence of Assignment and Outcome 9.3 Finding a Substitute for the Counterfactual Situation: The Independence of Assignment and Outcome
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9.4 Observable Definitions of Causality 9.4 Observable Definitions of Causality
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9.5 Getting around Identicality (Unit Homogeneity) through Average Causal Effect 9.5 Getting around Identicality (Unit Homogeneity) through Average Causal Effect
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9.6 Multiplying the Number of Units and the Noninterference (SUTVA) Assumption 9.6 Multiplying the Number of Units and the Noninterference (SUTVA) Assumption
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9.7 Summary of the NRH Approach 9.7 Summary of the NRH Approach
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References References
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10 Causation and Explanation in Social Science
Get accessHenry E. Brady is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at University of California, Berkeley. He received his Ph.D. in Economics and Political Science from MIT, and his areas of interest include Quantitative Methodology, American and Canadian Politics, and Political Behavior. He teaches undergraduate courses on political participation and party systems and graduate courses on advanced quantitative methodology.
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Published:02 September 2009
Cite
Abstract
This article provides an overview of causal thinking by characterizing four approaches to causal inference. It also describes the INUS model. It specifically presents a user-friendly synopsis of philosophical and statistical musings about causation. The four approaches to causality include neo-Humean regularity, counterfactual, manipulation and mechanisms, and capacities. A counterfactual is a statement, typically in the subjunctive mood, in which a false or ‘counter to fact’ premise is followed by some assertion about what would have happened if the premise were true. Three basic questions about causality are then addressed. Moreover, the article gives a review of four approaches of what causality might be. It pays attention on a counterfactual definition, mostly amounting to a recipe that is now widely used in statistics. It ends with a discussion of the limitations of the recipe and how far it goes toward solving the epistemological and ontological problems.
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