
Contents
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1. The Problem of Separability 1. The Problem of Separability
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2. Aristotle's Uses of ‘Separable’ and ‘Separate’ 2. Aristotle's Uses of ‘Separable’ and ‘Separate’
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3. Separability Claims in De Anima 3. Separability Claims in De Anima
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4. The Argument That Mind is Separable (De Anima III 4) 4. The Argument That Mind is Separable (De Anima III 4)
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4.1 The argument from mind's unlimited scope 4.1 The argument from mind's unlimited scope
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4.2 The argument from correlative objects 4.2 The argument from correlative objects
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4.3 Puzzles concerning the mind 4.3 Puzzles concerning the mind
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5. The Argument that the Productive Mind Alone is Separable (De Anima III 5) 5. The Argument that the Productive Mind Alone is Separable (De Anima III 5)
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6. Concluding Assessment—Mind the Gap 6. Concluding Assessment—Mind the Gap
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Notes Notes
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Bibliography Bibliography
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13 Aristotle on the Separability of Mind
Get accessFred D. Miller Jr. is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy and Executive Director of the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green State University.
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Published:06 November 2012
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Abstract
In De Anima, Aristotle addresses the problem of whether the mind is separable from the body. In book I, he broaches the broader question of whether the affections of the soul, including emotion, desire, and perception, are separable from the body. In book II, Aristotle follows his explication of the general definition of the soul with the remark that “neither the soul nor certain parts of it, if it naturally has parts, are separable from the body. Yet nothing prevents some [parts from being separable], because they are not the actualizations of any body.” By “parts,” Aristotle means separable faculties or powers, including nutrition, perception, mind, and desire. The issue of separability is signalled at the beginning of the treatment of mind in book III. If mind alone turned out to be separable from the body, the study of the soul would not belong exclusively to physics but would spill over into first philosophy. This would imply either that psychology consists of two separate sciences, or else that first philosophy and physics are not mutually exclusive.
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