Contributors

Bernard Berofsky is Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. He is the author of Liberation from Self (1995), Freedom from Necessity (1987), and Determinism (1971), as well as articles on the subjects of free will, moral responsibility, autonomy, determinism, and causality. His works have appeared in various journals, including American Philosophical Quarterly, Mind, Journal of Philosophy, Nous, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. He serves on the Editorial Board of the Journal of Philosophy. Department of Philosophy, 705 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, 1150 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, NY 10027.

Robert C. Bishop holds a research position in philosophy of science and physics in the Abteilung für Theorie und Datenanalyse of the Institut für Grenzgebiete der Psychologie (Freiburg, Germany). His current areas of research are philosophy of science, conceptual foundations of physics, free will, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of social science. His writings on determinism, chaos, free will, and emergence include the co-authored “Is Chaos Indeterministic?” (Selected Contributions to the Tenth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, 1999). Institut fur Grenzgebiete der Psychologic, Wilhelmstrasse 3A, D-79098, Freiburg, Germany.

Randolph Clarke is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Georgia. He has published a number of articles on action theory and free will, including “Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will” (1993), “Indeterminism and Control” (1995), and “Agent-Causation and Event-Causation in the Production of Free Action” (1996). Department of Philosophy, University of Georgia, Athens GA 30602. E-mail: [email protected]

Daniel Dennett is Distinguished Professor of Arts and Sciences and Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University. He is the author of numerous books and articles, including, on the topic of free will, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (1984), “Mechanism and Responsibility” (1973), “On Giving Libertarians What They Say they Want” (1978), and “I Could Not Have Done Otherwise. So What?” (1984). Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford MA 02155.

Richard Double is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Edinboro University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of three books, The Non-reality of Free Will (1991), Metaphilosophy and Free Will (1996), and Beginning Philosophy (1999). He has authored over sixty articles and reviews on the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics and is nearing completion of a fourth book, The Elusiveness of Morality. Department of Philosophy, Edinboro, University, Edinboro, PA 16444. E-mail: [email protected]

Laura Waddell Ekstrom is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia. She is author of Free Will: A Philosophical Study (2000) and the editor of Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom (2001). Her articles on autonomy, causation, responsibility, and free will have appeared in Synthèse, American Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Department of Philosophy, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187–8795. E-mail: [email protected]

John Martin Fischer is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the University Honors Program at the University of California, Riverside. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Cornell University in 1982. He is author of numerous papers on free will, moral responsibility, death, and issues in ethics, is the editor or coeditor of five volumes, and is author of two books, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control (1994) and (with Mark Ravizza) Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (1998). Department of Philosophy, University of California-Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521.

Carl Ginet is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Cornell University. He is the author of two books, Knowledge, Perception and Memory (1975) and On Action (1990) and numerous articles. Philosophy Department, Goldwin Smith Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853. E-mail: [email protected]

Ishtiyaque Haji is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota, Morris. He is the author of articles in ethical theory, metaphysics, and action theory, and of the book Moral Appraisability (1998). Department of Philosophy, Division of Humanities, University of Minnesota-Morris, Morris, MN 56267. E-mail: [email protected]

David Hodgson is Chief Justice in Equity and an Additional Judge of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Although his career has been in the law, he has had a long interest and involvement in philosophy. He has published two philosophical books with Oxford University Press, Consequences of Utilitarianism (1967) and The Mind Matters (1991), and in recent years he has published many articles on consciousness, plausible reasoning and free will. Supreme Court of New South Wales, Queen's Square, Sydney, NSW 2000, Australia. E-mail: [email protected]

Ted Honderich is Grote Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at University College, London. He is author of A Theory of Determinism (2 volumes; 1988), How Free Are You? (1993) and editor of Essays on Freedom and Action (1973) among many other writings on free will, mind and body, and other philosophical topics. Department of Philosophy, University College-London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK. E-mail: [email protected]

Robert Kane is University Distinguished Teaching Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of Free Will and Values (1985), Through the Moral Maze (1994), The Significance of Free Will (1996), (which was awarded the 1996 Robert W. Hamilton Faculty Book Award) and other writings in the philosophy of mind and action, ethics, the theory of values and philosophy of religion. Department of Philosophy, Waggener Hall 316, The University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712. E-mail: [email protected]

Tomis Kapitan is professor of philosophy at Northern Illinois University. He has taught at Birzeit University and East Carolina University and has recently been a visiting professor at the American University of Beirut. He is author of Philosophical Perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (1997) and co-editor of The Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness (1999). He has published papers in metaphysics, logic, and the philosophy of language, including “Deliberation and the Presumption of Open Alternatives” (1986), “Doxastic Freedom: A Compatibilist Alternative” (1989), and “Autonomy and Manipulated Freedom” (2000) and is currently writing a book dealing with the free will problem. Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115. E-mail: [email protected]

Benjamin Libet is Professor in the Department of Physiology at the University of California, San Francisco. He received a Ph.D. in neurophysiology, supervised by Ralph Gerard (founder and Honorary President of the Society for Neuroscience). Libet also worked with K.A.C. Elliott on brain metabolism and with Sir John Eccles on synaptic mechanisms. In 1958 he began a series of highly influential experimental studies in human subjects relating brain activities to the appearance or production of conscious experience. Department of Physiology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA 94143–0444.

Alfred R. Mele is William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. He is the author of Irrationality (1987), Springs of Action (1992), Autonomous Agents (1995), and Self-Deception Unmasked (2000). He is also the editor of The Philosophy of Action (1997) and co-editor of Mental Causation (1993). Department of Philosophy-1500, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306. E-mail: [email protected]

Timothy O'Connor is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University. He has written extensively on the topic of free will, editing Agents, Causes, and Events (1995) and authoring Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will (2000). He has also written on the concept of emergence as applied to the philosophy of mind and is currently writing a book on the metaphysics of modality and its application to the cosmological argument for theism. Department of Philosophy, Indiana University, Sycamore Hall 026, Bloomington, IN 47405. E-mail: [email protected]

Derk Pereboom is Professor and Chair in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Vermont. He received a BA from Calvin College and a Ph.D. from UCLA (1985) with a dissertation on Kant's Theory of Mental Representation. He is the author of Living Without Free Will (2001) and articles on Kant, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, and free will. Department of Philosophy, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 05401. E-mail: [email protected]

Paul Russell is Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia. He is the author of Freedom and Moral Sentiments: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility (1995). He has held a Research Fellowship at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge and also visiting positions at the University of Virginia, Stanford University, and the University of Pittsburgh. Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia, 1866 Main Mall, Vancouver B.C., Canada V6T 1Z1. E-mail: [email protected]

Saul Smilansky is Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Haifa, Israel. He works primarily on ethics and on the free will problem. His book Free Will and Illusion was published by Oxford University Press in 2000. Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel. E-mail: [email protected]

Galen Strawson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Reading. He is the author of three books, Freedom and Belief (1986), The Secret Connexion: Realism, Causation and David Hume (1989) and Mental Reality (1995), and he is the keynote author in Models of the Self, ed. S. Gallagher and J. Shear (1999). Department of Philosophy, University of Reading, Reading RG6 2AA, UK.

Christopher Taylor is Assistant Professor of Piano Performance, University of Wisconsin at Madison. He has a summa cum laude BA in mathematics from Harvard University (1992) and is completing a doctorate in Musical Arts at the New England Conservatory of Music. His piano recordings include a CD (Phillips) of works by Messiaen and Boulez which was released shortly after his third-place finish in the 1993 Van Cliburn competition. This is his first publication in philosophy. Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155.

Peter van Inwagen has been John Cardinal O'Hara Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame since 1995. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Rochester in 1969 and subsequently taught at Syracuse University for twenty-four years. He is author of An Essay on Free Will, Material Beings, God, Knowledge and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology, Metaphysics, Ontology, Identity and Modality, and numerous essays. Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556–5639. E-mail: [email protected]

Henrik Walter, M.D., Ph.D., is a neurologist, psychiatrist, and philosopher and has also studied psychology. In philosophy his writings on the problems of free will and intentionality include Neurophilosophie der Willensfreiheit (1998), translated into English and published by MIT Press as Neurophilosophy of Free Will (2001). Since 1998 he has been at the newly founded Psychiatric University Clinic doing clinical psychiatry and research in cognitive neuroscience on working memory, emotions, semantic information processing, and other topics. He will welcome serious proposals and collaboration to test philosophical theories on mental phenomena by doing neuroimaging experiments. Department of Psychiatry, University Clinic Ulm, Leimgrubenweg 12, 89075 Ulm, Germany. E-mail: [email protected]

David Widerker is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Bar-Ilan University in Israel. He has published widely on the topics of free will and moral responsibility, including “On an Argument for Incompatibilism” (Analysis, 1987), “Troubles with Ockhamism” (Journal of Philosophy, 1990), “Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities” (Philosophical Review, 1995), and “Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look” (Philosophical Perspectives, 2000). Department of Philosophy, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel. E-mail: [email protected]

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski is Kingfisher College Chair of the Philosophy of Religion and Ethics, University of Oklahoma and formerly Professor of Philosophy, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA. She is author of The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge (1991), Virtues of the Mind (1996), and many articles on philosophy of religion, epistemology, and ethics. Her current research is on theory of emotion and emotion-based virtue theory. Department of Philosophy, 455 West Lindsey, Room 605, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019. E-mail: [email protected]